Regional Overview
Asia-Pacific
June 2023
Posted: 6 July 2023
Cambodia: Crackdown on opposition before July elections
Ahead of the general election on 23 July, the Cambodian government has cracked down on the political opposition, independent media, and civil society in the country. While this has triggered some demonstration activity, repression under Prime Minister Hun Sen has limited people’s ability to protest. This repression can be seen in Hun Sen’s recent threats of violence on Facebook against those who question his party’s vote-buying in recent local elections; the threats led the social media company to recommend the suspension of his account in June.1Mike Ives and Sun Narin, ‘Cambodian Ruler’s Facebook Account Goes Dark After Spat With Meta,’ New York Times, 30 June 2023 In May, the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party, was disqualified from running in the upcoming elections for ostensibly failing to submit a verified copy of its original party registration document to the Ministry of Interior. However, the motivation for the disqualification has been widely seen as political. In February, the operating license of Voice of Democracy (VOD), a media outlet providing coverage of protests and human rights issues, was revoked. The media outlet sparked Hun Sen’s ire after publishing a report critical of his eldest son, Hun Manet.2Amnesty International, ‘Cambodia: Shuttering ‘Voice of Democracy’ outlet is attempt to slam door on independent media,’ 13 February 2023 The closure of VOD led to a series of protests by those concerned with the ongoing restrictions on freedom of expression.3Radio Free Asia, ‘Khmer Thavorak, NagaWorld Union, and Women on Friday Urge Government Not to Revoke VOD News License’, 13 Feb 2023 Hun Sen’s crackdown has also extended to those advocating for labor rights, as seen by union leader Chhim Sithar’s conviction in May on charges of “incitement.”4Human Rights Watch, ‘Cambodia: Casino Union Leader Chhim Sithar and Strikers Convicted,’ 25 May 2023 Sithar and other employees of NagaWorld, a casino in Phnom Penh, have been protesting since 2021, demanding to be reinstated and fairly compensated following mass layoffs.5Radio Free Asia, ‘Cambodian authorities clash with NagaWorld protesters, leaving several injured,’ 11 August 2022 The NagaWorld protests drove a spike in demonstrations in the country in 2022, with such demonstrations accounting for over 64% of total demonstrations. Nearly half of the NagaWorld demonstrations in 2022 were met with state intervention.
Bangladesh: Elevated Kuki-Chin National Army violence
Violence in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts region has been at elevated levels since March this year, with over 10 events reported in the last four months. This violence – concentrated in Bandarban district – is driven in part by events involving the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA), an armed group demanding the creation of an autonomous state for the Kuki-Chin people within Bangladesh. In June, two military personnel were reportedly killed by IEDs set off by the KNA in Bandarban. The Bangladesh government has cracked down on the KNA since late 2022 amid reports of links between the KNA and the Islamist militant group, Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS). Authorities allege that the KNA provided arms, training, and shelter to JAFHS in exchange for funding.6Shariful Islam, ‘“Biggest militant threat” country has ever faced,’ The Daily Star, 31 January 2023 The KNA has denied the allegations.7Rajeev Bhattacharyya, ‘Why Did Bangladesh’s Kuki Chin Flee to India’s Northeast?,’ The Diplomat, 21 February 2023 On 23 June, police arrested the founder of JAFHS when he was in Dhaka.8India Today, ‘Bangladesh Police arrests Islamist militant outfit chief Shamin Mahfuz,’ 24 June 2023 The military crackdown against the KNA has led to an influx of Kuki-Chin refugees into India.9Rajeev Bhattacharyya, ‘Why Did Bangladesh’s Kuki Chin Flee to India’s Northeast?,’ The Diplomat, 21 February 2023
Myanmar: Border Guard Force defections amid increased fighting in Kayah state
Political violence increased by over 50% in Kayah state in June relative to May as fighting between the military and resistance forces intensified, augmented by the defection of formerly military-aligned fighters. Fighting was concentrated in Hpasawng and Mese townships. The military increased its use of airstrikes in the state, targeting both resistance groups and civilians alike. Significantly, two previously military-aligned Border Guard Force (BGF) battalions joined resistance forces,10KNPLF, ‘Position Statement,’ 1 July 2023 carrying out attacks and capturing a police station and three military outposts in Mese township on 13 June.11Esther J, ‘Karenni BGF battalions confirm role in recent raids on junta outposts,’ Myanmar Now, 23 June 2023; Burma News International, ‘Seven junta soldiers take refuge in Thailand,’ 19 June 2023 The two battalions are part of the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), which split from the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) in 1978. It later agreed to a ceasefire with the military in 1994. The group then transformed two of its five battalions into BGF battalions under the military’s scheme in 2009.12The Irrwaddy, ‘Kayah Border Guard Forces Defect to Join Fight Against Myanmar Military,’ 21 June 2023 The KNPLF has now joined with the KNPP/KA, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) in what has been reportedly called the 4K Alliance.13Esther J, ‘Karenni ceasefire group announces defection to anti-junta resistance,’ Myanmar Now, 3 July 2023 The military carried out an airstrike on the KNPLF headquarters four days after the initial clash,14Burma News International, ‘Military Council launches aerial bombardment on Hoseit village, KNPLF headquarters,’ 23 June 2023 followed by additional airstrikes on KNPLF bases. On 23 June, the joint forces captured No.13 Border Point, the last strategic hill camp of the military in the area. This reportedly led to the surrender of dozens of military soldiers.15Mizzima, ‘Defence forces capture last junta army camp in Karenni State’s Mese Township,’ 27 June 2023; BBC Burmese, ‘Interview with Joint Secretary of KNPLF,’ 2 July 2023; The Irrawaddy, ‘Dozens of Myanmar Regime Troops Surrender to Resistance in Kayah,’ 27 June 2023 Towards the end of the month, the military recaptured two BGF outposts that had been seized by resistance forces in the state.16Kantarawaddy Times, ‘Junta Regains Control over Two BGF outposts Seized by Karenni Resistance Forces,’ 5 July 2023
Pakistan: TTP increases activity in Balochistan
While violence in Balochistan continued in June at lower levels than in May, instability in Balochistan has enabled non-state actors other than Baloch separatists to make inroads into the province. Notably, events involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Balochistan this year already exceed the seven events recorded for all of 2022. During the first six months of 2023, ACLED records nine political violence events involving the TTP in Balochistan, including the TTP targeting a police vehicle in Dera Murad Jamali town on 9 June.17ARY News, ‘Hand grenade attack on SSP’s squad in Naseerabad,’ 9 June 2023; Twitter @cozyduke_apt29, 9 June 2023 Since July 2022, four Baloch groups have joined the TTP, thus allowing it to strengthen its presence in the region.18Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, ‘The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban’s Afghanistan Takeover, Combating Terrorism Center, May 2023 Notably, in addition to the wilaya (administrative region) formed in Zhob in 2022, the TTP recently reportedly formed a new wilaya in the Kalat and Makran regions.19Harsh Behere, ‘TTP Unfazed by Pakistan’s New Multidimensional Counterterrorism Strategy, The Diplomat,’ 1 July 202 The Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), a militant group that emerged in February this year, has also become active in Balochistan. During an operation in Chaman tehsil (district subdivision) on 14 June, four TJP militants were reportedly killed in a clash with police.20The Balochistan Post, ‘Chaman: CTD claims to have killed four “terrorists” in encounter,’ 16 June 2023 While little is known about the group, there is indication they share similar goals with the TTP.21Abdul Basit Khan, ‘Pakistan’s threat landscape and a new militant group on the block,’ Arab News, 5 June 2023
Philippines: Two DI-Maute Group leaders killed
Two high-ranking leaders of the Dawlah Islamiyah (DI)-Maute Group, an Islamic State (IS)-inspired group in the Philippines best known for leading a siege on the city of Marawi in 2017,22International Crisis Group, ‘Philippines: Addressing Islamist Militancy after the Battle for Marawi, 17 July 2018 were killed in June. Faharudin Hadji Benito Satar, better known as Abu Zachariah, was killed in a military operation in Marawi on 14 June.23Martin Sadongdong, ‘Daulah Islamiyah leader slain by troops in Marawi – military,’ Manila Bulletin, 14 June 2023 Zachariah had been the emir or highest-ranked leader of IS in Southeast Asia since 202224Lindsey Kennedy and Nathan Paul Southern, ‘Top regional ISIL leader killed in Philippines’ ruined Marawi,’ Al Jazeera, 15 June 2023; Richel V. Umel and Ryan D. Rosauro, ‘Top IS leader killed in Marawi raid,’ INQUIRER.net, 15 June 2023 and was reportedly among the leaders of the 2017 Marawi siege, a five-month offensive by IS-inspired militants seeking to establish the city as the capital of an IS wilaya in Southeast Asia.25Martin Sadongdong, ‘Daulah Islamiyah leader slain by troops in Marawi – military,’ Manila Bulletin, 14 June 2023; Charles Knight and Katja Theodorakis, ‘The Battle of Marawi, one year on,’ The Strategist, 24 October 2018 Another senior DI-Maute Group leader handling finance and logistics was killed in a follow-up operation by state forces a few hours later. The commander of the Philippine military’s Western Mindanao Command said that the killing of the two IS-inspired leaders was a “significant breakthrough” against DI.26Richel V. Umel and Ryan D. Rosauro, ‘Top IS leader killed in Marawi raid,’ INQUIRER.net, 15 June 2023 The United States State Department also commented on the news, saying it was the result of the Philippines’ “persistent and years-long effort to rid the country of ISIS.”27Lindsey Kennedy and Nathan Paul Southern, ‘Top regional ISIL leader killed in Philippines’ ruined Marawi,’ Al Jazeera, 15 June 2023 DI-Maute Group activity has declined significantly since the 2017 Marawi siege. Thus far in 2023, ACLED records four political violence events involving the DI-Maute Group, compared to 182 in 2017.
Vietnam: Rare violence in the Central Highlands
On 14 June, armed assailants attacked the headquarters of the People’s Committees of Ea Tieu and Ea Ktur communes in Dak Lak province, located in the Central Highlands of Vietnam.28VnExpress, ‘18 more arrested for gun attacks on Central Highlands commune offices,’ 13 June 2023 A total of nine people were reportedly killed, including four police officers, two commune officials, and three villagers, while two other police officers sustained serious injuries. Three civilians who had been taken hostage were eventually released unharmed. The authorities seized a significant cache of weapons, including guns, grenades, bullets, and detonators.29Voice of Vietnam, ‘Dak Lak shooting declared act of terror, 75 face terror charges,’ 24 June 2023 In the aftermath of the incident, dozens of suspects were charged for their alleged involvement in the attack. The Central Highlands are home to the Montagnard ethnic minority, who have faced restrictions and land confiscations by the government.30Radio Free Asia, ‘Armed group attacks Vietnamese police stations, 39 people arrested,’ 11 June 2023 The motive behind the attack remains unclear, though police have attempted to link the assailants to the defunct separatist group United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, saying that flags of the group were found among the attackers’ belongings. Montagnard organizations have denied any association with the violence.31Radio Free Asia, ‘Vietnam to prosecute 84 for alleged involvement in Dak Lak attacks,’ 23 June 2023
See More
See the Codebook and the User Guide for an overview of ACLED’s core methodology. For additional documentation, check the Resource Library. Region-specific methodology briefs can be accessed below.
Links:
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in Afghanistan
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in China
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in Myanmar
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in North Korea
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for the Philippines Drug War