Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger

In 2024, the central Sahel countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger continued to experience persistent high levels of violence. These countries grapple with an entrenched jihadist insurgency that continues to expand through the activities of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel). In 2024, JNIM and IS Sahel launched a spate of high-impact or mass-casualty attacks that targeted state forces, militias, and civilians with increasing lethality. In particular, the increase in air and drone strikes, IED attacks, rocket and mortar shellings underline a clear change in combat tactics.

Burkina Faso is engulfed in escalating armed conflict. JNIM launched large-scale offensives that involved a series of mass killings of soldiers, Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), and civilians, resulting in the death of hundreds of people in the Sahel, Center-North, and East regions. JNIM’s strong and violent presence in Burkina Faso’s eastern regions has transnational implications: In the coastal states of Benin and Togo, where JNIM has expanded its operations and consolidated its presence, violence has taken on new characteristics and proportions.

In Mali, Tuareg and Arab rebels of the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA) and JNIM militants defeated Wagner Group mercenaries and Malian troops (FAMa) near Tin Zaouatene, Kidal region, in late July. It marked the Wagner Group’s largest defeat on the African continent to date, after which JNIM launched a widespread offensive and coordinated attacks on Bamako. The defeat of Wagner and FAMa at Tin Zaouatene was followed by a sophisticated attack on Bamako in which JNIM fighters temporarily took control of the capital city’s international airport. This raid was a major symbolic setback for Wagner and FAMa, which had previously seized the rebel stronghold of Kidal in November 2023.

JNIM is deliberately trying to destabilize both the Burkinabe and Malian military regimes, as the group has clearly expressed in its media and propaganda in the wake of high-impact attacks. The group described the attacks in Bamako and Nassougou as disrupting the peace of the Malian regime and its Wagner allies¹X @SimNasr, 17 September 2024 and shaking the ruling elite in Ouagadougou.²X @SimNasr, 13 August 2024 In the wake of the Barsalogho massacre in August, when JNIM reportedly killed hundreds of people building trenches,³Youri van der Weide et al., ‘Barsalogho Massacre: How Defensive Trenches Became a Mass Grave,’ Bellingcat, 4 September 2024 a senior JNIM figure publicly criticized Burkinabe President Ibrahim Traoré for his involvement in mobilizing the civilian population in the fight against the militants.⁴X @SimNasr, 3 September 2024

For its part, Niger also faces increasing security challenges from multiple militant groups, particularly IS Sahel. IS Sahel consolidated its presence along the Niger-Mali border, in the north of the Dosso region, and through the infiltration of Kebbi and Sokoto states in northwestern Nigeria. These maneuvers were carried out by local Nigerian IS Sahel recruits, locally referred to as ‘Lakurawa’ in the Hausa language, as Nigerian authorities acknowledged in early November 2024.⁵Monsuroh Abdulsemiu, ‘DHQ declares “9 Lakurawa terrorists” wanted,’ The Cable, 7 November 2024 The response to this acknowledgment came swiftly as Nigerien forces carried out airstrikes, killing 10 Lakurawa militants on 19 November near the border village of Manseyka, Tahoua region.⁶Forces Armées Nigériennes – FAN, ‘Bulletin des activités opérationnelles des FDS au cours de la période du 17 au 20 Novembre 2024,’ 20 November 2024; Le Souffle de Maradi, ‘#NIGER/#NIGERIA/#DÉFENSE : UNE DIZAINE DE #LAKURAWA MIS HORS D’ÉTAT DE NUIRE PRÈS DE #MUNTSEKA !,’ 22 November 2024 Meanwhile, IS Sahel’s jihadist rival, JNIM, has been active in the southwestern parts of Niger’s Tillaberi region and has significantly expanded its operations in the southern part of Dosso, along the borders with Benin and Nigeria. In October, JNIM carried out its first recorded attack in the northern Agadez region in a clash with security forces near Assamakka. An attack at the end of October on a security checkpoint in Niamey’s Seno quarter shows that JNIM is capable of carrying out attacks by exploiting the vulnerabilities of Sahelian capitals — and that it has established a stable operational presence in the surroundings of Niamey and Bamako.

What to watch for in 2025

As we move into 2025, the central Sahel continues to experience persistent high levels of violence, with instability spreading geographically and evolving in nature. Particularly in Burkina Faso and Mali, state forces have reacted to jihadist groups’ escalating activity with retaliatory violence against civilians in an attempt to deter the civilian population from providing support to armed groups. Jihadist groups, for their part, are stepping up their community outreach and preaching efforts. By presenting themselves as protectors against state forces, Wagner mercenaries, and pro-government militias, JNIM and IS Sahel are consolidating their influence over the civilian population, which is increasingly trapped in areas under jihadist control.

The protracted conflict in the Sahel is increasingly affecting urban centers. This reflects broader regional dynamics in which rapid urbanization and the strategic targeting of these areas maximize the impact of militant attacks. Recent attacks on the capital cities of Bamako and Niamey demonstrate growing vulnerability in these urban environments.⁷Jean-Hervé Jezequel, ‘The 17 September Jihadist Attack in Bamako: Has Mali’s Security Strategy Failed?,’ ICG, 24 September 2024 The overlap between urban and rural areas creates complex security challenges as militant groups use less secure urban outskirts as gateways. Furthermore, technological advances in the conflict, particularly the increasing use of drone warfare and remote violence by non-state actors, pose an additional risk to human security and critical infrastructure.

Indeed, the use of drones by both state actors and non-state armed groups, including Wagner, JNIM, and CSP-DPA,⁸X @MENASTREAM, 1 January 2024; David Baché, ‘Mali: les rebelles du CSP combattent désormais avec des drones,’ RFI, 12 September 2024; Benjamin Roger and Emmanuel Grynszpan, ‘Dans le nord du Mali, les drones ukrainiens éclaircissent l’horizon des rebelles,’ Le Monde, 10 October 2024 represents a significant change to a conflict that had been characterized by traditional and rudimentary guerrilla warfare. The use of modified commercial drones for offensive operations is becoming more sophisticated and widespread as jihadist groups employ drone warfare not only for surveillance and reconnaissance but also for targeted strikes through drone-delivered explosives, including kamikaze drones. These drone warfare capabilities represent a major tactical advance; although they are emergent, they could be refined to extend operational reach. These capabilities enable precision strikes (in combination with other forms of remote violence), improved surveillance and monitoring, and more impactful media and propaganda operations.

Emerging alliances between Tuareg, Toubou, and other rebels across the borders of Mali and Niger, along with coalition-building between rebels within Niger, represent new variables in the conflict equation. Although these groups currently have limited influence compared to their jihadist counterparts, they could eventually preoccupy or overwhelm the military forces, which already face numerous serious threats.

The ripple effects of this regional instability can be observed in the neighboring states of Benin and Togo, where the advance of JNIM operations presents a deliberate and strategic expansion rather than mere spillover. Similarly, the border areas between Niger and Nigeria are becoming focal points of both JNIM and IS Sahel activity. These areas have served as retreats and safe havens for the two groups. Although both JNIM and IS Sahel are coercively influencing the local populations, JNIM is likely to continue its violent campaign to consolidate its influence in these border areas, especially in the south of Niger’s Dosso region, where the group claimed its first operations in 2024. Meanwhile, the exposure of IS Sahel’s presence in northwestern Nigeria puts pressure on both Nigeria and Niger to take military action, which could also provoke a response from IS Sahel militants who, covertly and overtly, have been infiltrating the region largely unimpeded since at least 2018. The challenge for the region’s governments will be to deal with these evolving threats in a way that prevents further destabilization and protects vulnerable populations from the violence that continues to spread across their territories.