Update: 9 Feb 2023 | This factsheet includes information from the latest ACLED data on activity in Iraq, Syria and Yemen as of 4 February 2024.
The outbreak of the Israel-Gaza conflict on 7 October 2023 is bringing the Middle East to the edge of a broader war. Although both Iranian and United States officials have repeatedly stressed that they don’t want a full-blown escalation, the geographical spread of the violence, the actors involved, and the rising number of attacks indicate that the risk of a wider war is high and growing. Besides direct military engagement with Israel — mainly by Hezbollah along the Lebanon-Israel border — various other members of the Iran-backed ‘axis of resistance’ have increasingly drawn the US into confrontation. The retaliatory US strikes that began on 2 February against the axis of resistance push an already inflamed region further on a dangerous and unpredictable trajectory of violence.
On 2 February, the US announced it had launched strikes at more than 85 targets belonging to Iran–backed armed groups in Iraq and Syria. The strikes avoided Iran’s territory, but concentrated on the ‘Iran Corridor’ in the Syrian eastern province of Dayr al-Zawr, and included the surrounding areas of the region’s capital city, and the desert region of al-Mayadeen, as well as Shiite militias’ positions in Iraq’s al-Anbar province. The US noted that its 2 to 3 February overnight counterstrikes were the beginning of its response, carrying out a further drone strike on a moving vehicle in Baghdad on 8 February that killed a senior commander of Kataib Hizbullah.
The US and allied UK forces also launched a third round of missile and airstrikes against more than 35 Houthi targets in Yemen on 3 and 4 February, responding to continued Houthi attacks on commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The strikes come amid a significant increase in US military activity in the Middle East in the past four months. According to data collected by ACLED, before the latest round of strikes that began on 2 February, the US had already conducted retaliatory airstrikes in at least 60 incidents against axis of resistance targets since 7 October, a significant increase compared to only 16 airstrikes in the preceding 12 months (see graph below). The number recorded by ACLED reflects unique incidents of airstrikes reported by media and local sources as occurring in one location and on one date. This can include several individual airstrikes. Therefore, these incidents are recorded as ‘airstrike events,’ rather than individual strikes (for more details on the ACLED methodology, see the Knowledge Base).
The targets of US strikes since October have included:
- Iraq | Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba, Kataib Hizbullah, and the 13th Brigades of the Popular Mobilization Forces
- Syria | Pro-Iran militias, regime forces, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Abu All-Fadhal al-Abbas Brigade, and Fatemiyoun Brigade
- Yemen | Houthis
Up until 2 February, a total of 35 reported fatalities resulted from these airstrikes across the three countries. Over 30 additional militant fatalities were reported following the 2 February strikes in Iraq and Syria.
ACLED records more than 200 incidents of attacks and attempted attacks on US and Global Coalition forces across the Middle East by members or suspected members of the axis of resistance in the past four months — a 20 times increase compared to the preceding four-month period. In the 12 months before 7 October events, only about 30 similar events had been reported in the region.
The highest number of events targeting US bases were recorded in the following locations (see map below):
- Syria
- Dayr al-Zawr
- al-Hasaka
- Rural Damascus
- Iraq
- Ain Assad Air Base in al-Anbar
- Harir base in Erbil
The majority of events have remained low-level and have not inflicted significant casualties or damage. However, the 29 January drone attack on a military desert outpost on the border between Jordan and Syria that killed three American troops — which was reportedly not shot down due to being mistaken for a US drone — highlights the danger of an accidental escalation of tensions.
With over 120 attacks and attempted attacks, the umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a generic ‘brand’ believed to be used by various pro-Iran Shiite militants based in Iraq — has carried out the highest number of attacks on US forces (see graph below). Other pro-Iran militias in Syria were responsible for nearly 50 further attacks, while unidentified groups suspected to be members of the axis of resistance carried out about 20 attacks.
Furthermore, there were at least 10 Houthi or suspected Houthi attempts to directly target US warships in the Red Sea on at least eight occasions, although all attacks were intercepted. This is in addition to at least 37 attacks targeting commercial ships in the area as of 2 February. About half of all attacks were conducted using drones, while rockets were used in most other attacks.
Amid apparent attempts to de-escalate the situation following the recent attack in Jordan, Kataib Hizbullah announced on 30 January that it was suspending attacks on US interests, likely due to pressure from Tehran and ruling Iraqi parties. The group is believed to be the most prominent member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and attacks by this umbrella group may decrease in the short term. But since multiple actors have been involved in attacking US positions — and Iran has varying influence over different members of the axis of resistance groups, and does not directly control and command many — attacks are likely to continue as long as no ceasefire has been established in Gaza. The continuation of sporadic attacks on US interests, including a drone attack on a training base hosting US forces at al-Omar Oilfield in Syria’s eastern province of Dayr al-Zawr, claimed by Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a strike that reportedly killed six allied Kurdish fighters — is indicative that tensions remain high.
Visuals produced by Ciro Murillo.
