Yemen Situation Update: December 2023

The failure to capitalize on the de-escalation in 2023 may risk a re-escalation in 2024

Despite the end of the United Nations-mediated truce in October, 2023 saw a further decline in political violence in Yemen, which dropped to the lowest level since the start of the current conflict in 2015. The formal truce agreement has been replaced by an ‘unofficial ceasefire’ that has been in place for over 14 months, creating space for the resumption of peace talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. However, despite progress in the negotiations, the talks cooled down toward the end of the year as regional developments threatened to subsume political developments domestically.

This report looks at the main trends in the conflict in Yemen in 2023 and the developments underpinning these events. The report finds that although the past year came the closest to a peace deal since the conflict began, the year ended with the escalation in the Red Sea and increasing regional tensions that threaten to return the war to pre-2022 truce levels of violence.

Military activities between the warring parties dropped to a historic low

In 2023, the war in Yemen became a low-intensity conflict. Although the UN-mediated truce between the Houthis and the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) ended in October 2022, the parties have since maintained an unofficial truce. The informal ceasefire has actually resulted in an even greater reduction in military operations than the UN truce did (see graph below). As a result, 2023 saw the fewest incidents of political violence between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces since the conflict began, with events falling by 70% from the previous year. The halt to offensives led to a corresponding drop in reported fatalities from confrontations between the warring parties, which themselves decreased to their lowest level since the start of the war. However, although the overall number fell, the lethality of the incidents increased during the unofficial truce, potentially signaling a shift to a more targeted use of violence from the less lethal ‘territorial marking’ of the truce period.

Cross-border attacks remained on hold, but border violence continued

The lull in ground hostilities was matched by a halt to cross-border attacks, making 2023 the first year since the start of the Saudi-led Coalition’s military intervention with no airstrikes on Yemen. However, last year is already looking like an anomaly, as the 21-month hiatus in airstrikes ended in the first two weeks of the new year, and the threat of further strikes is high.¹Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali, and Mohammed Ghobari, ‘US and Britain strike Yemen in retaliation for Houthi attacks on shipping,’ Reuters, 12 January 2024 As part of the suspension of the Coalition’s aerial campaign, Houthi forces paused their cross-border missile and drone attacks on the Gulf states in March 2022 and have not yet resumed them. 

The suspension of long-range Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, though, did not mean that the border between Yemen and the Kingdom was quiet. The northern border governorate of Saada saw the third-most incidents between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces and almost half of all countrywide shelling events, while the Houthis also carried out sporadic attacks on Coalition troops patrolling the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, killing five Bahraini soldiers in a drone attack in September.²Aziz El Yaakoubi, ‘Yemen flare-ups jeopardise peace negotiations,’ Reuters, 26 September 2023 

Violence picked up away from the frontlines

The border also witnessed an increase in violence against migrants attempting to cross from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, which rose by over 55% compared to the previous year, mainly perpetrated by the Saudi military and involving close-range and artillery fire. The border incidents were part of a broader trend of rising violent events impacting civilians that more than doubled in 2023 (see graph below). In addition to the border violence, explosive remnants of war (ERW) also continued to claim civilian casualties, with over 140 reported fatalities reported in 2023 alone.³Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, ‘The legacy threat of ERW in Yemen despite the unofficial truce,’ January 2024 The threat posed by ERW is highest near the frontlines where the truce has enabled people to move more freely in areas that have been contaminated with explosive devices.

The militant group of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also increased its activity, which rose by 22% compared to the previous year, primarily in the southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwa. AQAP operations have been on the rise in the past two years in response to an ongoing military campaign led by forces from the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC), who are trying to clear the group from the two governorates. As the southern forces cleared hideouts in eastern Abyan, AQAP shifted its focus into neighboring Shabwa, where it conducted its first-ever recorded drone attacks, reflecting a step-shift in their capabilities.⁴Reuben Dass, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Drone Attacks Indicate a Strategic Shift,’ Lawfare, 20 August 2023

Progress in truce talks ended by Houthi Red Sea attacks

Violence along the Yemen-Saudi border experienced an uptick during the summer, likely in connection with the truce talks between the Houthis and Saudis. Between September and December, there were widespread rumors that a potential deal may have been in the works, as Riyadh pushed for an agreement to extricate itself from the conflict, but talks have since cooled amid the regional escalation.⁵Abdul Hadi Habtoor, ‘A regional and international movement to make the peace map in Yemen a success,’ Asharq Al-Awsat, 15 November 2023 

The stalling momentum is a direct result of the escalation in the Red Sea, as the Houthis carried out no less than 34 attacks towards Israel and against commercial and naval vessels by the end of  December. The group’s maritime operations have steadily expanded over the past two months, testing and eventually crossing the red lines of the international community in early January 2024 and provoking US and UK airstrikes on Houthi military assets. The Houthis have promised to retaliate, and the threat of an escalatory cycle is looming for 2024.⁶Ansarollah, ‘Armed Forces: 11 Mujahideen Were Martyred And Wounded In The American-British Aggression / We Will Not Hesitate To Target Sources Of Threat On Land And At Sea,’ 12 January 2024 

The heightened tensions in the Red Sea and the broader regional instability were not yet reflected in the level of armed violence in Yemen by the end of 2023. But the Israel-Gaza conflict did have a marked effect on demonstrations across the country, which surged in late 2023 as people took to the streets to show their anger at Israeli actions in Gaza. The year saw more pro-Palestine/anti-Israel demonstrations, 849, than in the previous eight years combined. Almost two-thirds of these could be classified as Houthi-sponsored (see map below),⁷Demonstrations that are typically being organized by and including local Houthi-aligned officials as the group has mobilized widespread anger about the Israel-Gaza conflict to boost local support and as a recruitment tool, a trend that will continue in 2024.

Economic and service issues driving incidents are expected to worsen 

The Israel-Gaza conflict was not the only driver of protest activity, which rose across the board in 2023 compared to the previous year. Overall, ACLED records nearly four times as many protest events in 2023 compared to 2022, with 2,330 events throughout the country. The demonstrations covered a range of topics, prominent among them public services and economic issues, especially power outages and fuel shortages. The IRG’s capital of Aden, in particular, experienced frequent protests over prolonged electricity cuts during the hot summer months, with the southern city reaching its highest demonstration levels since December 2021.

Popular anger is directed at the IRG for its failure to provide basic services. The revenue shortfall caused by the Houthi-enforced shutdown of oil exports since October 2022 has left Yemeni authorities struggling to deal with a dire financial situation and a limited capacity to generate revenues. Grievances over the distribution of oil and gas revenues also contributed to flare-ups throughout the year. There were at least five instances of oil pipelines being sabotaged in Shabwa, while Marib saw at least three incidents of oil infrastructure being blown up and five other instances of local armed groups establishing roadblocks to disrupt oil transportation. The freezing of truce talks due to the Houthi Red Sea attacks means that the oil export halt is unlikely to end any time soon, and the resulting unrest will only intensify in 2024.

Looking forward

• The incremental escalation in the Houthis’ Red Sea attacks has raised concerns among the international community about the threat to global shipping, leading to US and UK airstrikes on Yemen in early January 2024. The limited strikes, which targeted Houthi military sites across six governorates, seem intended more as a symbolic warning than an attempt to degrade the group’s maritime capability, but they are unlikely to deter the group from further attacks. 
• Houthi officials have vowed to respond militarily, and both sides are walking a fine line of tit-for-tat reciprocal escalation. The next Houthi action may expand to include US or UK military assets in the region. So far, both sides have tried to avoid setting off a wider regional conflagration, but there is significant unpredictability, given rising tensions and regional insecurity, and the situation could quickly devolve. 
• The strikes on Yemen will not convince shipping companies to resume transiting the Bab al-Mandab as long as the ships remain at shooting range from the Houthis. The companies have called for a more forceful response, but the Houthis have vowed to retaliate and commercial vessels will continue to reroute away from the Red Sea, the inflationary effects of which will continue to be seen in Yemen, the wider region, and globally over the coming weeks.
• The Houthis have been increasing the mobilization of their forces to the main frontlines, especially in Marib and along the borders of Shabwa, two critical oil-producing governorates, in preparation for a potential resumption of the conflict. The international airstrikes will be used to further galvanize and bolster their recruitment drive, presenting the group with a clear external enemy to rally around. In the short term, the group is holding marches and rallies to display their defiance. But further external military intervention and/or the breakdown of the Saudi truce talks could trigger new Houthi offensives.
• The military balance of power on the ground tips in the Houthis’ favor as the other Yemeni parties have been left to fend for themselves. Saudi Arabia has been pressing the US and other international actors to refrain from retaliating against the Houthi provocations in the Red Sea. But the negotiations have reportedly stalled as the maritime theater has heated up, reducing the prospects of a peace deal in the near future. However, Riyadh is still seeking to exit the conflict and will not want to directly re-engage for fear of reopening the threat of cross-border attacks. 
• Meanwhile, the IRG and other parties are preparing for the next stage in the conflict, whether Yemeni-Yemeni talks or renewed hostilities. Still, long-standing divisions remain, and these tensions will drive infighting and spoiling between the factions that may manifest as political violence.