Yemen Conflict Observatory
Regional Profile

West Coast

Updated: 31 January 2024

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  • Methodology
Territorial Control Maps

Territorial control maps are generated through the expert assessment of the Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO) team and they are updated on a quarterly basis. ‘Contested areas’ are defined on the district level (Admin2) and encompass active frontlines and territories disputed by the warring parties. Each map corresponds to a 'region' as defined by the YCO, potentially crossing governorate (Admin1) boundaries.

Links

Find links to relevant methodology docs below:

Coding decisions around the Yemen war

  • A brief overview of ACLED’s coding and sourcing methodology for Yemen

Quick Guide to ACLED Data

  • A brief overview of the most frequently asked questions by users of ACLED data

Knowledge Base

  • Guides for using and accessing ACLED data and documentation for ACLED’s core methodology
Map of territorial control in Yemen's West Coast Region as fo January 2024

This regional profile provides information about the West Coast region, as classified by the YCO, which includes al-Hudayda governorate, western Taizz, western Lahij, and the Red Sea islands. For more on the YCO and the ACLED methodology on Yemen, see the ‘More information’ tab to the right.

Overview

The West Coast region runs along the Red Sea coastline, spanning the lower half of the coastal plain known as Tihama, stretching from the Bab al-Mandab strait up to al-Hudayda. Due to its proximity to international shipping routes, the region encompasses some of the main ports in the country, most notably at al-Hudayda city, which served as one of the primary maritime entry points for imports to northern Yemen before the start of the current hostilities.1World Food Programme, ‘Market Study YEMEN – 2010,’ 2010, pp. 31-34 

The port remains active, but with some restrictions as all vessels are required to undergo prior inspection via the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) in Djibouti.2UNVIM, ‘About UNVIM,’accessed on 29 September 2023 To the north of the city, Ras Isa was a central node in Yemen’s oil industry, and al-Salif is another key port in the area; both remain closed on account of the conflict. To the south, al-Mukha is a port city in western Taizz. The port was closed for over six years, but reopened to commercial vessels in August 2021, having received extensive Emirati investment.3Maged al-Madhaji, ‘Yemen’s West Coast: A look into politics, society and war along the Red Sea’, Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, 24 May 2021 

The Houthis maintain de facto control over the northern half of the West Coast, extending as far south as al-Tuhayta in southern al-Hudayda. The rest of the coastline is held by the Joint Forces under the command of Tariq Saleh, based out of the growing town of al-Mukha. The lines of control have been largely fixed in southern al-Hudayda since the unilateral withdrawal of the Joint Forces in late 2021. However, tit-for-tat hostilities persist on several hotspots along the current frontlines that run from al-Tuhayta on the coast inland to Hays and Jabal Ras.

Although ground fighting slowed starting in late 2021, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea provoked a US- and UK-led coalition to mount strikes on seven locations in western al-Hudayda in January 2024. Targets included the al-Hudayda airport, the Ras Isa area, Kilo 16, and the al-Katib Naval Base.

Interactive Map

This dashboard includes political violence events recorded within this YCO-defined region since the start of the regional conflict on 26 March 2015. By default, the map displays data for the period beginning with the UN-mediated truce, on 2 April 2022, up to the most recent week.

Filters on the left allow users to define a time range and analyze trends in more detail. The toggle at the bottom of the dashboard activates markers indicating relevant infrastructure such as oil fields, airports, and military camps.

Conflict background

Houthi forces seized control of al-Hudayda in late 2014 with little resistance as the group quickly expanded from Sanaa into other northern governorates, installing loyalists and securing strategic infrastructure, including the lucrative ports and oil terminals. However, soon after the start of its military intervention, the Saudi-led Coalition imposed a naval and aerial blockade on al-Hudayda and other West Coast ports, restricting the flow of humanitarian aid and goods into Houthi-controlled areas. Vessels seeking entry into Yemeni ports required government authorization and had to be inspected by coalition forces on the justification that it was enforcing a UN Security Council arms embargo against the Houthis.4UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2216,’ 14 April 2015, p. 5 However, this created weeks-long delays and increasing costs for shipping companies, reducing traffic to the Red Sea ports, exacerbating concerns about restrictions on the entry of aid to alleviate the humanitarian crisis5Human Rights Watch, ‘Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians,’ 7 December 2017 in the country and the risk of potential famine.6International Crisis Group, ‘Instruments of Pain (I): Conflict and Famine in Yemen,’ 13 April 2017, pp. 1-5 To help facilitate the flow of cargo, UNVIM went into effect in May 2016, steadily improving the rate of imports, although still far below pre-conflict levels.7Security Council Report, ‘In Hindsight: The Story of the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Yemen,’ 1 September 2016 

In early 2018, after over a year of little movement, a United Arab Emirates-led offensive on Yemen’s West Coast progressed north from Lahj, steadily making its way up the coastline and pushing Houthi forces back to al-Hudayda city in one of the largest operations mounted by the Coalition since the start of the conflict. The Emirati-supported Joint Forces, which encompassed the Giants Brigades and Tihama Resistance, reached the outskirts of their intended objective of al-Hudayda city by June 2018, besieging the critical port city, where Houthi forces had fortified themselves in preparation for a final battle.

Concerned over the potential humanitarian consequences of either an extended siege or a deadly assault on the populated city,8International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen: Averting a Destructive Battle for Hodeida,’ International Crisis Group, 11 June 2018, pp 7-8 the international community led by the UN managed to halt hostilities in July, eventually leading to a negotiated settlement – the Stockholm Agreement – which was formalized in December. A ceasefire came into effect in al-Hudayda governorate on 18 December 2018. The agreement fixed the frontlines on the outskirts of al-Hudayda city and in districts to the south, including al-Durayhimi, Bayt al-Faqih, al-Tuhayta, and Hays. 

There was negligible movement to these frontlines until November 2021, when the Joint Forces, frustrated by the internationally frozen frontlines and seeking to redistribute their resources to the active fronts in the conflict, unilaterally withdrew, retreating to the south of al-Hudayda.9The Yemen Review, ‘Coalition Falls Back in Hudaydah, Fighting Shifts South – The Yemen Review, November 2021,’ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 9 December 2021, pp. 4-6 The lines of control were re-established around Hays and al-Tuhayta districts. The frontlines have remained unchanged since then, with a low but persistent level of hostilities in the southern Hudayda districts. Ongoing incidents are typically characterized by artillery fire and drones being used to drop explosive shells on adversaries’ positions while the sides continue to accuse one another of launching occasional skirmishes and reconnaissance activity.

Although physically removed, Houthi forces posed a latent threat to Saleh’s stronghold in al-Mukha, which twice came under missile fire in 2021. Missiles and drones hit the port on 11 September, damaging storage units, and again hit the district on 10 November.10Al Jazeera, ‘Yemen gov’t says Houthis hit Red Sea aid port,’ Al Jazeera, 11 September 2021 However, there have been no long-range attacks on al-Mukha since the UN-mediated truce took effect in April 2022.

Beyond the frontlines, tensions have been simmering between rival factions within the Joint Forces, primarily driven by Saleh’s growing influence. Saleh has been acting as an unofficial governor in al-Mukha, replacing local officials with allies as he consolidates control from al-Khawkha down to the Bab al-Mandab strait. His actions have received some pushback from local groups, including the Tihama Resistance and Islah party-affiliated Taizz Military Axis, but none are in a position to challenge his UAE-backed dominance on the coast. In March 2022, Saleh inaugurated a political office, the Political Bureau of the National Resistance, which originated in al-Mukha and has since opened branches in Marib and Shabwa.

Timeline

  • 2014
    • Oct. | Houthi forces take control of Hudayda
  • 2016
    • Aug. | The Saudi-led Coalition imposes naval restrictions on the ports in Hudayda
  • 2017
    • Dec. | UAE-led offensive, Operation Golden Spear, is launched on the West Coast, reaching the outskirts of the Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah by June 2018
  • 2018
    • Dec. | UN-mediated Stockholm Agreement ends fighting in Hudayda
  • 2021
    • Nov. | Second Houthi drone and missile attack targets al-Mukha in three months
    • Nov. | Joint Forces unilaterally withdraw from al-Hudayda city, retreating to the south of the governorate
  • 2024
    • Jan. | Joint US-UK strikes in response to attacks in the Red Sea hit Houthi military sites on the west coast of al-Hudayda 

Regional Context

As a result of the years of fighting along the West Coast, the region, in particular, the south of al-Hudayda, is one of the areas in the country most heavily contaminated by explosive remnants of war. Despite the halt to hostilities, civilian casualties due to landmines and unexploded ordnances are still reported almost weekly, typically in the former frontline areas on the outskirts of al-Hudayda city and in districts to the south.

An offshore floating storage vessel for oil, the FSO Safer, had been in a state of worsening deterioration off the coast of al-Hudayda, threatening an environmental catastrophe to the Red Sea region in case of a leak. In August 2023, a UN-funded operation successfully transferred the oil from the decaying tanker onto a UN-owned replacement, called the Yemen.11International Maritime Organization, ‘FSO SAFER: Ship-to-ship transfer of oil completed,’ 21 August 2023 However, the removal of the FSO Safer, the sale of the transferred oil, and the use of the resultant revenues remain points of contention between the Houthis and the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG).

In addition to the FSO Safer, issues around al-Hudayda port have formed one of the central negotiating tracks between the warring parties. The tight control over imports, with all vessels undergoing inspection in Djibouti via UNVIM prior to entry, was a main point of contention for the Houthis, who repeatedly demanded all restrictions be lifted at the port. The constraints were finally loosened in February 2023 as a Coalition trust-building measure in talks with the Houthis, allowing the import of a broad range of previously prohibited commercial goods.12Khaled Abdullah and Adel al-Khadher, ‘Yemen’s Hodeidah receives first ship carrying general cargo in years amid truce push,’ Reuters, 26 February 2023 The IRG has called for the Hudayda port revenues to be put towards public-sector salary payments, accusing the Houthis of using the revenues to fund their war efforts instead.