Yemen Conflict Observatory
// Monthly Report
Yemen Situation Update: March 2024
Unilateral road openings more likely to reopen hostilities than critical routes
With the unofficial truce still holding in the broader conflict and the UN-led peace talks stalled by the escalation in the Red Sea, the Yemeni parties each announced unilateral initiatives for Ramadan, including infrastructure projects and financial disbursements, as a means of boosting local support. Among these unilateral proposals have been a series of reopenings of stretches of the main roads on either side of the frontlines. However, the one-sided moves have not only failed to open critical routes but have, in some cases, become a potential flashpoint between the warring parties.
Armed clashes have increased on some of the roads proposed for reopening, resulting in increased fatalities and ongoing fighting. In the absence of any discussions or mediation, one-sided announcements are unlikely to lead to any meaningful progress in the peace process and may instead precipitate more incidents.
IRG and Houthis trade road opening proposals
Beginning in late February, the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the Houthis announced a series of unilateral openings of some of the main roads that have been closed by the ongoing conflict. Sultan al-Arada, Marib governor and vice president of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), led the way, announcing on 22 February that the stretch of the northern route between Marib city and Sanaa city would be reopened (see map below).1Saba News, ‘Marib, on its part, restores road connection with Sana’a, throws ball into Houthi court,’ 22 February 2024 Al-Arada called on the Houthis to take a similar step on their side of the frontline to help alleviate the suffering of people in Marib.
However, the Houthis stated they would only open the route under two conditions: the release of all detainees arrested at security or military checkpoints in Marib and an agreement that no one using the road would be arrested at checkpoints on the route in the future.2Yemen Press Agency, ‘Al-Houthi welcomes announcement of re-opening of Marib-Nihm-Sanaa road,’ 22 February 2024 The following day, Houthi forces shelled an IRG checkpoint on the road linking Marib and Sanaa, killing one soldier and injuring three others, in a rare attack in that previously quiet part of the Marib front.3Khabar Agency, ‘4 soldiers were martyred and injured by Houthi bombing that targeted a security point in response to the initiative to open the Marib-Sanaa road,’ 23 February 2024 Shortly afterward, the Houthi leadership proposed their own road opening, but on the other direct route connecting Marib and Sanaa city (see map below), demanding that the IRG reciprocate on their end of the road.4Saba Net, ‘The Governor of Ma’rib announces an initiative to open the Sana’a-Sarwah-Ma’rib road unilaterally,’ 22 February 2024 Both routes, however, remain closed.
Similarly, an IRG committee stated on 2 March that it would open two roads in Taizz city, to which the Houthis responded by declaring the unblocking of a disconnected side road to the north of the governorate capital and a road in the south of the governorate linking to Lahij.5Al-Masdar, ‘Starting today, Saturday, the government committee announces the opening of two main roads to Taiz and hopes the Houthis will respond,’ 2 March 2024 However, as with Marib, neither side has shown any inclination to open the adjoining parts of any of the routes, and the roads are all still closed to commercial traffic.
Meanwhile, the Houthis began preparations for their own one-sided road openings ahead of Ramadan. In early March, the group began preparations to clear a section of the main north-south road in al-Dali that runs between Sanaa and Aden.6South24, ‘Shooting ends hopes of critical Al-Dhalea road opening,’ 12 March 2024 An attempt by a Houthi committee, accompanied by an armed convoy, to remove a roadblock in the north of the governorate on 12 March devolved into clashes with Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated forces, who accused the Houthi forces of instigating the firefight.7YemenEco, ‘The moment the Sanaa Government Committee came under fire while opening the Al-Dhalea-Aden road,’ YouTube, 12 March 2024 STC officials said the reopening should have been coordinated with all parties and laid out their conditions that any future openings should be linked to the UN-led political roadmap and carried out under international supervision.8STC, ‘The Presidency: Opening roads must take place under UN supervision and international and local oversight committees,’ 14 March 2024
Efforts led by local authorities and tribes to clear the Sanaa-Aden route that runs through al-Bayda, which has been cut off in the south of the governorate, were also reportedly ongoing during Ramadan.9Aden al-Ghad, ‘The local authority in Makeras announces its readiness to open the Aqabat Thara road and calls on the tribes of Abyan to respond to it,’ 18 March 2024 The road crosses an active frontline at the Aqaba Thira mountain pass on the border between Houthi-controlled al-Bayda and STC-held Abyan. So far, though, the discussions have failed to convince the warring sides to demilitarize the route.
Houthi forces militarily respond to road-opening efforts
Although none of the unilateral road openings has led to any movement on any of the proposed routes, the heightened political activity has had a mixed impact on the ground. Most notably, fighting has increased in al-Dali following the failed road opening in mid-March. In response to the shooting, Houthi forces mounted a series of attacks across the front, hitting most of the active frontlines in the west of the governorate.
Since 12 March, 11 incidents were reported in the districts surrounding the road proposed for reopening, including 10 in Qaataba and one in Damt. As shown in the chart below, this is the highest monthly incident count in al-Dali since July 2023 and marks an uptick from the one event reported in February. Amidst the unrest, notably fierce hostilities were reported on the Qaataba frontlines in the second half of the month: 51 fatalities were reported in Qaataba district in March — the most in over two years.
The other road openings, though, have not had the same impact on the frontlines. In Marib, other than the single shelling incident on the IRG side of the reopened northwestern road, limited hostilities were reported in March, marking a continuation of the typically low incident and fatality numbers seen in the areas around the westbound routes in Marib in recent months.
Conversely, although the frontlines in Taizz remained among the most active in the country (see map below), Taizz city saw a decrease in incidents of political violence and fatalities in March compared to previous months. Collectively, the three districts where the two parties reopened roads saw the lowest incident count this year and the lowest fatality numbers since November. Similarly, the already relatively quiet Aqaba Thira front between al-Bayda and Abyan witnessed no incidents or fatalities in March, a slight decline from the three incidents in the previous month.
Negotiations over road openings a long-term obstacle in peace talks
All of these roads have been closed for most of the nine years since the start of the current conflict. The reopening of these critical routes, in particular around the Houthi-besieged city of Taizz, has been a central tenet of the several rounds of peace talks in the last decade but has been caught up in the wider paralysis that has beset the UN-led negotiations.10Brett Scott, ‘The Road to Peace Runs Through Taiz,’ Deep Root Consulting, 8 June 2020, pp. 26-42 Local efforts to de-link the process from the stalled national-level discussions have also repeatedly failed to make headway, stymied by the parties to the conflict and their territorial divisions.11Human Rights Watch, ‘Houthis Should Urgently Open Taizz Roads,’ 29 August 2022
Through all six rounds of peace talks, road reopenings have been part of the discussions between the IRG and Houthis, but all have failed to get off the ground. In 2018, as part of the UN-mediated talks that led to the Stockholm Agreement, the office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen brokered a statement of understanding on Taizz that was aimed at reaching a deal to lift the siege on the governorate capital.12Office of the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, ‘Statement of Understanding on Ta’iz,’ 3 December 2018 However, there was no follow-through on the arrangement.
The most recent UN-brokered truce, from April to October 2022, also included an aspect on road openings. As with previous talks, the openings did not advance beyond the discussion stage and were the only unimplemented element of the nationwide truce agreement.13Mohammed Hatem, ‘Yemen Shiite Houthi Rebels Say They Will Not Extend Truce,’ Bloomberg, 16 July 2022 The IRG and Houthis have accused one another of obstructing the process, allegations that have continued into the March reopenings. The IRG has accused the Houthis of hypocrisy, drawing parallels between Israel’s siege on Gaza and the group’s ongoing blockade of Taizz.14Salman al-Maqrami, ‘In Taiz siege, Yemenis see Houthi double standards,’ Amwaj Media, 9 April 2024
Unlike the previous road opening efforts, which were affected by the heavy fighting and airstrikes on most of the frontlines, the latest proposals have come as the conflict has de-escalated into a low-intensity war. However, despite the more favorable context, the decrease in hostilities has not been sufficient to overcome the warring parties’ unwillingness to reach a compromise arrangement.
Instead of opening the long-closed roads, the unilateral measures have increased tensions on several fronts and set off some of the most intensive clashes in the past year, especially in al-Dali. Future one-sided, uncoordinated attempts to reopen roads risk provoking further fighting at these critical points on the frontlines, as maintaining their hold over the routes provides the Houthis and IRG with territorial control and a source of revenue from checkpoints.15Casey Coombs and Salah Ali Salah, ‘The War on Yemen’s Roads,’ Sanaa Centre for Strategic Studies, 15 January 2023 pp.12-14 With national-level negotiations on hold, there is little incentive for the warring sides to make the necessary concessions at the local level to lift the roadblocks despite the humanitarian and economic costs for the rest of the country.16Saeed al-Batati, ‘The deadly journey along Yemen’s potholed, heavily mined roads,’ Arab News, 23 January 2023
Looking forward
- The proposed road reopenings for Ramadan have failed to open critical routes and have instead become a potential flashpoint between the warring parties. Both sides are issuing unilateral announcements without engaging with the other party to coordinate or discuss their activities, resulting in parallel and unconnected routes and the potential for misunderstandings on the frontlines.
- Given the pause in truce talks, any local initiatives are unlikely to advance independently and may create more tension than any local relief. Efforts to begin talks about road openings or other negotiating tracks remain on hold due to the Houthi Red Sea attacks and the broader regional situation and will not move forward until these are resolved. The UN-proposed roadmap is paralyzed by the circumstances, and linked tracks will remain at a standstill until the broader talks can start moving again.
- Regarding the Red Sea crisis, despite the deadly Houthi attack that killed three sailors, there has been no significant escalation from either side. Houthi drone and missile launches have kept a steady pace, although the success rate remains low. The defensive naval missions deployed in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden by the US and the EU are managing to intercept most of the projectiles, which is diminishing, but not removing, the threat to commercial ships.
- The US-led strikes are seemingly decreasing the number of Houthi attacks but not halting them or reducing their impact on global shipping. Most vessels are still being diverted away from the high-risk Red Sea area. The targeting of the US strikes remains narrowly focused, which has limited the casualty toll and civilian impact but also allowed the Houthis to keep their weapons stockpiles intact and continue the maritime attacks.
- Outside the maritime theater, the conflict remains low-intensity and, despite the wider regional escalation, does not seem likely to reignite in the short term. Periodic skirmishes and standoff fire will most probably be the primary incidents across the active frontlines, with the associated casualties and civilian impact, but at a similar level as in recent months.
Round-Up
First sailor deaths in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea
The Red Sea crisis saw the first fatalities and the second loss of a ship as the hostilities in the waters off Yemen entered their fourth month. A Houthi missile strike on the True Confidence, a Barbados-flagged, Liberian-owned bulk carrier, on 6 March killed two Filipino crew members and a Vietnamese seaman and injured at least four more sailors.17Jonathan Saul, ‘Three killed in first fatal Houthi attack on Red Sea shipping, CENTCOM says,’ Reuters, 7 March 2024 The remaining crew were forced to abandon ship. This is the second vessel left adrift by the Houthi attacks. Of the 34 attacks carried out by the group in March, there was only one more successful hit — when a missile struck the Panama-flagged, Chinese-owned Huang Pu oil tanker on 23 March — but the ship was able to sail on.18X, ‘MARCH 23 RED SEA UPDATE, US Central Command, 24 March 2024 US and EU naval missions continued to intercept Houthi-launched missiles and drones, including the largest Houthi swarm attack to date,19Reuters, ‘US, UK, French military shoot down Houthi drones after attack on bulk carrier, destroyers,’ 10 March 2024 as well as conduct preemptive degrading strikes on Houthi military sites, destroying 47 missiles, 18 drones, five drone boats, and six storage facilities.20Information from the US military press releases from 1 to 30 March 2024, which YCO researchers have aggregated by target. See: US Central Command, ‘Press Releases,’ accessed on 1 April 2024. However, US officials conceded that the strikes have demonstrated a limited impact on the Houthi capacity to carry out attacks in the Red Sea.21Peter Martin, Mohammed Hatem, Sam Dagher, and Alex Longley, ‘The ‘No-Fail’ Mission to Protect the Red Sea Isn’t Working,’ Bloomberg, 27 March 2024
First vessel sunk by the Houthis presents environmental risk
The Rubymar finally sank in the Red Sea on 2 March, over two weeks after being struck by a Houthi missile, becoming the first commercial vessel lost in the ongoing Houthi attacks.22Jon Gambrell, ‘A ship earlier hit by Yemen’s Houthi rebels sinks in the Red Sea, the first vessel lost in conflict,’ Associated Press, 3 March 2024 The Belize-flagged vessel had been slowly drifting northward and taking on water after being attacked on 18 February. Telecommunication companies confirmed that four key undersea cables had sustained damage, and there has been speculation that the damage may be linked to the Rubymar, which dragged its anchor along the seafloor as it floated in the Red Sea.23Drew Fitzgerald, ‘Red Sea Conflict Threatens Key Internet Cables,’ The Wall Street Journal, 3 March 2024 The incident reportedly affected 25% of data transmission in the area. IRG officials have also warned that the vessel’s approximately 21,000 metric tons of ammonium phosphate sulphate fertilizer present an environmental risk.24Saba Net, ‘The Crisis Cell announces the sinking of the ship “Rubymar” and holds the Houthi militias responsible for the disaster,’ 2 March 2024 The IRG has proposed a plan to salvage the sunken ship, which would include preventing a wider spill, refloating the vessel, and towing it for repairs.252 December, ‘A United Nations expert arrives in Mocha to discuss ways to contain the Rubymar disaster,’ 23 March 2024 However, the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) has said that salvage operations are on hold until Houthi attacks in the Red Sea stop.26Gloria Dickie and Lisa Baertlein, ‘Houthi attacks must ease for salvage of two vessels, UN shipping agency says,’ 21 March 2024
Houthi forces kill dozens in security campaign in al-Bayda
Houthi security forces reportedly killed and injured at least 18 civilians, including five women and three children, when they blew up two houses in Radaa city in northern al-Bayda on 19 March.27Al-Masdar, ‘The Houthi militia blows up the homes of citizens over their residents, while about 20 people are under the rubble,’ 19 March 2024 The explosions demolished several surrounding homes, burying people under the rubble. The incident came after two security personnel were reportedly killed in an ambush allegedly set up by one of the homeowners in revenge for the murder of his brother a year earlier by Houthi forces.28Khabar News, ‘Dead and wounded in the Houthi militia’s bombing of two houses on the heads of their residents in Radaa, Al-Bayda,’ 19 March 2024 Protesters took to the streets in Radaa over the following days to condemn the incident. The Sanaa-based Interior Ministry deemed the security forces’ detonation of the house an “irresponsible action” and said they used “excessive force in an illegal way” while pursuing suspects in the ambush.29Yemen Security Media, ‘A spokesman for the Ministry of Interior explains the circumstances of what happened in Radaa District, Al Bayda Governorate,’ 21 March 2024 To defuse growing outrage, the Houthis said the perpetrators had been arrested and pledged to pay reparations and rebuild the houses that were destroyed.
Houthi security forces clash with worshippers at mosque in Sanaa
Clashes broke out at a mosque in al-Sabain in Sanaa city on 17 March. Security forces exchanged fire with locals following a dispute about the Tarawih prayers at the Omar bin al-Khattab Mosque in the Zafar neighborhood.30Al-Masdar, ‘Dead and wounded in clashes between citizens and Houthi militants who tried to stop Tarawih prayers in a mosque in Sanaa,’ 18 March 2024 Houthi security personnel were reportedly attempting to end the prayers early so that Abdulmalik al-Houthi’s Ramadan speech could be broadcast at the mosque. An argument ensued with a Marib shaykh who lives in the neighborhood, which then escalated into armed clashes that reportedly led to the death of at least one person.31Al-Masdar, ‘Dead and wounded in clashes between citizens and Houthi militants who tried to stop Tarawih prayers in a mosque in Sanaa,’ 18 March 2024 Additional security forces subsequently surrounded the shaykh’s house until tribal mediators intervened and managed to resolve the situation the following day. The Houthi security department later said that the incident was caused by four individuals resisting arrest after assaulting someone in the mosque.32Yemen Security Media, ‘The Metropolitan Police arrests those accused of murder and shooting at security personnel,’ 18 March 2024 One of the security personnel was reportedly killed in the ensuing hostilities.
Change in AQAP leadership sparks renewed attacks on southern forces
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) announced the death of the group’s leader, Khalid Batarfi, on 10 March.33Saeed Al-Batati, Eric Schmitt and Vivian Nereim, ‘Al Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Says Its Leader Has Died,’ The New York Times, 11 March 2024 AQAP has not provided any official details of the date or cause of Batarfi’s death, but there have been rumors that he died after a long illness.34Ibrahim Ali, ‘The New AQAP Leader: The Choice of Necessity,’ South24, 27 March 2024 Batarfi had led AQAP since February 2020, following the death of his predecessor, Qasim al-Raymi, in a US drone strike. In his place, Saad al-Awlaqi has been appointed as the new head of the group.35Al-Arabiya, ‘Saad al-Awlaki named new leader for al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch,’ 27 March 2024 Al-Awlaqi is a senior AQAP leader with reportedly good connections across the south, and particularly in Shabwa, where he is from. The change in leadership seems to have sparked a resurgence in the group’s actions, which intensified in late March. AQAP claimed a series of deadly attacks on STC-affiliated forces in eastern Abyan, marking the group’s deadliest period since early January.36South24, ‘New AQAP Leader Atef Oversees Second Attack Against Southern Forces,’ 31 March 2024
March Monthly Overview
Timeline
Map
This dashboard encompasses political violence events related to the Yemen war that occurred within the timeframe covered by the monthly report. It includes all political violence events in Yemen, and only war-related events in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
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