West Coast

Conflict background

Houthi forces seized control of al-Hudayda in late 2014 with little resistance as the group quickly expanded from Sanaa into other northern governorates, installing loyalists and securing strategic infrastructure, including the lucrative ports and oil terminals. However, soon after the start of its military intervention, the Saudi-led Coalition imposed a naval and aerial blockade on al-Hudayda and other West Coast ports, restricting the flow of humanitarian aid and goods into Houthi-controlled areas. Vessels seeking entry into Yemeni ports required government authorization and had to be inspected by coalition forces on the justification that it was enforcing a UN Security Council arms embargo against the Houthis.⁴UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2216,’ 14 April 2015, p. 5 However, this created weeks-long delays and increasing costs for shipping companies, reducing traffic to the Red Sea ports, exacerbating concerns about restrictions on the entry of aid to alleviate the humanitarian crisis⁵Human Rights Watch, ‘Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians,’ 7 December 2017 in the country and the risk of potential famine.⁶International Crisis Group, ‘Instruments of Pain (I): Conflict and Famine in Yemen,’ 13 April 2017, pp. 1-5 To help facilitate the flow of cargo, UNVIM went into effect in May 2016, steadily improving the rate of imports, although still far below pre-conflict levels.⁷Security Council Report, ‘In Hindsight: The Story of the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Yemen,’ 1 September 2016 

In early 2018, after over a year of little movement, a United Arab Emirates-led offensive on Yemen’s West Coast progressed north from Lahj, steadily making its way up the coastline and pushing Houthi forces back to al-Hudayda city in one of the largest operations mounted by the Coalition since the start of the conflict. The Emirati-supported Joint Forces, which encompassed the Giants Brigades and Tihama Resistance, reached the outskirts of their intended objective of al-Hudayda city by June 2018, besieging the critical port city, where Houthi forces had fortified themselves in preparation for a final battle.

Concerned over the potential humanitarian consequences of either an extended siege or a deadly assault on the populated city,⁸International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen: Averting a Destructive Battle for Hodeida,’ International Crisis Group, 11 June 2018, pp 7-8 the international community led by the UN managed to halt hostilities in July, eventually leading to a negotiated settlement – the Stockholm Agreement – which was formalized in December. A ceasefire came into effect in al-Hudayda governorate on 18 December 2018. The agreement fixed the frontlines on the outskirts of al-Hudayda city and in districts to the south, including al-Durayhimi, Bayt al-Faqih, al-Tuhayta, and Hays. 

There was negligible movement to these frontlines until November 2021, when the Joint Forces, frustrated by the internationally frozen frontlines and seeking to redistribute their resources to the active fronts in the conflict, unilaterally withdrew, retreating to the south of al-Hudayda.⁹The Yemen Review, ‘Coalition Falls Back in Hudaydah, Fighting Shifts South – The Yemen Review, November 2021,’ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 9 December 2021, pp. 4-6 The lines of control were re-established around Hays and al-Tuhayta districts. The frontlines have remained unchanged since then, with a low but persistent level of hostilities in the southern Hudayda districts. Ongoing incidents are typically characterized by artillery fire and drones being used to drop explosive shells on adversaries’ positions while the sides continue to accuse one another of launching occasional skirmishes and reconnaissance activity.

Although physically removed, Houthi forces posed a latent threat to Saleh’s stronghold in al-Mukha, which twice came under missile fire in 2021. Missiles and drones hit the port on 11 September, damaging storage units, and again hit the district on 10 November.¹⁰Al Jazeera, ‘Yemen gov’t says Houthis hit Red Sea aid port,’ Al Jazeera, 11 September 2021 However, there have been no long-range attacks on al-Mukha since the UN-mediated truce took effect in April 2022.

Beyond the frontlines, tensions have been simmering between rival factions within the Joint Forces, primarily driven by Saleh’s growing influence. Saleh has been acting as an unofficial governor in al-Mukha, replacing local officials with allies as he consolidates control from al-Khawkha down to the Bab al-Mandab strait. His actions have received some pushback from local groups, including the Tihama Resistance and Islah party-affiliated Taizz Military Axis, but none are in a position to challenge his UAE-backed dominance on the coast. In March 2022, Saleh inaugurated a political office, the Political Bureau of the National Resistance, which originated in al-Mukha and has since opened branches in Marib and Shabwa.