Yemen Conflict Observatory
Regional Profile
Al-Mahra
Updated: 31 January 2024
More information
- Methodology
Territorial Control Maps
Territorial control maps are generated through the expert assessment of the Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO) team and they are updated on a quarterly basis. ‘Contested areas’ are defined on the district level (Admin2) and encompass active frontlines and territories disputed by the warring parties. Each map corresponds to a 'region' as defined by the YCO, potentially crossing governorate (Admin1) boundaries.
Links
Find links to relevant methodology docs below:
Coding decisions around the Yemen war
- A brief overview of ACLED’s coding and sourcing methodology for Yemen
- A brief overview of the most frequently asked questions by users of ACLED data
- Guides for using and accessing ACLED data and documentation for ACLED’s core methodology
This regional profile provides information about the al-Mahra governorate. For more on the YCO and the ACLED methodology on Yemen, see the ‘More information’ tab to the right.
Overview
Al-Mahra governorate is located in the southeastern part of Yemen. It shares a long – almost 300 kilometers – border with Oman to the east and another to Saudi Arabia in the north. Although the second largest governorate after neighboring Hadramawt at more than 67,000 km2, al-Mahra is the least populated governorate in mainland Yemen, with a population of about 175,600.1United Nations OCHA, ‘2023 Population Estimates,’ 2023 The capital of the governorate, Ghaydah, is situated on the southern coastline that stretches along the Arabian Sea, upon which the main seaport of Nishtun is located.
Due to its remote location, al-Mahra has been largely isolated from the wider conflict. However, it has been subject to the same foreign interventions that have influenced developments in the rest of the country. Although al-Mahra has traditionally been within Oman’s sphere of influence, Saudi and Emirati involvement has increased throughout the war, disrupting local tribal governance and dividing opinions.
A growing Saudi military buildup, in particular, has sparked a local backlash, but continues to expand, while also funding infrastructure projects and local military units in support of pro-Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) Governor Muhammad Ali Yassir to manage the competing factions. The appointment and replacement of the governors since 2015 have been influenced by external powers. Yassir had previously served as governor from December 2014 to November 2015, but was fired by then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi after he pushed back against plans of the United Arab Emirates to establish a new Elite Force in the governorate. He was, though, brought back in February 2020 after the Saudi-backed replacement, Rajih Bakrit, ran afoul of local groups,2The New Arab, ‘Hadi ousts the governor of Al-Mahra after the incidents at the Shahn port,’ 23 February 2020 Yassir was deemed a less divisive figure that could help defuse opposition and armed confrontations against the Saudi presence.3Al-Mahra Post, ‘Vice Chairman Of The Al-Mahra Sit-In Committee: The New Governor Is An Acceptable Figure, And Our Goal Is A Complete Exit From The Saudi Occupation,’ 23 February 2020
Interactive Map
This dashboard includes political violence events recorded within this YCO-defined region since the start of the regional conflict on 26 March 2015. By default, the map displays data for the period beginning with the UN-mediated truce, on 2 April 2022, up to the most recent week.
Filters on the left allow users to define a time range and analyze trends in more detail. The toggle at the bottom of the dashboard activates markers indicating relevant infrastructure such as oil fields, airports, and military camps.
Conflict background
Al-Mahra has been a relatively stable area during the country’s civil war. However, in recent years, the province has become increasingly militarized, with the arrival of forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the Gulf states pursue their diverging interests in the governorate. Although the foreign military presence has stirred local opposition, it has remained relatively calm compared to most of the rest of the country.
After the Houthis took over the capital of Sanaa in 2014, al-Mahra aligned itself with President Hadi and the IRG. When Houthi forces and troops loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh advanced into southern Yemen, Hadi fled from Aden to al-Mahra, which was seen as a safe and loyal governorate. He then crossed the border into Oman. The local authority in Mahra later supported the March 2015 launch of Operation Decisive Storm by the Saudi-led Coalition.
Al-Mahra had long been known as a smuggling zone, with routes along the Omani and Saudi borders as well as the Arabian Sea coastline. But it specific was concerns over the risk of Iranian weapons that could pose a potential direct threat to its territory4United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen report to the Security Council, January 2017 that precipitated the deployment of large numbers of Saudi troops and military equipment to al-Mahra’s main entry points in November 2017.
Tensions between the Saudi forces and locals in al-Mahra emerged from the start. By March 2018, Saudi forces had converted al-Ghayda airport into a military base and began employing Yemeni allies as security forces in the governorate.5Al-Mahrah Post, ‘An investigation into the details of the arrival of Saudi forces to al-Mahra and the transformation of al-Ghaydah airport into a military base,’ April 2019 New security measures were added at the facility and civilian flights were canceled. Other Saudi military bases were established at Nishtun port in early 2018, as well as other camps in Hat district, Lusick (in Hawf district), Jawdah (in Huswain district), and Darfat (in Sayhut district). But, similar to Suqutra, the deployments set off a series of protests against Saudi control of the airport, leading to their withdrawal as part of a deal with the local authorities.
The UAE, meanwhile, has tried to use the Southern Transitional Council (STC) to establish influence in al-Mahra. The inauguration of the southern party’s office in al-Ghaydah in October 2017 faced strong local resistance.6Southern Transitional Council, “President Al-Zubaidi Issues a Resolution on the Formation of the STC Local Headquarters in al-Mahra”, December 2017 The resistance was especially over reports that the STC was planning on establishing its own local security forces,7Aden al-Ghad, “Ben Afrar rejects the formation of security belt forces in Mahra and adheres to the demands of an independent region for Mahra and Socotra”, October 2017 a 4,000-strong force trained by the UAE in Hadramawt that would be based in al-Ghayda and Hawf districts, which quickly departed following local tribal protests. Since the UAE drawdown of its troops from Yemen in 2019, its footprint in al-Mahra has shrunk, though the STC has continued to try to build local support.
Protests against the presence of external actors, especially Saudi forces, remained a regular occurrence, peaceful for the most part, but there were some rare instances when the situation turned violent. In April and August 2019, Saudi attack helicopters carried out airstrikes against checkpoints set up by locals, but no casualties were reported. The next year, in February, clashes erupted after residents prevented the entry of Saudi forces to Shahan district’s Fujit area, injuring at least one protester and several members of the security forces. Other security incidents have also been relatively rare. Most notably, former governor Rajit Bakrit was targeted in an assassination attempt in April 2019 that wounded three of his bodyguards. However, these have been the exception.
Timeline
- 2015
- The UAE establishes the Mahri Elite Forces, but they are soon disbanded
- 2018
- Mar. | Heavy Saudi military deployment at al-Ghayda airport starts local protests against presence of external forces
- 2019
- Apr. | Governor Rajit Bakrit targeted in assassination attempt
- Apr. | Saudi Apaches use airstrikes to force removal of checkpoint blocking Saudi troops
Regional Context
Al-Mahra is a land of contrasts. The Empty Quarter, a vast desert, covers much of southern al-Mahra. However, the governorate also contains a mountainous region in the east that is seasonally covered with lush green foliage. The long coastline is rich in fish and marine life, and the governorate is also home to a number of natural resources, including gold, marble, granite, and black sand. The governorate has a distinctive commercial activity and is the main artery for Yemen’s trade with Gulf countries, primarily Oman via their shared border.
In August 2016, the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) stopped funding most non-essential public spending, including salaries for government employees. This led to the withdrawal of non-Mahri security forces and state employees from al-Mahra, leaving then-Governor Muhammad Ali to hand control of the main Shahin and Sarfait border crossings with Oman to local tribes. The closure of most of Yemen’s official points of entry during the conflict has made the border crossings with Oman increasingly important for traders shipping goods into the country.8Salisbury, ‘Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order,’ Chatham House, December 2017, pp.24-28 Although this has led to an increase in customs revenues, it has also resulted in a rise in corruption as the tribes accepted bribes to allow smugglers and importers to bring goods into the country.
In addition to funding additional security controls at the land and sea ports, Riyadh has also been trying to gain popular support by providing aid through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center and the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Authority. Their development work has covered a broad range from counter-terrorism and coast guard operations to renovating al-Ghayda’s hospital and building power stations. There have also been long-rumored alleged plans to build a controversial pipeline linking oil fields in eastern Saudi Arabia to a new oil terminal on the al-Mahra coast to export its oil via the Arabian Sea and bypass the Iranian-controlled Strait of Hormuz,9Al-Jazeera, ‘Saudi Arabia ‘to build oil port’ in Yemen’s al-Mahra: sources,’ August 2018 although so far these have yet to materialize. These have been the source of local unrest, but have not turned into the drivers of armed violence.