Mexico’s new administration braces for shifting battle lines in the country’s gang wars

On 2 June, Claudia Sheinbaum was elected president of Mexico, succeeding Andrés Manuel López Obrador after his six-year term. Her victory unfolded amid escalating violence across the country, with the electoral process itself marred by unprecedented levels of violence targeting political figures. With 20,708 positions at stake across various governance levels, about 500 violent incidents targeting political figures occurred throughout January to November 2024, driven by power brokers and criminal groups seeking to coerce or co-opt politicians and ensure outcomes favorable to their interests.

Sheinbaum’s election took place against a backdrop of emerging and intensifying gang disputes, evidenced by an 18% increase in the lethality rate of clashes between non-state armed groups compared to 2023. While criminal groups continue to vie for control over drug trafficking, they have turned to other illicit activities to secure their financial sustainability — including extortion, human smuggling, and fuel theft — leading to heightened competition over illicit markets. 

Although violence remained concentrated in established hotspots such as Guanajuato, Nuevo León, and Michoacán, the first 11 months of 2024 saw the broadening of conflict zones, with violence exceeding levels recorded in all of 2023 in at least 14 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities. Internal splits within established criminal groups have been a significant driver of heightened levels of violence. The high-profile arrest of Sinaloa Cartel leader ‘El Mayo’ in the United States on 25 July triggered deadly power struggles between the Los Mayitos and Los Chapitos factions, with hundreds of people killed since September. The rift within the Sinaloa Cartel, which maintains a presence in at least 10 states,¹Aristegui Noticias, ‘Mapa | ¿Cuáles cárteles controlan más territorio en México y cuáles son sus pugnas internas?,’ 9 October 2024 has disrupted criminal dynamics elsewhere, with violence further spilling over into neighboring Chihuahua and Sonora. Meanwhile, in Tabasco, the fragmentation of the criminal landscape following a split within the local La Barredora group in December 2023²Peter Appleby, ‘¿Está México provocando una guerra criminal al enviar migrantes a Tabasco?’ InSight Crime, 18 October 2024 ignited disputes over control of migrant trafficking routes between local criminal groups as well as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).

The continued expansion of the CJNG has further exacerbated criminal disputes with local criminal groups and its main rival, the Sinaloa Cartel. In Guanajuato, rising violence was attributed to turf battles between the CJNG and Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (SRL), both vying for control of the lucrative fuel theft market. Their competition for fuel revenue has spilled over to neighboring Querétaro, a state where violence has traditionally been relatively contained.³Pablo Ferri, ‘Harfuch vincula la masacre de Querétaro con el asesinato de tres personas la semana anterior,’ El País, 12 November 2024 On 7 November, 10 people were killed in Los Cantaritos bar, likely in an attempt by the SRL to destabilize its rival.⁴Pablo Ferri, ‘La matanza de Querétaro fulmina la fantasía de los Estados santuario en México,’ El País, 12 November 2024 Meanwhile, in Chiapas, violence surged as the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG fought for control of the Guatemalan border and human trafficking routes. 

Amid intensifying confrontations, criminal groups’ use of explosives and remote violence doubled compared to the previous year, with particularly notable increases in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Guanajuato. Groups have used drone-delivered charges, grenades, homemade bombs, and improvised landmines, reflecting a worrying escalation in their tactics. Mexican groups have notably adapted commercial drones for combat use and adopted remote violence tactics from Colombian insurgent groups.⁵Keegan Hamilton and Kate Linthicum, ‘Soldiers and civilians are dying as Mexican cartels embrace a terrifying new weapon: Land mines,’ Los Angeles Times, 9 March 2024 This shift enables them to engage in asymmetric warfare, compensating for their strategic disadvantages in conflicts with rival groups and state forces while helping them assert their authority over local populations by instilling fear.

The government’s response under López Obrador remained largely unchanged despite increasing violence across various fronts. His “hugs, not bullets” policy — a term he coined during his presidential campaign in 2018 and which prioritizes social programs and restrained intervention over direct confrontation with criminal groups — has been criticized by some as an agreement tacitly allowing gangs to operate as long as violence levels remain relatively controlled.⁶International Crisis Group, ‘The Generals’ Labyrinth: Crime and the Military in Mexico,’ 24 May 2024 While the strategy has contributed to a decrease in clashes between non-state armed groups and state forces, escalating violence indicators suggest that it has failed to bring a long-term reduction in violence and disrupt criminal groups’ operations sustainably.

What to watch for in 2025

Sheinbaum, who took office in October 2024, faces a reshuffling gang landscape and potentially heightened violence in the coming year. Ongoing conflicts among criminal organizations risk expanding into new areas, particularly in states with a significant Sinaloa Cartel presence amid the ongoing turf war between Los Mayitos and Los Chapitos. Major criminal outfits like the CJNG will likely exploit these internal rifts to support their territorial expansion. Reports have suggested that the CJNG may be seeking to form an alliance with Los Chapitos to challenge Los Mayitos in Zacatecas.⁷Luis Chaparro, ‘EXCLUSIVE | F.E.U.: The Deadly Alliance Between ‘Los Chapitos’ And ‘El Mencho,’’ SAGA, 18 October 2024 Such an alliance could exacerbate violence not only in territories internally contested by the Sinaloa Cartel but also in regions where the CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel are locked in disputes. At most, the CJNG will capitalize on the Sinaloa Cartel’s weakening position to expand its territorial control, particularly in areas of ongoing conflict with rival groups, including Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Guerrero, while intensifying conflicts in locations like Aguascalientes, Querétaro, and Tabasco.

The conflict landscape in 2025 will also be shaped by the Sheinbaum administration’s emerging security strategy. Although Sheinbaum emphasizes social programs to address the root causes of violence, in alignment with her predecessor’s policy,⁸Associated Press, ‘Mexico’s president lays out a plan to combat cartel violence. But it looks like more of the same,’ 8 October 2024 there are signs she may be distancing herself from this rhetoric.⁹Pablo Ferri, ‘Balazos, detenciones y más coordinación: un mes de la estrategia de seguridad de Sheinbaum,’ El País, 4 November 2024 In her first months in office, ACLED records an increase in clashes between state forces and criminal groups, underlying the government’s likely attempt to project control amid rising violence across states. 

Furthermore, with Donald Trump re-elected as president, the US is likely to take a hardline stance toward Mexico. Trump and his allies have repeatedly called for harsh reprisals if Mexico fails to curb drug trafficking and migration flows, threatening mass deportations and a 25% tariff on Mexican goods if these issues persist.¹⁰Elías Camhaji, ‘Trump 2.0, mucho más peligroso para México: “La relación con Sheinbaum será escabrosa. Es tiempo de control de daños,”’ El País, 7 November 2024 While Sheinbaum has signaled a firm stance toward the incoming US administration,¹¹Simon Romero, ‘La presidenta de México responde a la amenaza de aranceles de Trump,’ The New York Times, 26 November 2024 she may face pressure to adopt a stricter approach toward criminal groups that includes high-profile arrests of cartel leaders. Meanwhile, Republican leaders in the US, including Trump’s pick for national security adviser, have floated the idea of using military force within Mexico to target drug kingpins and curb fentanyl trafficking. Such actions could exacerbate the fragmentation of the criminal landscape, fueling internal power struggles and intensifying clashes between rival factions. 

The US approach to migration may also inadvertently impact Mexico’s security landscape. Stricter US policies aimed at limiting migration flows could make human trafficking an increasingly lucrative endeavor for Mexican criminal organizations. It could enable gangs to finance internal conflicts and expand their control, driving further violence as groups fight to protect these profitable routes from both rivals and law enforcement.

Concerns also persist over the potential militarization of Sheinbaum’s security strategy. Just before the end of López Obrador’s term, the National Guard — a purportedly non-militarized security force created in 2019 — was placed under the Ministry of National Defense.¹²Fabiola Sánchez, ‘Mexico’s Congress puts National Guard under military command despite criticism. Why does it matter?’ Associated Press, 25 September 2024 In the administration’s early months, National Guard deployments have increased, particularly in areas with high levels of violence. This trend suggests a potentially greater role for both the National Guard and the military in the state’s security strategy, a development that raises concerns about potential human rights abuses.¹³United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), ‘Mexico: UN experts concerned over upcoming constitutional reform proposal implying greater role of Armed Forces in public security,’ 24 September 2024 For instance, in Chiapas, military personnel were criticized for mistakenly killing six migrants in a truck they believed was transporting drugs.¹⁴Emiliano Rodríguez Mega and James Wagner, ‘El ejército mexicano dispara fatalmente a 6 migrantes,’ The New York Times, 2 October 2024 Civil society organizations have also criticized the reappointment of the human rights commissioner, María del Rosario Piedra Ibarra, who has been accused of partisanship in line with the ruling party, Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, and failing to adequately address human rights issues,¹⁵Gloria Leticia Díaz, ‘Reelección de Rosario Piedra es repudiada por organizaciones de la sociedad civil,’ Proceso, 13 November 2024 particularly forced disappearances.¹⁶UNOHCHR, ‘UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances publishes findings on Mauritania, Nigeria, Mexico and Netherlands,’ 3 October 2023

The risk to civilians remains high. Mexico continues to be the second-most dangerous country in the world for civilians, particularly in light of its limited mechanisms to oversee state use of force. Judicial reforms initiated under López Obrador, among them the popular election of judges set for June 2025,¹⁷The Guardian, ‘Mexico to pursue judicial elections plan after top court fails to block reform,’ 6 November 2024 could further exacerbate risks for civilians, including political figures. This reform could expose candidates who may be more vulnerable to partisan or criminal influence, incentivizing gangs to penetrate state institutions through targeted attacks or co-optation. In the long term, increased criminal influence in judicial institutions could contribute to rising impunity, further eroding public trust and security.

In 2025, Mexico is set to experience heightened violence, with the CJNG capitalizing on the Sinaloa Cartel’s fragmentation to expand its control in key conflict zones. Sheinbaum’s government may adopt more aggressive security measures, but ongoing US pressure and potential militarization could destabilize the situation further. Beyond security operations, persistent criminal influence in local government and the judiciary will continue to undermine long-term stability and limit progress in curbing gang violence.