Sudan Situation Update | October 2024

Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks

14 October 2024

Sudan at a Glance: 7 September – 4 October 2024

Vital Trends

Since fighting first broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, ACLED records 8,109 events of political violence and more than 24,850 reported fatalities in Sudan.
From 7 September to 4 October 2024, ACLED records 460 political violence events and over 1,810 reported fatalities.
Most political violence was recorded in Khartoum and North Darfur states during the reporting period, with 259 and 71 events and 345 and 1,061 reported fatalities, respectively.
The most common event type was explosions/remote violence, with 201 events recorded, followed by battles, with 195 events. Compared to the previous four weeks, ACLED records a 14% decrease in explosion/remote violence events. Most of these events were recorded in Khartoum.

Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks

The 17th month of the war between the SAF and the RSF marked the most significant SAF offensive in the capital, Khartoum, following months of training new troops across its controlled territories. For the first time, RSF troops found themselves in a defensive posture across the Khartoum tri-cities and were caught off guard by the scale of the SAF operations. As a result, the RSF faced disarray and territorial losses, particularly in the western parts of Khartoum city and northern Bahri, where the SAF successfully broke the siege on the Weapons Corps in Kadaro and linked it with its forces in northern Omdurman.

Further west, the SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces opened fighting with the RSF on three frontlines in North and West Darfur states. The coalition clashed with the RSF in the northern desert areas of Mellit and Kutum in North Darfur, and took control of Kalbus in West Darfur. By opening these new fronts, the Darfur Joint Forces seek to distract the RSF from encircling El Fasher, which remains the focus of the RSF’s war efforts in North Darfur. In south-central Sudan, the SAF linked its forces in Sennar city with those in White Nile state by regaining control of the strategic Jebel Moya area. As a result, the SAF troops surrounded the RSF inside the Sennar state from all directions.

A major offensive links SAF troops in Khartoum

During his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan said the RSF “should be considered a terrorist group”¹ on the same day that the SAF launched an operation to reconnect its troops stationed across the Sudanese tri-city capital.² This operation marked one of the SAF’s largest coordinated attacks. Troops in every base in Khartoum began offensives against RSF positions across the tri-cities. Heavy airstrikes and artillery shelling preceded advances by SAF infantry troops on al-Halfaya and White Nile bridges to secure strategic positions previously held by the RSF. The offensives came after the SAF consolidated its military strength. Over the past months, the SAF trained thousands of recruits and inaugurated training camps for its ally, the Darfur Joint Forces, in Gedaref and Kassala.³ In August, Russia and Egypt also provided 15 new fighter jets to the SAF.⁴

During the morning hours of 26 September, SAF troops stationed at the Engineers Corps base, located between the White Nile and al-Fitahab bridges in Omdurman, used the bridges to cross into al-Mogran neighborhood in Khartoum city. Fierce clashes erupted in two locations: on the road along the Blue Nile River and on the al-Fitahab bridge road heading to the RSF-controlled Strategic Corps base, where the SAF gained control of the Khartoum city sides of the two bridges (see map below). At the same time, intense fighting broke out further east around the besieged SAF-controlled General Command Headquarters. Concurrently, clashes were reported in the vicinity of the SAF-controlled Armored Corps base in southern Khartoum. In the days following these clashes, the SAF gained control of Lamab neighborhood north of the Armored Corps base.

In Bahri city, clashes erupted around the SAF Signal Corps base, situated in the southern part of the city along the Blue Nile River. SAF troops advanced north along one of the main northbound roads near the base, al-Ingaz Street. Simultaneously, farther north, SAF forces stationed in Omdurman successfully crossed the al-Halfaya bridge into Bahri. This move marked a significant shift. Unlike the SAF’s previously failed attempts to cross the bridge, its troops were able to maintain positions on the eastern side of the bridge in the RSF-controlled al-Halfaya neighborhood of Bahri. This was coordinated with clashes near the SAF-controlled Weapons Corps located further north, where SAF troops regained control of the neighborhoods there and advanced south toward RSF-controlled al-Halfaya. On the second day of the offensive, the SAF successfully took control of al-Izirgab and al-Halfaya neighborhoods in Bahri, linking its forces in Karari with the Weapons Corps base.

These developments were further bolstered by the SAF advances from the north in the neighboring River Nile state. There, the SAF 3rd Infantry Division in Shendi city of River Nile state expanded its control south and regained control of the RSF-controlled Hajar al-Asal areas. These areas are located in River Nile state but are only about 70 kilometers north of the al-Gaili oil refinery in Bahri. The events that began on 26 September marked a significant success for the SAF on this front. However, the SAF failed to gain control over the al-Gaili oil refinery in northern Bahri or advance south toward the Signal Corps base as it faced stiff resistance from the RSF. A large deployment of RSF snipers in the Shambat neighborhood slowed the SAF’s progress, preventing further advancement at the time of writing. The al-Gaili oil refinery is a vital fuel source for RSF troops operating in the Khartoum tri-cities. Intensified clashes to control the refinery began in early September.

An operation in February successfully broke the siege around the Engineers Corps base in Omdurman, and now, the SAF has managed to lift the siege on the Weapons Corps base and the Reconnaissance Corps base in northern Bahri. Currently, three bases remain under siege: the Signal Corps and the General Command headquarters, which are connected by two bridges but isolated from the rest of Khartoum; and the Armored Corps base in the south of Khartoum. With the latest offensive, the SAF appears to be aiming to break the siege around the General Command headquarters and the Signal Corps base by linking these key bases with the Engineers Corps base in Omdurman through downtown Khartoum. If the SAF manages to secure this connection, it would then likely aim to extend its control southwards of the downtown area to link with the Armored Corps base, further weakening the RSF’s hold on the capital.

Multiple frontlines across Darfur to break the siege around El Fasher

North Darfur was the site of heavy clashes between September and October. The state capital, El Fasher, remains the only major city in Darfur under the control of the SAF, and is the target of a major offensive by the RSF. Yet, at the end of September, the Darfur Joint Forces mobilized its troops in the desert areas north of El Fasher and opened three new fronts with the RSF in North and West Darfur states (see map below). The end of September marks the end of the rainy season that constrained troop movement.

In North Darfur, the RSF made several advances towards El Fasher, launching coordinated offensives from the north, east, and south, backed by heavy drone strikes and artillery bombardments. For example, on 8 September, SAF anti-aircraft units shot down 30 RSF drones during intense fighting. On 14 and 16 September, the RSF bombarded El Fasher again with artillery, launching over 90 shells. A significant RSF advance occurred on 12 September in the al-Wihda and al-Salam neighborhoods from the southern front, where they briefly took control of the Southern Hospital in al-Salam. The next day, the Darfur Joint Forces successfully repelled the RSF and regained control of the hospital. On 21 September, the RSF advanced to within 1.5 kilometers of the 6th Infantry Division headquarters near the Grand Market. Despite these advances, the SAF and Darfur Joint Forces pushed back against the RSF, resulting in multiple territorial exchanges. The infantry troops defending El Fasher were constantly backed by SAF airstrikes that targeted RSF troops moving toward the city. According to some sources, the battles in El Fasher left hundreds of casualties among the ranks of the RSF, including the death of at least two commanders.⁵

On 1 October, the Darfur Joint Forces opened new fronts with the RSF in North Darfur, clashing in at least four different locations in Mellit locality. The Darfur Joint Forces newly deployed troops to these areas in the northeast of the region at the end of September. Their experience with rural warfare and swift movements allowed them to distract the RSF and gain control over northeastern parts of North Darfur. Another front opened in the north of Kutum district, where the Darfur Joint forces attacked the RSF in three locations, including the RSF base of Bir Maza, situated 28 kilometers north of Kutum city (see map above).

In West Darfur, an additional front opened in Kulbus, near the border with Chad. As the Darfur Joint Forces mobilized there and gained control of Jabal Umm by 27 September, the RSF threatened to attack Kublus if the Gimir Native Administration did not expel the Darfur Joint Forces from the city within three days. However, the RSF attacked the Darfur Joint Forces on 30 September in Jabal Umm, and in Kulbus on 1 October, in which the Darfur Joint Forces repelled the RSF attempts to retake the area. Previously, the RSF did not have a presence in the area of Gimir because, when the RSF overtook West Darfur in November 2023, the Gimir Native Administration made an agreement with the RSF that the RSF would not enter the locality if it maintained no military presence. These maneuvers reflect the Darfur Joint Forces’ primary goal to relieve the RSF stronghold on El Fasher and send reinforcements to the city. After multiple clashes on different frontlines, as of 6 October, the Darfur Joint Forces successfully sent reinforcements to El Fasher through the Halouf Gate, the northern entrance to the city.

The recent clashes in North Darfur have intensified attacks on civilians, as the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) faction led by Minni Minnawi accused the RSF of attacking and burning 17 villages inhabited by the Zaghawa ethnic group in early October.⁶ The Zaghawa ethnic group, who make up a majority of the troops in the Darfur Joint Forces, are now at heightened risk of further violence by RSF and its allied Arab militias. Tensions between Arab and Zaghawa ethnic groups could potentially lead to a scenario similar to the violence in El Geneina city, West Darfur, when the RSF raided the city, targeting mostly ethnically Masalit civilians and killing hundreds of civilians following days-long clashes with the SAF in June and November 2023.

The SAF’s dual offensive to regain control over Jabal Moya in Sennar

Last June, the fall of Jabal Moya, a strategic mountain range located at the border between al-Jazirah and Sennar states, to the RSF marked a turning point in the conflict. Its higher position overlooking the plains of Sennar state gave the RSF a significant strategic advantage, eventually leading the SAF to lose control over the state capital, Sinja. The RSF’s control of Jabal Moya also severed the road linking the SAF 18th Infantry Division in White Nile state with SAF troops in Sennar. In response, SAF troops from the 18th Infantry Division retreated west to Jabal Dud and maintained their positions there.

In the following months, the RSF consolidated its hold over the territories it controlled in Sennar while expanding its presence into northern Blue Nile state, which lies south of Sennar. Meanwhile, the SAF managed to hold Sennar city and the last remaining route connecting it to SAF-controlled areas in Gedaref state. Since the fall of Sinja, clashes in Sennar have mostly been limited to the city and its surrounding areas. The SAF and its allies — the Darfur Joint Forces, al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigade, Popular Resistance, and reinforcements from the Justice and Equality Movement deployed at the end of September — have been actively involved in the defense.

On 3 October, SAF troops launched a two-front offensive, advancing from both Sennar city in the east and Jabal Dud in the west toward Jabal Moya.⁷ They captured Jabal Sagadi, located northwest of Jabal Moya, and Fangoga and Jabal al-Awar, to the southeast of Jabal Moya, tightening the siege on RSF forces (see map below). After two days of intense clashes, the SAF successfully regained control over Jabal Moya, re-establishing a vital link between the 18th Infantry Division in White Nile and its forces in Sennar city.