Islamic State in Yemen

Historical background

ISY was established in November 2014 after a number of defectors from the militant jihadist group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) pledged allegiance to the global caliphate declared by IS.⁶Reuters, ‘Islamic State leader urges attacks in Saudi Arabia: speech,’ 13 November 2014 ISY quickly adopted a radical stance along the Sunni-Shiite sectarian divide and attempted to position itself as spearheading the fight against the Houthis. In March 2015, it carried out simultaneous suicide bombings targeting two Shiite mosques in Sanaa city that led to a total of 142 reported fatalities. The group’s brutal tactics proved to be divisive within its own ranks, with mass defections taking place by the end of 2015 as some members denounced violations of Islamic law.⁷Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, ‘Divisions emerge within the Islamic State’s Yemen ‘province’,’ Long War Journal, 23 December 2015; Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, ‘More Islamic State members reject governor of Yemen Province,’ 28 December 2015

Despite a number of high-profile attacks, ISY never took hold in Yemen. The group was largely seen as alien to Yemen’s social fabric due to the ruthless nature of its attacks and the fact that a sizable number of its fighters came from foreign countries.⁸United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 19 July 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ 19 July 2016, p.11 ISY also faced the challenge of finding a place within a jihadist environment already filled with the presence of well-rooted AQAP. Furthermore, if ISY initially gained traction following the successes of the IS in Iraq and Syria, the latter’s defeats later impaired the recruitment capacities of ISY. At its peak between 2016 and 2018, ISY was estimated to have no more than 500 fighters in its ranks.⁹United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 11 January 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ 13 January 2017, p.12; United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ 27 July 2018, p.10 

In 2018, the initial tacit pact of non-aggression between AQAP and ISY against their common Houthi enemy broke down, contributing to further depleting the group’s ranks between 2018 and 2020 (for more on clashes between AQAP and ISY, see this ACLED report). In August 2020, a Houthi offensive targeting ISY in its stronghold in al-Bayda governorate dealt the group its final blow, with the global IS spokesperson publicly admitting ISY’s defeat in October 2020.¹⁰Twitter @hxhassan, 18 October 2020 Since then, the group has been largely absent from Yemen’s conflict environment altogether, with ACLED recording only one violent event involving ISY over more than three years. However, there are reports of ISY trying to work on a new organizational structure. In May 2023, the group reportedly held a meeting with its senior members to that effect in Shabwa governorate.¹¹United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 24 July 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ 25 July 2023, p.15 

In August 2023, ISY pledged allegiance to Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the fifth caliph of IS.¹²Aymen al-Tamimi, ‘Caliphs of the Shadows: The Islamic State’s Leaders Post-Mawla,’ Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel, August 2023 However, as of September 2023, this change in leadership has not tangibly affected ISY’s organization or agenda.