Prior to 7 October 2023, the Middle East was experiencing a period of general political détente, symbolized by the rapprochement between Gulf countries and Iran on one hand,¹Parisa Hafezi, Nayera Abdallah, and Aziz El Yaakoubi, ‘Iran and Saudi Arabia agree to resume ties in talks brokered by China,’ Reuters, 11 March 2023; Reuters, ‘UAE, upgrading ties with Iran, says envoy to return to Tehran within days,’ 21 August 2022 and ongoing normalization efforts with Israel on the other.²Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Ambassador Hesham Youssef, Robert Barron, Adam Gallagher, ‘Is a Saudi-Israel Normalization Agreement on the Horizon?,’ United States Institute of Peace, 28 September 2023 This thawing of tensions between regional powerhouses went hand in hand with a notable decline in armed activity attributed to militias and groups linked to the Iran-led Axis of Resistance (AoR) across Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran in 2023 compared to the previous year.³In fact, only Syria saw a slight increase in the activity of Assad’s forces. Away from Israeli ground operations in Palestine and Lebanon, the balance of power within the AoR shifted significantly. The Houthis emerged as a prominent regional force, capitalizing on Hezbollah’s setbacks in Lebanon. Iraqi militias engaged with the US and Israel on a limited scale, and while the Assad regime in Syria largely refrained from direct involvement in the conflict, it was removed definitively from the equation with its rapid collapse in early December in the face of lightning rebel advances. Iran was drawn into its first-ever direct confrontations with Israel, its regional standing diminishing as a result.

In the aftermath of 7 October, the Houthis emerged as the self-proclaimed champions of the Palestinian cause, upsetting the balance of power within the AoR to the detriment of Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias. Yemen’s key geographical position, combined with an asymmetric warfare strategy, provided the Houthis with disproportionate deterrence power.⁴Indeed, both Tehran and Hezbollah indicated that retaliatory actions against Israel would be undertaken by the Houthis and the Iraqi militias to avoid all-out war and regional escalation. See Hanin Ghaddar, ‘What Did Nasrallah Really Say, and Why?,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 November 2023 Since November 2023, the Houthis have disrupted global trade in the Red Sea,⁵John Power, ‘Houthi Red Sea attacks still torment global trade, a year after October 7,’ Al Jazeera, 5 October 2024 launching over 290 attacks⁶Of these attacks, around 90 had an unclear target and 45 remain uncorroborated by non-Houthi sources. Around 45% of the recorded attacks were intercepted. involving at least 165 ships. Additionally, newly acquired drone and missile technology has enabled them to target Tel Aviv with greater accuracy, prompting the first-ever Israeli airstrikes on Yemeni soil, the latest occurring in September 2024. Domestically, this strategic shift has contributed to a reduction in the group’s frontline activity.

In Iraq, the Islamic Resistance emerged as a new ‘facade’ group for pro-Iran militias in October 2023, claiming responsibility for shelling and drone attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria. Its activities escalated continuously until January 2024, when a drone attack on a US military outpost in Jordan resulted in the reported deaths of three American soldiers. In the aftermath, Kataib Hizbullah announced a suspension of hostilities.⁷Al Jazeera, ‘Kataib Hezbollah announces halt of attacks on US forces,’ 31 January 2024 Since then, the Islamic Resistance has conducted sporadic attacks, primarily drone operations against Israel, which intensified in September following Israel’s launch of Operation Northern Arrows, continued in October, skyrocketed following Israel’s 26 October attack on Iran, and gradually ceased in November.⁸Ameer al-Kaabi, Michael Knights, and Hamdi Malik, ‘Iraqi Militias Downscaling Their Anti-Israel Actions,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 November 2024 Alongside the Houthis, the Islamic Resistance claimed dozens of drone and missile attacks against Israel, yet it appeared more vulnerable to the threat of US and Israeli retaliation.

Syria remained a key battleground for Israel and the United States to confront the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran, enabling retaliation without direct regional escalation. The Assad regime, for its part, shied away from an open confrontation with Israeli forces, yet this neutral stance ultimately did not preserve its hold on power. On 27 November, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies launched a military campaign that resulted in the fall of Syria’s main cities and the end of the Assad family’s 50-year rule. Neither Hezbollah, weakened by the Lebanon conflict and constrained by the recent ceasefire agreement with Tel Aviv, nor Syria’s foreign sponsors, Iran and Russia, came to the rescue of Assad’s crumbling regime during HTS’s flash offensive. Israel instead carried out airstrikes targeting Assad’s military infrastructure and chemical weapons sites. Overall, Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah and pro-Iran positions in Syria more than doubled in 2024, also involving a series of targeted assassinations of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders culminated in the April 2024 strike on Iran’s embassy in Damascus.⁹Amwaj Media, ‘Inside story: Iran declares ‘new equation’ as all eyes on Israel’s next move,’ 14 April 2024 

The latter incident triggered Iran’s first direct attack on Israel soon after. Tehran launched over 300 drones and missiles, prompting a low-profile Israeli retaliation. A second escalation occurred in October after Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, leading to Tehran’s launch of more than 180 ballistic missiles toward Israel. In response, the Israeli Air Force targeted Iranian military sites for the first time. These clashes followed a controlled escalation approach, resulting in limited casualties and damage. Yet, the escalation redefined the rules of engagement between Israel and Iran, setting a dangerous historical precedent and pushing the region to the brink of all-out war.

Statements by the United States Biden administration suggesting that the Middle East was at its quietest in a decade stand in stark contrast to the sharp escalation of US regional activity in 2024.¹⁰Gal Beckerman, ‘The Middle East Region Is Quieter Today Than It Has Been in Two Decades,’ The Atlantic, 7 October 2023 Armed activity recorded during the first 11 months of 2024 already surpasses the total for 2023. In fact, Washington was further drawn into the Middle East. American attacks have struck pro-Iran militias in Syria. Aiming to curb Houthi threats in the Red Sea, the US led an international coalition to protect navigation routes, alongside an aerial campaign in Yemen targeting Houthi infrastructure to weaken the group’s missile and drone capabilities. The latter operation involved the highest monthly number of US airstrikes recorded by ACLED since 2018, yet it hardly achieved the goal of degrading Houthi military infrastructure.

What to watch for in 2025

Over the past decade, Iran and the AoR exerted significant deterrence vis-a-vis Israel, with Tehran’s ‘ring of fire’¹¹Daniel Sobelman, ‘Israel, Gaza, and Iran’s “Ring of Fire,”’ Lawfare, 8 September 2024 and the prospect of coordinated regional strikes seen by Tel Aviv as a sub-nuclear threat.¹²Eyal Zamir, ‘Countering Iran’s Regional Strategy: A Long-term, Comprehensive Approach,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8 May 2022 Indeed, Hamas 7 October attack shook Israel’s sense of invincibility and rallied AoR support from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. Yet, this support proved largely symbolic as Iran and Hezbollah sought to avoid full-scale war, and other AoR actors offered limited direct engagement. The strategic balance now favors Tel Aviv, as two of Iran’s key security pillars — regional influence through AoR non-state actors and missile and drone capabilities¹³Ali Vaez, ‘Iran’s Year of Living Dangerously: How the Failure of Tehran’s Strategy Is Raising Its Appetite for Risk,’ Foreign Affairs 11 October 2024 — appear strained.

Undoubtedly, Israel’s operations in Lebanon and Gaza have weakened the AoR’s ‘ring of fire,’ reducing the short- to mid-term threat posed by Hamas and Hezbollah. The sudden and unexpected collapse of the Syrian regime has dealt a further blow to Iran’s ‘forward defense’ strategy. Iran has long invested in Syria, with the country serving as a land corridor to deliver logistical and armed support to Hezbollah.¹⁴Etana Syria, “Explainer: Iran in Syria Today,” 9 December 2024 While Assad’s fall represents a major strategic setback, Tehran has already signaled the will to maintain relations with Syria,¹⁵Amwaj, “Iran signals desire to maintain ties with Syria after Assad’s fall,” 9 December 2024 in an effort to preserve its foothold in the region. Israel, on the other hand, seized a buffer zone in the Golan Heights and it is likely to continue its airstrikes to curb Iranian influence at its borders. Lastly, Syria’s new rulers, once united in opposition to Assad, now face a new reality that could fuel further internal fragmentation and instability, impacting the broader Middle East.

The situation in Iraq is even more uncertain. Israel’s 26 October attack on Iran drew unanimous condemnation from Shiite Iraqi actors, yet deep internal fractures persist between them. Intra-Shiite violence resurged after the December 2023 provincial elections, and potential early elections with the Sadrists may threaten Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s position.¹⁶Amwaj Media, ‘Amid new intra-Shiite dynamics, Sadr signals return to Iraqi politics,’ 2 May 2024 In 2024, Sudani initiated a rapprochement with Turkey and agreed with Washington on a phased US troop withdrawal while pledging to strengthen the role of the Iraqi forces against the Islamic State (IS).¹⁷Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Tara Copp, ‘Wrapping up mission, US troops will leave some longstanding bases in Iraq under new deal,’ The Associated Press, 27 September 2024 However, the resurgence of IS and increased attacks by pro-Iran militias against Israel and the US are straining the government,¹⁸US Department of State, ‘Secretary Blinken’s Call with Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani,’ 5 November 2024 and Israel has threatened strikes if attacks originate from Iraqi soil.¹⁹Middle East Monitor, ‘US warns Iraq over potential Israel strike in response to Iran attack from its soil,’ 7 November 2024

The Houthis’ support for Palestine has won them consensus regionally and across Yemeni political factions, boosting recruitment. The group has consolidated its grip on civil society and strengthened its ranks in Yemen by exploiting the relative calm on domestic frontlines. A resumption of hostilities — especially around Marib and the West Coast — remains a potential leverage point in negotiations with regional and international actors. The Houthis pledged to reassess Red Sea operations if Israeli actions in Gaza cease.²⁰Reuters, ‘Houthis say they can reassess Red Sea attacks if Israeli ‘aggression’ stops,’ The Jerusalem Post, 27 February 2024 A temporary halt of the attacks is probable in the event of a ceasefire, and Saudi Arabia — eager to exit the Yemen war and pressured by Houthi threats to oil infrastructure²¹With advanced missile and drone capabilities, the Houthis have shifted from deterrence to compellence, as evidenced by the recent economic de-escalation agreement that Saudi Arabia brokered under Houthi pressure. See X_@abdusalamsalah, 23 July 2024. — may resume discussions on the United Nations peace roadmap.²²United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, ‘Update on efforts to secure a UN roadmap to end the war in Yemen,’ 23 December 2023 Despite the group’s pro-Palestine rhetoric, drone and missile attacks in the Red Sea primarily aim to maximize Houthi power in Yemen and will remain a long-term threat. 

With the AoR weakening and missile attacks on Israel proving less effective, Iran’s deterrence appears diminished and may prompt a strategic shift. From the start of the Gaza crisis, Tehran has signaled a desire to stay out of the conflict, quickly de-escalating tensions after each round of attacks. Additionally, President Masoud Pezeshkian expressed a willingness to engage the West to lift sanctions.²³Amwaj Media, ‘Iran projects unity, openness to talks as Trump wins elections,’ 11 November 2024 Tehran will likely seek to end direct confrontations with Israel and return to indirect confrontations through AoR members. Meanwhile, it may be tempted to go all-in on developing a nuclear deterrent to strengthen its position in future negotiations with the US administration.²⁴Ali Vaez, ‘Iran’s Year of Living Dangerously: How the Failure of Tehran’s Strategy Is Raising Its Appetite for Risk,’ Foreign Affairs, 11 October 2024

Conversely, Israel may seek to capitalize on its military advantage to strengthen its deterrence posture, potentially through new strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, targeting militia activity in Syria and Iraq, and attempting to decapitate the Houthi leadership in Yemen. Implementing these threats will also depend on the stance of the new US administration. Donald Trump’s victory in the recent presidential elections adds a layer of unpredictability to the Middle Eastern equation despite his unwavering support for Israel and an arguably isolationist stance.²⁵Yossi Melman, ‘Unpredictable Trump Is Not in Netanyahu’s Pocket,’ Haaretz, 10 November 2024; Amwaj Media, ‘Apprehension in Iran as Trump returns to power,’ 7 November 2024

Trump’s immediate priority will likely be ending the conflicts in Lebanon and Palestine, with little focus on long-term regional strategy and an effort to decouple the Palestinian file from the broader Middle East agenda. He may reinstate a ‘maximum pressure’ policy on Iran,²⁶Although this strategy previously failed to secure a nuclear deal. See Richard Nephew, ‘Easier Said than Done: Renewing Maximum Pressure on Iran,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2024 maintain US support counter-terrorism and Israeli operations in Syria, and bolster local forces in Iraq while pursuing a gradual drawdown of troops. Trump’s transactional ties with Gulf countries — centered on security, economic deals, and normalization with Israel²⁷Ahmed Morsy, ‘The Return of the “Disruptor-in-Chief”?’ Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 7 November 2024  — will probably dictate his approach toward Yemen. This will entail curbing the Houthi threat in the Red Sea through sanctions, international coordination, and support for regional partners, particularly those backed by the United Arab Emirates.