When is quiet too quiet? Understanding shifts in extremist mobilization in 2024

18 September 2024

The United States is bracing for a contentious 2024 election cycle. As experts warn of possible political violence, ACLED has relaunched the US Crisis Monitor to track what happens.

The United States’ presidential contest has been unprecedentedly turbulent in 2024. In the space of less than two months, former President Donald Trump was convicted on 34 felony counts on 30 May, then celebrated a Supreme Court decision finding former presidents broadly immune from criminal proceedings on 1 July, before surviving an assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania on 13 July.¹ Two months later, on 15 September, the US Secret Service fired at a man armed with a scoped rifle at one of Trump’s golf courses in West Palm Beach, Florida, who was attempting to carry out an apparent assassination attempt according to the FBI.² Not to be outdone in headline-grabbing, President Joe Biden announced on 21 July that he was dropping out of the presidential race. He quickly endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris, who accepted the Democratic Party’s official nomination through a ‘virtual roll call’ ahead of the Democratic National Convention on 6 August.³

Despite the apparent political opportunity the election presents … 2024 is currently on track to see the lowest single-year levels of extremist group mobilization since ACLED began collecting US data in January 2020.

With such a shifting, volatile situation in American politics, it might be reasonable to expect that reality to be mirrored on the country’s streets. Indeed, even before these more recent developments, ACLED noted an elevated risk for political violence in the United States in 2024. After all, during the 2020 election cycle, extremist groups took to the streets assertively, culminating in the fateful January 2021 Capitol riot. These groups continued to operate in public in the immediate aftermath of the riot and into 2022, organizing against access to abortion and LGBTQ+ rights. Yet despite the apparent political opportunity the election presents, and despite this recent history, 2024 is currently on track to see the lowest single-year levels of extremist group mobilization since ACLED began collecting US data in January 2020.

So what explains this decline in the activity of extremist groups, even at an uncertain and highly significant political moment? Multiple interpretations of ACLED data, which apply to different groups to varying degrees, help to shed light on this question. They include perceptions around Trump’s likelihood of regaining the presidency, gaping holes in leadership following the 2021 riot at the US Capitol, a possible shift in tactics to threats instead of in-person actions, and difficulties finding ideological purchase as the Israel-Palestine conflict dominates national demonstration movements.

Extremist groups have (mostly) lost steam

Extremist group activity — meaning the participation of all actors of concern across the political spectrum, such as militia groups, openly white supremacist or neo-Nazi groups, militant street movements, etc. tracked by ACLED in demonstrations and acts of political violence — has been on the decline since 2023, which saw a 35% reduction in extremist mobilization compared to the previous year. Taken separately, the number of acts of political violence involving extremist actors has also declined each year since 2020 (see graph below). This decline is visible not only in this big-picture aggregate, but also when examining the evolution of particularly influential groups, and when drilling down into specific issues that have mobilized extremist groups in the past.

Many of the most active groups of previous years have seen their membership crumble and decay in the aftermath of the 6 January 2021 Capitol riot. Dozens of members of groups like the Proud Boys, Three Percenters, and Oath Keepers — including group leaders and high-ranking lieutenants — were arrested for their participation in the riot.⁴ This led directly to the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters losing the majority of their ability to mobilize members on the streets. Similarly, the QAnon movement, though still active in online spaces, has seen a precipitous falloff in references during demonstrations since 2022. On the other hand, although the Proud Boys — the most consistently violent extremist group tracked by ACLED — actually became more active in 2022 compared to the previous year, disagreements over the riot, as well as reports that former leader Enrique Tarrio had been a federal informant, splintered the group internally, their decentralized chapter-based structure growing increasingly loose (for more on the Proud Boys since the Capitol riot, see this report). From that point onward, Proud Boys activity declined precipitously, falling by roughly 65% from 2022 to 2023. This falloff has only accelerated in 2024, with the group’s activity declining by an additional 74% from January to August 2024 compared to the same period in 2023 (see graph below).

Similarly, many of the movements that organized in opposition to these groups — such as loosely organized anti-fascist groups — have seen their activity decline in recent years. Anti-fascist groups were most active during the major wave of Black Lives Matter demonstrations following the death of George Floyd, and in counter-mobilizing around pro-Trump demonstrations during and after the 2021 election. Though anti-fascists continue to mobilize in 2024, primarily over the Israel-Palestine conflict, overall recorded anti-fascist activity has declined each year since 2021. In the lead-up to November this year, from 1 January to 31 August 2024, anti-fascists have mobilized at roughly half the rate as what was observed over the same period before the 2020 presidential election.

Nearly all indications seem to point to a diminished role for extremist groups in 2024, and political developments in recent months have been so significant that the conditions for extremist mobilization may have shifted.

It is important to note that a sustained lull in extremist mobilization from 2023 to the present may not indicate that 2024’s election will be free from a sizable extremist presence. Indeed, the participation of extremist groups in demonstrations and political violence in 2020 spiked dramatically in the immediate lead-up to the presidential election in early November, as well as in its aftermath amid Donald Trump’s claims of voter fraud and the accompanying ‘Stop the Steal’ movement. More than a quarter of all recorded extremist activity that year took place in November and December alone. However, even extremist mobilization in the first eight months of 2020 exceeded what has taken place so far in 2024: Extremist activity from 1 January through 31 August has been recorded at levels more than a third lower than what was observed over the same period in 2020. It is simultaneously true that nearly all indications seem to point to a diminished role for extremist groups in 2024, and political developments in recent months have been so significant that the conditions for extremist mobilization may have shifted, potentially upending many of the factors that define the present trend.

Moreover, not all groups fit this trend of longer-term decay and decline. Notably, certain white nationalist and neo-Nazi groups actually increased their mobilization efforts from 2022 to 2023, even as the broader extremist milieu faded significantly. Groups like Patriot Front, Active Clubs, and White Lives Matter, which have overlapping membership, have expanded in chapter-based networks across the country over the past two years. Meanwhile, the Blood Tribe, a neo-Nazi group that first appeared in public in 2023, has organized increasingly brazen demonstrations outside synagogues, drag shows, and state capitols. Although white nationalist and neo-Nazi groups’ 2024 activity is not currently on pace to exceed their 2023 participation in demonstrations and political violence, volatility and political opportunities surrounding the election make this projection far from certain.

Drivers of past extremist activity are on the decline

From 2020 to the present, extremist groups have regularly mobilized around a number of specific themes or political demands. While these issues tend to resonate with the beliefs of a broad swath of extremist groups regardless of political climate, these groups are at their most active, and most visible, when they attempt to opportunistically ride the wave of a larger demonstration movement.

For example, demonstrations against access to abortion peaked in mid-2022, amid the US Supreme Court ruling overturning Roe v. Wade (for more on abortion-related demonstrations in 2022, see this report). Extremist participation in anti-abortion demonstrations, similarly, spiked during this time. These groups do not frequent anti-abortion demonstrations: roughly 90% went on without any reported participation by an extremist group in 2022. However, this also means that they participated in more than 10% of all anti-abortion demonstrations that year, compared to an average of only 5% of anti-abortion demonstrations in 2020, 2021, 2023, and 2024, which all saw much fewer demonstrations related to abortion. This trend demonstrates how extremist group activity peaks around issues that are both salient to them and salient to a larger demonstration movement. Though abortion remains a highly salient political issue in 2024, especially in the context of the presidential election, a decline in demonstrations relating to abortion has resulted in a proportionally steeper decline in extremist group activity related to abortion.⁵

Similar dynamics can be seen around anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations, which peaked in 2023 and have declined by roughly 71% so far in 2024 compared to the same period last year. Though extremist groups participated in more than a third of all anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations in 2023, so far in 2024 they have only been present at roughly one in ten demonstrations (for more on anti-LBGTQ+ demonstrations in 2024, see the July US Crisis Monitor).

Mobilizing for Trump

Mobilization in support of Donald Trump reveals a departure from this trend of opportunistic mobilization. Extremist groups participated in roughly 10% of the more than 1,200 pro-Trump demonstrations ACLED records in 2020, as well as nearly a third of pro-Trump demonstrations in 2021 amid the “Stop the Steal” movement. This means that despite a decline of more than 70% in pro-Trump demonstrations from 2020 to 2021, extremist participation in pro-Trump demonstrations more than tripled as a percentage of overall activity. So far in 2024, extremist groups have participated in approximately 10% of pro-Trump demonstrations, following similar patterns to 2020. However, pro-Trump demonstrations have been roughly two-thirds less frequent than they were over the same period in 2020, despite the assassination attempts against the former president and his conviction on criminal charges (see graph below).

This precipitous decline indicates that Trump’s followers may have grown less responsive to his calls to action than they were in the past. In 2021, hundreds of demonstrations — including the 6 January Capitol riot — mobilized after Trump claimed the election had been stolen from him. Just over two years later, in March 2023, Trump expressly called for his followers to “PROTEST, TAKE OUR NATION BACK” on his site, Truth Social, predicting he would be arrested for his alleged interference in Georgia’s 2020 election.⁶ Over the next month, only around three dozen demonstrations — many with more media present than actual demonstrators — were organized across the country.⁷ When Trump was actually arrested in August of the same year, fewer than five pro-Trump demonstrations were recorded over the following month. Similarly, when he was convicted in late May 2024, ACLED records only roughly a dozen pro-Trump demonstrations over the next month. Though many far-right groups have expressed outrage online over legal proceedings against Trump, they have rarely mobilized to oppose them.⁸

After the assassination attempt against Donald Trump on 13 July 2024, Republican elected officials predicted an outpouring of popular support, culminating in Trump’s victory in November. As Republican Congressman Derrick Van Orden predicted hours after the shooting, “President Trump survives this attack, he just won the election.”⁹ Indeed, over the next month, demonstrations in support of Trump spiked to their highest levels since January 2021, though ACLED records fewer than 50 such demonstrations, and only one involving the participation of an extremist group — a 20 July rally involving KKK affiliates in rural Michigan. Moreover, possibly because no clear motive could be immediately identified for the would-be assassin’s actions, demonstrations — and media focus on the assassination attempt — tapered off quickly, especially following President Biden’s announcement that he would drop out of the 2020 race.¹⁰ The more recent apparent assassination attempt of 15 September may trigger a similar wave of sympathy demonstrations, though it remains to be seen if these will be as short-lived as those in July.

Although extremist groups appear to have more perseverance when it comes to demonstrating in support of Trump than for other issues, it might seem reasonable that the culmination of an assassination attempt and a criminal conviction against him (especially against the backdrop of an election year) would result in a much larger spike in pro-Trump demonstrations involving these groups. It is not clear what explains this apparent gap in opportunities for pro-Trump mobilization and the present reality.

Especially before Biden dropped out of the race, many groups may have seen little need to mobilize to support Trump. To many, Trump — who is seen variously as the champion of these groups’ preferred agendas or the best viable option at the present moment — may have seemed sure to regain the presidency. Other groups may fear a repeat of the law enforcement crackdown on extremist groups following the Capitol riot, with some leaders, including the Proud Boys’ main Telegram channel, referring to opportunities to mobilize as “traps” or “honey pots.”¹¹ This may help explain an increase in online threats and harassment against local officials recorded by Princeton’s Bridging Divides Initiative, even as in-person action involving extremist groups has fallen.¹² Still, others may be disillusioned with Trump, seeing him as disloyal or weak for failing to live up to their expectations politically or pardon the Capitol rioters. For example, some antisemitic groups have condemned Trump on Telegram for his support for Israel.¹³ While overall extremist group support for Trump may seem slightly cooler compared to previous years, the most active neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups appear to have taken an even chillier stance toward the former president. In addition, few of these groups reacted to Trump’s conviction or the assassination attempt against him, apparently choosing to stay silent on these matters instead (though at least one pro-Trump demonstration organized by the KKK did take place following the July assassination attempt). Whatever the case — hubris, complacency, fear, disillusionment, or something else — it seems most likely that different explanations fit different groups to varying degrees.

Risk of a repeat? Political violence in 2020 and 2024

It is difficult to overstate how different conditions are in 2024 compared to the previous presidential election year. 2020 saw massive and widespread demonstrations in support of the Black Lives Matter movement, including the largest single-month spike in events in ACLED’s United States dataset by a massive margin. At the same time, widespread resistance to COVID-era restrictions took place throughout the pandemic. Extremist groups organized en masse around these drivers, both of which were further magnified as they were hotly debated as part of an already contentious presidential election. After it was clear that Trump had lost the election, he made his claims of voter fraud from the position of president, calling on his supporters to keep him in power, rather than to get him there in the first place. It is significant that Trump does not hold office in 2024, just as it is significant that extremist groups have not appeared to be gathering their strength over the past year. It is still possible that some groups have chosen to plan for action around the election away from the public eye. A more clandestine approach would represent a drastic departure for many of these groups whose previous tactics sought to radicalize the public through displays of force and strength. Still, some groups — and especially those that fear action from law enforcement — may have made such a change.

For now, data on extremist groups and demonstration trends gives little indication that 2024 will see a repeat of the patterns that characterized 2020. This is not to say that there is little risk of political violence in 2024.

Of course, 2024 has its own large demonstration movement over the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, unlike with the issues of systemic racism, police brutality, or COVID-related ‘medical freedom,’ many extremist groups may have issues finding ideological purchase in a public setting when it comes to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Though pro-Palestine demonstrators may seem like comfortable opponents for most extremist groups, many of these groups are virulently antisemitic and unwilling to support Israel (or be construed as supporting Israel) as a consequence. At the same time, they align little with the pro-Palestine movement, not only because of its political character but because these groups are most often also strongly anti-Muslim. This may help explain why extremist groups have participated in less than 1% of all demonstrations related to the conflict: It presents little ideological opportunity to ‘ride the wave,’ as these groups have done in the past.

For now, data on extremist groups and demonstration trends gives little indication that 2024 will see a repeat of the patterns that characterized 2020. This is not to say that there is little risk of political violence in 2024. Indeed, the assassination attempts against Trump highlight how unpredictable individuals can take action to change the political environment dramatically. Some of the deadliest acts of political violence in the United States were carried out by people who acted alone and were not formally affiliated with extremist groups.¹⁴ Multiple scenarios surrounding the election could rapidly distort the current situation. To take the most obvious possibilities, if the 2024 election is very close, or highly contentious, a wave of outraged supporters may decide to take to the street. In such a scenario, extremist groups would likely join their ranks and fan the flames further, without much need for prior organizing. Indeed, on 14 September, days after Trump’s unsubstantiated claim during the 10 September presidential debate that Haitian migrants in Springfield, Ohio, were “eating the pets of the people that live there,” dozens of people self-identifying as Proud Boys marched in the city to demonstrate against a “Haitian invasion.”¹⁵ While it is worth remembering that a more widespread public reaction has not yet taken place in response to Trump being indicted, convicted, or shot, the added spotlight and significance of the election could easily influence how his supporters react to any future developments.