Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Historical background

AQAP was established in January 2009 from the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda, following the Saudi branch’s relocation to Yemen in 2006. The group adopted an aggressive strategy towards the US, which prompted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to consider AQAP more dangerous to US security than the global franchise in fewer than two years after its creation.⁷Greg Miller, ‘CIA sees increased threat in Yemen,’ Washington Post, 25 August 2010 The instability that ensued after the 2011 uprising against then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime contributed to shifting AQAP’s focus on local operations. The political and security fragmentation allowed AQAP to take control of a number of towns in southern Yemen and establish the ‘Abyan emirate.’ The group controlled Zinjibar, the capital city of Abyan governorate, for more than a year.⁸International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,’ 2 February 2017 

Although the Yemeni military and allied resistance forces ousted AQAP from Zinjibar in 2012, the group was capable of exploiting renewed instability in 2015, during the military campaign led by the Houthi-Saleh alliance against the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). Occasionally, AQAP militants were reported to fight alongside IRG forces in Aden, al-Bayda, al-Dali, and Taizz. AQAP claimed a major success when its militants took over al-Mukalla, the capital city of Hadramawt governorate, which they held for a year until April 2016. During this period, the control of the revenues of al-Mukalla port and the looting of the local branch of the central bank significantly increased AQAP’s wealth.⁹Tawfeek Al-Ganad, Gregory D. Johnsen, and Mohammed al-Katheri, ‘387 Days of Power: How Al-Qaeda Seized, Held and Ultimately Lost a Yemeni City,’ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 5 January 2021

After being ousted from al-Mukalla and other areas of control by UAE-backed Yemeni forces in 2016, AQAP endured a period of sustained US drone strikes, while also confronting the Yemeni branch of the Islamic State. The ensuing depletion of its ranks forced AQAP into a period of retrenchment from 2019 to 2022. Since late 2022, AQAP has resumed regular operational claims with its activity focused on UAE-backed forces affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC). By referring to these forces as ‘UAE mercenaries,’ AQAP claims to be combating Western allies in the region. This renewed focus on Western interests is part of a strategic shift within the group, allegedly inspired by al-Qaeda’s de facto global leader Sayf al-Adl.¹⁰Hussam Radman and Assim al-Sabri, ‘Leadership from Iran: How Al-Qaeda in Yemen Fell Under the Sway of Saif al-Adel,’ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 28 February 2023 In this latest phase, AQAP is believed to be cooperating with Houthi forces to carry out drone strikes on UAE-backed forces (for more, see ACLED’s reports on the phases of AQAP’s wartime activity in 2020 and updated in 2023).¹¹Asim Taha al-Sabri, ‘The Houthis support al-Qaeda in Yemen with drones,’ Akhbar al-An, 19 May 2023; Asim Taha al-Sabri, ‘Who pushed Batarfi to attack Iran in his last appearance?,’ Akhbar al-An, 31 May 2023

After September 2023, AQAP activity steadily declined in Abyan and Shabwa, with only a few high-profile attacks. However, the onset of the Israel-Gaza conflict on October 7 prompted increased media activity by the group, including the revival of its Inspire magazine.¹²X @Dr_E_Kendall, 28 December 2023