Actor Profile:
Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)

26 March 2024

This is the fourth installment in our Actor Profile series unpacking the latest data on armed group activity around the Sahel. All data are available for direct download. Definitions and methodology decisions are explained in the ACLED Codebook, and more information can be found in the ACLED Knowledge Base.

Burkina Faso’s Self-Defense Militia

The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (or Les Volontaires pour la défense de la Patrie), commonly known by the acronym VDP, is a self-defense militia in Burkina Faso. As of 2022, the number of active volunteer fighters under the VDP umbrella was estimated to be 28,000.¹ The VDP operates nationwide, recruiting members from the country’s various ethnic groups, with a majority coming from sedentary communities such as the Mossi, Foulse, Gourmantche, and Songhai. The VDP has its roots in preexisting initiatives, such as the Koglweogo and Dozo self-defense groups, which have become increasingly involved in counterinsurgency operations since the beginning of the crisis in 2015.² These self-defense groups initially formed the core and recruitment base for the country’s irregular people’s defense forces.

Then-President Roch Kaboré founded the VDP by law on 21 January 2020 to mobilize, train, and arm civilians to defend their communities and the country. The group was established two months after a particularly deadly attack by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) on a gendarmerie-escorted convoy of the mining company SEMAFO, which reportedly killed almost 40 people. The day after the attack, Kaboré, in a televised address to the nation, called for a general mobilization of the population against jihadist militancy and ordered the recruitment of volunteers for the defense of the homeland in areas under threat.³

The Burkinabe military has adopted a systematic approach for the establishment of VDPs within ‘red zones,’⁴ and their subsequent management. All candidates are sent to complete two to three weeks of training at regional military garrisons or at the National Patriotic Watch Brigade (BNVP) training center in Ouagadougou.⁵ The training centers are also responsible for providing weapons to successful candidates. Once established, the VDP units are then placed under the command of the nearest military detachment, specialized police units,⁶ gendarmerie brigade, or, if none of these units are available, the nearest police station.

The VDP in Burkina Faso symbolizes the formalization and legalization of community-led security and the evolution of popular self-defense measures in response to escalating conflict and insecurity. It also represents a shift toward a more structured and state-supervised militia system that aims to address the growing jihadist threat. This break with the past has set Burkina Faso apart in the region as a country where the state directly oversees citizen militias.⁷

A Short History of the VDP

Kaboré Establishing the VDP and Navigating Militant Threats (January 2020 – January 2022)

Kaboré’s tenure was characterized by a deteriorating security situation, increasingly deadly attacks that prompted a state of emergency, and worsening communal tensions.⁸ In response to the escalating jihadist violence, the government formalized the VDP to integrate community-led security efforts into the national counterinsurgency strategy. This move was intended to strengthen Burkina Faso’s defense against the jihadists by arming the civilian population and integrating the existing self-defense militias into the state’s security apparatus.

Following the creation of the VDP, Burkina Faso experienced an intensification of jihadist violence, including targeted attacks on communities, which were seen as a response to the state’s military operations and its alignment with the militias. The al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) responded to the VDP’s popular mobilization with violent retribution against local communities; JNIM imposed blockades on many towns and villages. These attacks not only highlighted the retaliatory tactics of jihadist groups but also underscored the far-reaching consequences of the state’s counterinsurgency strategy, which often led to serious human rights violations.

The VDP’s recruitment practices largely favored sedentary communities, to the exclusion of the Fulani and other pastoralist groups, exacerbating existing ethnic cleavages.⁹ Reports of extortion, forced disappearances, abductions, summary executions, and other abuses committed by VDP recruits against Fulani communities are a testament to the challenges of integrating armed civilian units into official security strategies without exacerbating inter-ethnic conflict.

In 2020, the Kaboré government entered into early negotiations with JNIM, which were the first to take place beyond the local level. These negotiations led to a temporary ceasefire and reduced violence, including the lifting of an embargo on Djibo and the relatively calm conduct of presidential elections. However, in 2021, the reported death toll among VDP members was many times higher than the reported number of regular soldiers killed. This showed that the VDP had become increasingly exposed by replacing the army on the frontline, especially in remote and rural areas under jihadist influence.

This period saw some of the deadliest attacks since the beginning of the insurgency and mass atrocities committed by militants in reaction to the state-backed countermobilization. The massacre in Solhan in June 2021, one of the deadliest attacks since the beginning of the insurgency, reportedly left around 160 people dead, raising questions about the effectiveness of the government’s counterinsurgency strategy and the role of the VDP. In December 2021, 41 VDP members, including the Loroum VDP leader, were killed in an ambush in the northern province of Loroum,¹⁰ a month before Kaboré was overthrown in a military coup.

Damiba’s Strategy Undone Amid Persistent Insecurity (January 2022 – September 2022)

In January 2022, after ousting Kaboré, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba assumed power and promised to improve security through a comprehensive strategy that included political, amnesty, and reconciliation initiatives. Although Damiba established local committees for dialogue and demobilization, insecurity persisted during his tenure and jihadist violence continued to spread.

While military efforts were considerable during Damiba’s eight-month reign — more than 200 airstrikes and operations in which nearly 1,300 militants reportedly were killed and over 20 militant bases destroyed¹¹ — they were not enough to curb the tide of increasing militant activities. Under Damiba, the VDP’s involvement in joint military operations remained limited, yet they increasingly faced JNIM attacks. As JNIM militants pressed their operations further inland on the so-called central Mossi plateau, the formation of VDP units often occurred on the go.

A major setback to Damiba’s leadership was the evacuation of remaining VDP members and civilians from Madjoari department in May 2022 after a year-long violent campaign by JNIM against the military, the VDP, and the inhabitants of the department. This was followed by JNIM’s capture of Solenzo, the provincial capital of Banwa province, in August 2022. Finally, in September 2022, a devastating ambush by JNIM fighters against a civilian transport convoy accompanied by the military and VDP near the village of Gaskinde resulted in numerous dead, wounded, and missing people, as well as significant material losses (see map below: VDP Areas of Operation).¹² Despite Damiba’s attempts to balance military and political solutions, his strategy fell short of achieving the hoped-for stabilization, leading to his ousting by Captain Ibrahim Traoré in September of the same year.

Traoré’s Shift Toward Total War and Mass Mobilization (September 2022 – December 2023)

Traoré deposed Damiba just eight months into his rule. The transition marked a significant shift in Burkina Faso’s approach to addressing its security crisis. Traoré’s heavy-handed tactics against the insurgency stand in contrast to Damiba’s comprehensive strategy, which included political components and dialogue. Traoré took a more uncompromising stance by adopting a “total war” strategy against insurgents, emphasizing the need for a robust, militarized response over negotiations.¹³ This approach reflects Traoré’s belief in a more confrontational method for reclaiming lost territories and securing the nation.

Responding to Traoré’s mobilization call, a VDP recruitment drive between October and November 2022 saw an overwhelming turnout, with 90,000 individuals signing up, far exceeding the initial target of 50,000.¹⁴ This mass mobilization arguably underscores the popular support for Traoré’s strategy and the VDP’s central role in Burkina Faso’s military and security plans. Under Traoré, the VDP’s role in military strategy has been significantly amplified, not just as auxiliary forces but as a key element of the national defense strategy against jihadists. Before coming to power, Traoré held responsibilities for training fighters who acted as force multipliers during the coup against Damiba.

Under Traoré, the VDP has become a central pillar of his military approach.¹⁵ However, Traoré has also used the VDP as a platform for the forced recruitment of dissidents and activists to silence critics of all stripes.¹⁶ The aggressive mobilization and expansion of the VDP under Traoré have long-term implications on Burkina Faso’s social fabric and inter-communal relations — especially as aggressive military tactics have been met with increasing militant violence against the military forces, the VDP, and the civilian population.

The VDP’s Armed Activities and Areas of Operation

The VDP is the fourth-most active armed actor in Burkina Faso, after JNIM, the military, and IS Sahel. Their operations span a wide geographic area, encompassing 35 provinces and 158 departments across 12 of the country’s regions (see map below). This geographically widespread activity underscores the VDP’s significant role in Burkina Faso’s ongoing conflict and efforts against jihadist groups.

Since its inception, the VDP has been involved in over 1,000 armed engagements with jihadist factions, leading to more than 5,000 reported fatalities. A substantial portion of these confrontations — more than 800 — were specifically against JNIM and its affiliated groups, resulting in upward of 4,300 reported deaths. The yearly activity of the VDP from 2020 through 2023 has seen an average increase of 82%, indicating a rapid increase in its involvement in the conflict. The VDP operates both independently and alongside the military and other security forces. While the VDP initially functioned as auxiliary units, guides, and village self-defense, it has evolved at the operational level to engage in direct confrontations, ambushing militant groups, and participating in large-scale coordinated operations with air and ground forces.

Its military capabilities vary widely, although most units possess modern small arms and light weapons such as AK rifles and PKM machine guns. However, some less well-equipped units or individual volunteer fighters use traditional hunting rifles, craft-made firearms, and blade weapons, with some units having a mixed weapon stock of assault and hunting rifles.¹⁷ Many VDP units, especially those in Arbinda (Soum province), Korizena (Oudalan province), and Tanwalbougou (Gourma province), operate in contested areas and have earned recognition as particularly battle-hardened and resilient, capable of holding their ground in extremely hostile environments.

The VDP’s military involvement is primarily concentrated in the Sahel, East, Center-North, and North regions. Though the scope of VDP activities and participation in military operations declined sharply during Damiba’s short term, the VDP area of activity has grown exponentially under Traoré to encompass 12 regions, up from eight under Kaboré. Moreover, the number of VDP armed engagements in the 15 months since Traoré came to power has already surpassed that of the previous 32 months under Kaboré and Damiba (see graph below). Especially in the Center-East, Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, and Hauts-Bassins regions, VDP activities have increased significantly. The number of reported fatalities resulting from violence involving the VDP has also doubled under Traoré’s regime compared to the period encompassing Kaboré’s and Damiba’s watch.

The VDP was also held responsible for several abuses against the civilian population. These included extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, looting, and destruction of property, as well as sexual violence. These attacks, which began almost immediately after the operationalization of the corps under Kaboré, have been disproportionately directed against Fulani communities, including internally displaced people in the Sahel, East, Center-North, and North regions, which at the time were also generally the regions most affected by political violence. VDP’s actions have significant implications for civilian security, ethnic relations, and human rights, helping fuel an escalating conflict and humanitarian emergency.

These actions attributed to the VDP show a consistent pattern of ethnically motivated violence that preceded the creation of the VDP. Under the pretext of rooting out collaborators, VDP’s extrajudicial violence exacerbates ethnic tensions and contributes to boosting militant recruitment among pastoralist communities.¹⁸ But they also raise serious human rights issues and contribute to prevailing impunity, ultimately undermining the rule of law and fueling further conflict.

While these practices declined sharply under Damiba’s regime, even this period saw a geographically limited spike in Fada N’Gourma, the capital of the East region, where a dozen Fulani men, including ruggas (pastoralist leaders), were reportedly abducted or killed between February and May 2022. However, Traoré’s term in office shows a far more concerning pattern of VDP operations than those of his predecessors, as attacks on civilians have increased, including mass atrocities, extrajudicial killings, and other acts of violence. Around 80 VDP attacks on civilians occurred during Traoré’s first 15 months in power compared to around 60 such attacks in the two years under Kaboré’s watch (see graph below).

The ‘Militiafication’ of Violence in Burkina Faso

As Burkina Faso faces an unprecedented surge in violence and instability, the VDP is becoming a central part of the country’s security architecture. At the same time, it is also emerging as one of the key armed actors participating in the political violence of the broader conflict in the central Sahel. Against the backdrop of escalating conflict and deepening communal divisions, the rapid expansion of the VDP and its central role at the forefront of the fight against jihadist groups underscores both its potential and the challenges it faces.

The geographical spread of the VDP, mirroring the expansion of militant activity, has imposed increasing human losses on groups such as JNIM and IS Sahel. However, this counter-mobilization has also entangled communities in a vicious cycle of attacks and retaliation, propelling Burkina Faso into an almost nationwide conflict of civil war-like proportions that was ranked as the second-deadliest in West Africa in 2023.

The role of ‘militiafication’ in the escalation of violence should not be underestimated. The involvement of the VDP in the violence is widespread, as the provinces where the VDP is most involved in violence are spread across all different parts of the country. However, there are a few cases that stand out. Yatenga Province, for example, where violent confrontation between the VDP and JNIM is a central element of local conflict dynamics, ranks as the province with the highest number of deaths among the five G5 Sahel countries on the ACLED Conflict Index. In Koulpelogo province, where the conflict between the VDP and JNIM is also a central element of the local dynamics, the descent into violence is more recent (the earliest involvement of the VDP was recorded in mid-2021). Despite this, the violence rapidly reached extreme levels, which is also remarkable given the province’s proximity to the border with Togo and its distance from the hotbed of violence in Liptako-Gourma.¹⁹

As the central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which have joined forces in the Alliance of Sahel States defense pact, attempt to unify their counterinsurgency strategies through increased cooperation and coordination, it remains to be seen how ‘militiafication’ will develop in the respective countries given the different approaches. In neighboring Mali, for example, the relationship between the state and the self-defense groups and militias remains ambiguous,²⁰ even though state forces, Russian partner forces from the Wagner Group, and militias conduct joint operations. In Niger, the Nigerien government of the previous regime under former president Bazoum had taken measures to control Tuareg militias operating in the Tahoua region, through a system of control, co-optation, and integration into the National Guard under the moniker the ‘Nomad Guard.’ However, it did not do the same with the ethnic Djerma self-defense groups (or zankai) in Tillaberi.²¹ In fact, the zankai operate largely in autonomy and recently expanded their presence to the southwestern parts of Tillaberi, near the border with Burkina Faso, where a local self-defense group in early 2024 was involved in escalating violence.

Furthermore, the potential deployment of Russian troops, referred to as the ‘Africa Corps,’ brings a new dynamic to Burkina Faso’s already volatile conflict matrix.²² Considering Mali’s experience with the Wagner Group, the ramifications of a Russian deployment in Burkina Faso are contingent on Russia’s military support approach. A Russian Ministry of Defense mission could focus on training and materiel rather than combat operations.

The dramatic escalation of violence in 2023, with over 8,000 reported deaths, highlights the severity of the conflict that spans nearly the entire country. Despite numerous ground offensives by the army and VDP, efforts to curb militant advances have not achieved the desired containment, with setbacks recurring across several regions. The conflict in the Sahel is unlikely to wind down despite the heavy-handed approach endorsed by regional governments.

The resort to arming civilians in the Burkinabe context has led to serious human rights violations and an escalation of violence but also represents a clear step toward a militarization of society in which the lines between civilians and combatants are blurred, and identities are increasingly weaponized. Burkina Faso must focus on protecting the civilian population and respecting human rights to achieve sustainable peace, stability, and security.