Conflict Watchlist 2025 | Pakistan

Militants thrive amid political instability in Pakistan

Posted: 12 December 2024

In 2024, Pakistan experienced one of the most violent years in over a decade as it grappled with fractious politics and rising militancy from Baloch separatists and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The national and provincial elections in February failed to restore order and were marred by widespread allegations of military manipulation to keep former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party out of power.¹ While independent candidates aligned with the PTI secured the highest number of parliamentary seats, Khan remained imprisoned. In March, Shehbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz — widely seen as the military’s preferred party — was appointed prime minister and formed the new government. This led to an unprecedented breakdown in civil-military relations, marking the lowest point in the country’s history and sparking a political crisis.

Pakistan’s violent landscape stretches beyond the country’s political instability. According to the ACLED Conflict Index, Pakistan ranks 12th among the world’s most extreme conflicts in 2024, and over a fifth of its population is exposed to violence. Nearly 85% of this violence was concentrated in the border provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the respective strongholds of Baloch separatists and the TTP.

In Balochistan, ACLED records double the separatist activity for the first 11 months in 2024 compared to the entire previous year, as Baloch separatists intensified their ongoing insurgency against the Pakistani government, which they accuse of exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources.² Violence increased in the run-up to national and provincial elections when separatists enforced a boycott by attacking polling infrastructure during voting.³ High levels of violence continued through the rest of the year, indicating the separatists’ increased armed and organizational strength. The insurgency also became increasingly ethnocentric amid rising violence targeted against ‘outsiders’ — mainly Punjabi laborers. Punjabi laborers, scapegoated for Pakistan’s Punjabi-dominated political and military institutions, faced more targeted violence in the first 11 months of 2024 alone than in all the years combined since ACLED began covering Pakistan in 2010. Attacks targeting Chinese nationals working on projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, also increased in 2024.

In neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, political violence remained at persistently high levels throughout 2024 amid continuing TTP activity and increased attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) group, a breakaway TTP faction. Among these groups, the TTP carried out the most attacks, maintaining its stronghold in the twin districts of North and South Waziristan bordering Afghanistan and making inroads into the Lakki Marwat district bordering Punjab province. Most of the TTP and HGB attacks targeted security forces, whom they seek to drive out of the province to take control of tribal lands.⁴ An increasing number of attacks targeted off-duty police officers.

For its part, ISKP waged several attacks against civilians, including the country’s sizable Shia population, religious minorities, tribal leaders, and politicians, who were suspected of having been targeted over differing interpretations of Islam. In Kurram district, a northwestern region bordering Afghanistan, clashes between Shia and Sunni tribal groups left hundreds dead as of 30 November. Despite a ceasefire negotiated by the government and tribal leaders, hostilities persisted.⁵ ISKP called on its fighters to defend Sunni communities from Shia attacks, thus attempting to position itself in the conflict.⁶ Long-running sectarian tensions continue to plug into unresolved tribal land disputes, further fuelling a cycle of retaliatory killings.

The convergence of political instability and rising militancy has created a volatile environment with spillover effects in the region. As militant groups gained strength, violence surged, and border clashes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces tripled by October compared to the previous year. Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of providing a safe haven for the TTP, while Afghanistan has claimed that ISKP operates out of training centers in Pakistan.⁷ Although the two countries remained engaged in regular diplomacy,⁸ tensions between the two worsened markedly in 2024, further complicating an already dire situation.

What to watch for in 2025

The contentious domestic political situation will likely create more opportunities for militants to make gains by exploiting local anger in 2025. It will also make it more difficult for the government to engage in a political dialogue or mount a unified challenge against militants.

Balochistan, which is home to a disaffected population that has been unsuccessful in effecting change through the ballot box or peaceful protests, provides fertile ground for militants.⁹ The state has shown little interest in engaging politically with the issue of Baloch separatism, painting peaceful activists with the same brush as militants.¹⁰ The federal government’s recent decision to launch a “comprehensive military operation” in the province also gives a hint of its chosen approach to tackling separatist violence.¹¹ In a context where experts believe that human rights violations by state forces are one of the key drivers fuelling the conflict,¹² an overly militarized response will only serve to strengthen the separatists, both by supporting their narrative and promoting recruitment. Any deployment of foreign security personnel, as pushed by China, could prove explosive in Balochistan, where separatism is viewed through the lens of anti-colonialism.¹³

Tackling militancy will prove to be even more challenging in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the PTI-led provincial government’s political differences with the national government and the military are likely to hinder efforts toward a unified approach. Security forces also face a hostile local population and weariness among their personnel,¹⁴ further diminishing the chances of strategic success for counter-insurgency operations beyond tactical victories. These chances are reduced even more by the government’s ambitious goal not only to dismantle militant groups and sanctuaries but also to eradicate extremism comprehensively, all while popular discontent and mass mobilization against military operations persist.¹⁵ The military’s emerging and imprecise use of drones and airstrikes, whose frequency may increase in 2025 due to rising militancy, also has the potential to lead to an escalation in civilian casualties and provoke further backlash.¹⁶

The TTP has positioned itself to make further gains in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2025, having already strengthened its presence in several districts where it has carried out patrols along major roads and established parallel local courts.¹⁷ Its public posturing, declaring a temporary ceasefire during the Pashtun National Jirga (meeting), and emphasizing that its targets remain security personnel and not civilians, also seems geared toward winning support among locals and entrenching its presence in the process.¹⁸ At the same time, closer ties between the TTP and the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), as suggested by a recent joint attack and TTP’s public statements in support of the LeJ,¹⁹ may allow the TTP to expand into Punjab province where the JuA and LeJ have strong networks. ACLED already records an increase in TTP activity in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province and an important political and economic hub. Increased militancy in Punjab would make the security situation a national problem.

ISKP has also set its eyes on Pakistan, recently expanding propaganda in Pashto and Urdu languages, widely spoken in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, that criticizes the TTP’s religious ideology.²⁰ Regional security could destabilize more if ISKP succeeds in attracting footsoldiers from the TTP, laying the ground for territorial clashes between the two groups. The HGB, which has so far rejected the TTP’s overtures to form an alliance, could also emerge as a strong rival.²¹ In the past, Pakistan has tried to tackle militancy by pitting militant groups against each other.²² A repeat of this strategy, as implied by Afghanistan’s recent statements on Pakistan turning a blind eye to ISKP training camps in its territory, could prove dangerous.²³

ISKP is poised to benefit significantly from the recent resurgence of sectarian violence in Kurram District. Determined to confront Shia Muslims, ISKP is likely to exploit the sectarian divisions between the district’s Shia and Sunni populations to recruit Sunni members and launch attacks against Shia civilians. With the return of militants from the Zainabiyoun Brigade — Iran-backed Shia fighters previously active in Syria — and the resurgence of various Sunni militant groups, including the TTP, ISKP will likely intensify its activities in the area. If the government remains unable to mediate in this largely autonomous tribal district, sectarian conflict in Pakistan is likely to see a sharp increase next year.

The transnational nature of these challenges could drag Pakistan into broader regional conflicts. The recognition of the cross-border nature of the insurgent threat in Pakistan’s new anti-militancy operation, launched in June 2024,²⁴ sets the stage for a more interventionist approach should regional cooperation not materialize. Baloch separatism could spill over into tensions with Iran, as escalating separatist activity could increase pressure on Pakistan to crack down on Baloch armed groups, many of which operate from Iran. While Iran and Pakistan’s retaliatory cross-border airstrikes targeting militant hideouts were quickly contained earlier this year, they illustrate the continuing threat to regional security that Baloch separatism poses. At the same time, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are likely to escalate in the face of a resurgent TTP. As Pakistan increases controls along the disputed Durand Line border to control cross-border militant infiltration, border clashes can be expected to increase. It may also not find a partner in peace in the Taliban government, which has shown no signs of reducing support for the TTP.²⁵

Pakistan ranks 12th in the latest edition of our Conflict Index. To find out more, read our December 2024 Conflict Index results.

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Pearl Pandya

Pearl Pandya is the South Asia Research Manager at ACLED, having joined the organization in February 2022 as an India Researcher. In her current role, she oversees the South Asia research team and performs data review and analysis. Prior to joining ACLED, she worked on international law and human rights at the UN, and in local politics in India. Pearl holds a master’s degree in public international law from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a LL.B. from King's College London.

Zain Shah

Zain Shah is a Pakistan researcher at ACLED, covering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Gilgit-Baltistan. He joined the organization in November 2023. Currently pursuing an MA in International Governance and Diplomacy at Sciences Po, he also holds a dual BA in Middle Eastern Studies and International Relations from Sciences Po and the University of British Columbia. Zain previously held roles at the Hudson Institute, FDD, and CDA Institute, where he focused on foreign and security policy in the Middle East and South Asia, with a particular interest in governance and the intersection of Islam and politics.