Yemen Situation Update: February 2024

The Red Sea crisis has cooled domestic developments as the Houthis shift resources to the maritime front

The crisis in the Red Sea entered its fourth month since the Houthis started attacks on commercial and naval ships in November 2023. In response to the attacks, the US launched Operation Poseidon Archer in January 2024 to curb the group’s maritime activities and degrade its capacity to target merchant ships. However, the Houthis have shown no signs of being deterred as both their attacks and the US-led strikes increased in February, reaching a monthly high.

Beyond their effects on the waterways off Yemen’s coast, the events in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have impacted developments within the country. This report focuses on how the Red Sea crisis has affected domestic conflict in Yemen since 7 October 2023. Although regional tensions have escalated since October, the level of armed violence in Yemen has decreased. With most of the attention on the maritime theatre, the homefront has thus far remained static as the Houthis divert military resources to their attacks on international shipping lanes.

Armed violence decreases in Yemen as the Red Sea crisis escalates

Despite the escalating hostilities in the Red Sea and the end of the UN-mediated truce in October 2022, an ‘unofficial’ truce between the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the Houthis is holding. Incidents have continued on the frontlines, but as the Houthis’ focus pivoted to the Red Sea, the overall level of fighting has dropped. From the start of the war in Gaza on 7 October to the end of February, there has been a notable decrease of 42% in political violence in Yemen: ACLED records 1,336 events in the five months before 7 October and just 775 in the nearly five months since. 

This is part of a longer-term trend. Even before the start of the Red Sea crisis, the war in Yemen had already become a low-intensity conflict, and 2023 experienced the fewest incidents of political violence between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces since the conflict began. However, since the start of the Red Sea crisis on 7 October, the average number of monthly political violence events decreased by one-third compared to the preceding five-month period (see graph below).

The overall number of reported fatalities has also declined by 33%. Yet, although the total number dropped, the lethality of the incidents has increased — a consistent trend during the unofficial truce period. This is likely the result of a shift to a more targeted use of violence, as opposed to the ‘territorial marking’ of the UN truce period. Furthermore, several governorates saw an increase in fatalities compared to before the Red Sea crisis — in particular in al-Baydha, where the numbers have doubled since October, driven by a Houthi security campaign to arrest locals for allegedly revealing the location of launch sites for missiles being fired into the Red Sea.¹Khabar News, ‘Twenty Houthi members were killed in an ambush carried out by tribesmen during a militia campaign,’ 6 February 2024

Despite declining event numbers, several other frontlines have remained active. In particular, the Marib-Shabwa border saw the most intensive hostilities on any front since October. Clashes between Houthi forces and the Southern Giants Brigade (SGB) spiked in January, as the Houthis launched a series of probing assaults toward the southern governorate. However, the Houthi incursions were ultimately repelled, and the lines of control remained unchanged.

Ground fighting declines, but air and drone strikes continue away from the frontlines

The governorates to see the greatest decrease in political violence since October include Saada and al-Hudayda. In the former, border violence with Saudi forces dropped off as the Houthis have shifted to the Red Sea, reaching the lowest levels since 2016. The western governorate of al-Hudayda also witnessed a decrease in the clashes between Houthi forces and the Joint West Coast Forces. However, Hudayda governorate — which is reportedly the launch point for most Houthi maritime attacks — has been the target of more than half of all US-led strikes since they began on 12 January.

Airstrikes have surged since January as the US-led Operation Poseidon Archer carried out bombings on Houthi military targets. The strikes were the first in Yemen since April 2022, when the Saudi-led Coalition suspended its aerial campaign as part of the UN-led truce. At least 44 airstrike events were recorded in the first two months of the year, resulting in eight reported combatant fatalities and one civilian death.²Saba Net, ‘One martyr and eight wounded as a result of the American-British aggression raids on the capital and the provinces,’ 25 February 2024 The rate of the pre-emptive strikes tripled from January to February and looks set to continue accelerating as long as the Houthi maritime attacks continue.

Away from the frontlines, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) activity has also dropped off significantly. In the five months prior to the Gaza conflict, 65 incidents were attributed to AQAP, but in the period since, the number has fallen by nearly two-thirds. This has been most noticeable in Abyan, where AQAP-associated fatalities dropped by around 80% after 7 October, compared to the five months prior. The trend is seemingly unrelated to the Red Sea crisis and more a product of a campaign by STC-affiliated forces to clear AQAP from southern governorates, but nevertheless, it is a contributing factor to the overall decline in political violence. 

Another notable trend is related to the use of drones and rockets by the Houthis in Yemen. Since the beginning of the UN-mediated truce in April 2022, the Houthis have ramped up drone operations, with ACLED recording an average of around 20 drone events per month. Since 7 October, Houthi drone activity started below average and gradually increased, overall remaining in line with the monthly average, and shifting from the frontlines in Yemen toward the Red Sea front. Missile events have instead surged since 7 October (see graph below). However, guided missile events since 7 October remain lower than those recorded before the truce for the same period. This suggests that, in the absence of a domestic conflict resurgence, drone and missile operations in the Red Sea could continue for some time without depleting Houthi stockpiles.

Red Sea escalation stalls peace talks but boosts Houthi recruitment

The escalation in the Red Sea has also had a chilling effect on the negotiations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. The peace talks had seemingly been making some progress over the summer, with the first official visit of a Houthi delegation to Riyadh, but the discussions have stalled since then, despite a willingness on the Saudi side to proceed.³Al-Masdar, ‘Saudi Foreign Minister: We are close to completing the UN road map on Yemen and are ready to sign it as soon as possible,’ 20 February 2024 In their stead, local initiatives led by the IRG and Houthis have tried to address some of the main issues between the warring sides, although these have also failed to move forward.

In February, efforts increased to reopen critical routes bisecting the frontlines ahead of Ramadan, but so far, all of these proposals have fallen flat.⁴Marib Governorate, ‘Member of the Al-Arada Leadership Council announces the opening of the (Ma’rib – Fardat Nihm – Sana’a) road unilaterally,’ 22 February 2024 The Houthis and IRG resurrected previous unilateral plans to open routes in Marib, Taizz, and al-Hudayda, but each was rejected by the other side, which in turn issued their own parallel proposals to open an entirely different road.⁵Ansarollah, ‘Al-Qahum Denies A Forged Statement Attributed To An Ansar Allah Politician: Media Intelligence Fabricated It,’ 24 February 2024 Under the current circumstances, the roads are likely to remain closed until broader truce negotiations progress.

The onset of the Gaza conflict and the Red Sea hostilities has also impacted the level of support for the Houthis, both domestically and regionally.⁶Stacey Philbrick Yadav, ‘The Houthis’ “Sovereign Solidarity’ with Palestine,’ MERIP, 24 January 2024 In September 2023, the group faced some of the largest displays of public dissent since it took control of Sanaa city in 2014.⁷Amnesty International, ‘Wave of arrests by Huthi de facto authorities following demonstrations,’ 29 September 2023 Although dissatisfaction remains, the protests have been subsumed by the widespread anger toward the Israeli military campaign and a degree of support for the subsequent Houthi military actions, leading to frequent rallies in support of Palestine. The Houthi leadership has seized on the situation to recruit and mobilize new fighters, which the group’s leadership claims have swelled its ranks by more than 150,000 since October,⁸Al Khabar Al Yemeni, ‘Ansar Allah leader reveals the scale of their military preparations during the war on Yemen,’ 2 February 2024; Saba, ‘The government spokesman reviews in a press conference the latest developments related to the Palestinian issue and the Yemeni position,’ 14 February 2024 incentivizing the group to continue the Red Sea attacks and its confrontation with the US.

Looking forward

• There are still no signs that the Houthi maritime attacks are close to ending, and the direct impact of the incidents is growing. The past month saw the first sinking of a commercial vessel and the first seaman fatalities. Houthi operations have not become more effective, with the multiple naval protection missions and the US-led operation intercepting or preemptively destroying most of the launches toward international shipping lanes. But the longer the maritime conflict continues, the greater the likelihood of further casualties or another sinking.
• The US-led naval missions are destroying and intercepting the majority of Houthi projectiles, but the intended objective of deterring attacks on shipping has not been achieved. The US-led strikes may be slowly degrading the Houthis’ stockpiles of weapons; however, the current casualty-averse approach by the US limits the potential damage to the group’s arsenal. Any shift in tactics, though, risks a greater civilian impact, provoking another evolution in the Houthi attacks.
• The effect of the broader Specially Designated Global Terrorist group listing has yet to be seen, but may be more keenly felt in the coming month. With Ramadan approaching in mid-March, the riyal creeping closer to an all-time low, and the ongoing Houthi maritime attacks affecting global shipping, the economic impact will become more evident in the coming weeks. The lead-up to Ramadan usually sees a rise in demand for goods and a related price increase, which may be more exaggerated in the current circumstances. There are already concerns about money transfers to Yemen, including remittances that usually help balance out the pre-Ramadan inflation, which could be affected by the SDGT designation and the banking and financial sectors’ concerns about potential legal and reputational risks.
• The Houthis have already started to issue their own punitive policies in retaliation for the SDGT listing. The group ordered all US and UK nationals to leave the country and listed both countries as enemies of the state. The full ramifications of these measures are not yet clear but they will further restrict the already limited operating space. The authorities in Sanaa have also formed the new Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre, which seems likely to take a more security-based approach to aid, creating yet another possible challenge for international NGOs, and more are expected to follow.