Q&A: Behind the data on the Israel-Hezbollah war

What is the scale of Israel’s bombardment on Lebanon?

In the past few weeks, from 16 September to our last data cutoff on 25 October, we have recorded over 3,250 Israeli airstrike events in Lebanon. To put this in perspective, our data for the Middle East dating back to 2017 shows that the number of airstrike events in Lebanon during both September and October was higher than in any other month we’ve recorded in the region (see graph below).¹The number of airstrikes recorded by ACLED reflects unique incidents of airstrikes reported as occurring in one location and on one date. This can include several individual airstrikes. Therefore, these incidents are recorded as ‘airstrike events,’ rather than individual strikes (for more details on the ACLED methodology, see the Knowledge Base). This includes the number of airstrike events in Syria in April 2017, which included US-led coalition forces’ air campaign against the Islamic State.

How do these airstrikes differ from those Israel has carried out in Gaza?

The number of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) airstrikes we recorded in Lebanon in September and October both far surpass the number recorded in Gaza for any single month over the past year. However, airstrikes in Gaza have been more lethal on a per-month basis, given its small size, high population density, and the challenges civilians have faced in evacuating combat zones. So far, despite the very intense airstrikes in some parts of Lebanon, Israel does not appear to have engaged in a carpet bombing of Lebanon similar to that in Gaza.

Where are Israel’s airstrikes targeting?

The primary focus of airstrikes has been on Hezbollah’s strongholds in the south, the Bekaa Valley in the east, and the suburbs of Beirut (see maps below). 

But the IDF has also conducted airstrikes far from Hezbollah’s strongholds. For example, on 14 October, a strike on a Christian community near the northern town of Tripoli killed over 20 people, including 12 women and two children. While it is unlikely that Israel intended to target these civilians, there was reportedly just one Hezbollah member among the displaced family in the house that was targeted.

As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated, Israel will “strike Hezbollah without mercy everywhere in Lebanon,”²David Gritten and Jonathan Head, ‘Lebanon says 21 killed in air strike in country’s north,’ BBC, 15 October 2024 so such airstrikes may continue as more of the Shiite community, including potential Hezbollah members, seek refuge in other parts of the country.

This also has the potential to lead to social friction, given Lebanon’s sectarian divides, as people in other areas may become increasingly reluctant to receive displaced Shiites out of fear that Israel will target them or their properties.

How have civilians been affected?

As in Gaza, Israel is demonstrating a high tolerance for inflicting significant civilian casualties in pursuit of military goals.

Since Hezbollah has stopped announcing its fighters that have been killed, we lack clarity on the breakdown of militant and civilian fatalities. But, reports from the Lebanese Public Health Ministry indicate that many of those killed are women and children. For instance, on 23 September — Lebanon’s deadliest day in decades — more than 550 people were killed, with over a quarter being women and children.

Another related issue is Israel’s approach to defining and targeting individuals based on what it considers ‘involvement’ with an armed group, rather than strictly distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. In the context of Lebanon, where Hezbollah is not only an armed group but also a political and social entity that operates schools, hospitals, and charities, this can lead to significant risks for civilians. 

One case that illustrates this is the attacks targeting the health sector in Lebanon. Since October 2023, we have recorded over 90 incidents involving health and rescue workers or health facilities, many affiliated with Hezbollah or the Amal movement, being hit in Israeli attacks. Around 70% of these incidents have occurred since 17 September (see map below) and have ranged from Israel targeting rescue workers conducting recovery and rescue operations to strikes on hospitals, medical centers, and ambulances.

What do we know about Israel’s ground operation in Lebanon?

Information and reporting on Israel’s ground operation remain relatively limited, especially from the Israeli side. However, the reports we do have suggest that the operation has primarily focused on the Bint Jubayl and Marjayun districts in the Nabatiye governorate, in the central part of southern Lebanon along the border. It also extends southwest into the Tyre district in the South governorate.

These areas along the border, where Israeli troops are currently operating, were subjected to heavy airstrikes and shelling over the past year, which has continued into October (see maps below). So, Israel had already laid the groundwork for its troops to move in and fully clear the area, both above and below ground, likely with the aim of creating a buffer zone near the border.

How has Hezbollah responded?

While Israeli outlets suggest that the IDF has so far encountered limited resistance, based on the available reports, we record over 50 armed clashes during the first four weeks of the ground operation (see map below). This indicates that Hezbollah is still attempting to conduct an organized defensive battle in some of the villages near the border. Additionally, we have documented over 60 other events since the start of October in which Hezbollah forces have carried out one-sided attacks, such as detonating IEDs or firing rockets, anti-tank missiles, or mortars at Israeli forces on the ground in Lebanon, continuing to inflict casualties on Israeli soldiers.

Has Hezbollah increased its rocket, missile, and drone attacks on Israel?

Yes, Hezbollah has continued to launch projectiles and drones into Israel. Although Israel’s air defense systems still intercept most projectiles, since the intensification of violence last month, Hezbollah has increased both the scale and the geographic scope of its attacks.

It is true that we are still not observing the regular use of precision-guided missiles or the previously feared thousands of daily rocket launches into Israel. However, Hezbollah is still firing hundreds of rockets into Israel and the occupied Golan Heights daily. It has also increasingly targeted areas deeper inside Israel (see map below), occasionally using more sophisticated weapons, and has employed drones — which are harder to detect and track — which have reportedly caused fatalities among IDF soldiers. For example, on 13 October, four soldiers from the Golani Brigade were killed near Binyamina, nearly 70 kilometers south of the border with Lebanon. So, the level of violence Hezbollah has maintained has been sufficient not only to prevent Israeli evacuees from returning to their northern communities but also to disrupt life further into central Israel.

How likely is it that current negotiations will be successful?

We’ll have to wait and see if US-led diplomatic efforts at this stage will at least lead to a temporary ceasefire while broader negotiations over the implementation of an ‘enhanced’ version of UNSC resolution 1701 continue. The return of Israeli evacuees would require Hezbollah to stop firing rockets into Israel; short of Israeli ground troops moving deep into Lebanon to fully dismantle Hezbollah’s military capabilities — an unlikely scenario — only a political solution can achieve this aim in the short term. Israel’s military establishment appears to be in favor of an agreement amid significant military and intelligence successes of Israel in recent weeks. But, it is not clear if Israel’s political leadership thinks that enough has been done yet.

If negotiations at this stage remain fruitless and Israel decides to remain on the ground, it could face two options: establishing a narrow tactical strip for a limited period to generate more pressure for a diplomatic settlement or a broader, permanent security zone in southern Lebanon, similar to the area it controlled from the mid-1980s to 2000. This latter scenario, in particular, could drag Israel into a protracted conflict, bogging down the IDF in southern Lebanon, exposing soldiers to guerrilla attacks, and recreating an occupation situation similar to that following the 1982 Israeli invasion, which might eventually increase Hezbollah’s domestic support. This option seems unlikely based on the IDF’s public statements, but the volatility of developments in the region, as well as domestic political considerations in Israel and the upcoming US elections, leaves the future uncertain.