How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map

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The arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in the United States on 25 July 2024 marked a breaking point for the Sinaloa Cartel. Amid simmering tensions as a result of previous disruptions in its top leadership, the arrest of the former top leader led to an all-out war between two of the cartel’s factions, Los Chapitos and El Mayo, to the extent that many have begun to question the cartel’s continued existence. The rift has led to a spike in violence in the group’s stronghold in Sinaloa, but it has also started to spread in territories controlled and disputed by the Sinaloa Cartel as other criminal groups seek to leverage the fracture for territorial expansion. The outbreak of clashes and attacks in September 2024 following El Mayo’s arrest¹ contributed to 2024 recording some of the highest levels of violence involving non-state armed groups in Mexico over the last six years, and has since contributed to persistently high levels of violence across the country.

Confronted with preexisting and emerging conflicts, President Claudia Sheinbaum has started to implement her new security plan, which she unveiled upon taking office on 1 October 2024. The state response under the Sheinbaum administration has involved heightened deployments, intelligence-led operations, and high-profile arrests. These actions are partly influenced by renewed pressure from the Trump administration to reduce drug trafficking and migration, as United States politicians are contemplating unilateral military strikes against criminal organizations in Mexico. Although still in its early stages, there are few signs that these efforts have meaningfully weakened criminal groups. Instead, measures the government is undertaking suggest it may be reenacting the “kingpin” strategy used by President Felipe Calderón to topple criminal groups’ top leadership, which risks fueling the emergence of opportunistic criminal actors.

The fallout of the Sinaloa Cartel dispute has set off a broader realignment of criminal groups and openings for new conflicts in contested territories. To understand the significance of the Sinaloa Cartel’s rift and its impact on gang violence dynamics, it is necessary to understand how it came to garner such influence and how its internal structure has enabled its expansion across the country.

The Sinaloa Cartel, its operations, and internal divisions

The Sinaloa Cartel, one of Mexico’s largest criminal groups, has a federal structure that allows its factions and allies to maintain full operation autonomy and horizontal relations without a rigid hierarchy.² In the early 1990s, the Sinaloa Cartel consolidated its operations under the leadership of former members of the fractured Guadalajara Cartel: Joaquín Guzmán, known as “El Chapo,” Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, and Juan José “El Azul” Esparragoza.³ The criminal organization helmed by these three leaders established its strongholds in Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua states, particularly around the mountainous area known as “the Golden Triangle,” where the cartel controlled poppy and marijuana crops.⁴ With time, the cartel has diversified its criminal activities, involving itself in the production of synthetic drugs, extortion of agricultural industries, and other legal and illegal businesses.⁵ While these states have been crucial for operations, the cartel has also formed alliances with local criminal groups to expand its influence in strategic areas connecting to the northern border in Sonora and Baja California states and the south in Chiapas and Quintana Roo states.

The leadership of the cartel has been shaken on several occasions, notably after the arrests of two of the cartel’s historical leaders and the suspected death of El Azul in 2014, leading to readjustments between the different factions.⁶ In 2016, Mexican authorities arrested El Chapo, who was later extradited to the US in 2017.⁷ More recently, on 25 July 2024, El Mayo was arrested in the US along with Joaquín Guzmán López, one of El Chapo’s sons.⁸ Following the arrests of these high-profile figures, the leadership of the cartel’s factions has been transferred to their family members.

Currently, the cartel comprises two main factions, both of which are connected to the cartel’s founding members. The faction led by El Chapo’s sons, known as Los Chapitos, operates primarily in Sinaloa and has a strong presence in the municipality of Culiacán and on the Pacific coast of the state, as well as in Sonora and Baja California (see map below), where they have disputed territorial control with rival groups.

Information on the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel and affiliates and the cartel’s factions per state is sourced from the NarcoData project (2020), Mexico Violence Resource Project (2021), and X @laloguerrero, 27 July 2024.

For the purpose of this report, Sinaloa Cartel-affiliated groups are determined based on the network analysis of Nathan P. Jones, et al., “A Social Network Analysis of Mexico’s Dark Network Alliance Structure,” Journal of Strategic Security, 2022, p.7, complemented with more recent information on gang affiliations.

The other main faction was led by El Mayo. After his arrest, it came under the control of one of his sons, who is known as “El Mayito Flaco.”⁹ The El Mayo faction dominates operations in Durango and rural areas of Sinaloa and has a strong presence in Baja California, Sonora, and Zacatecas.

Other groups have formed part of the cartel federation and, at times, have competed with the Los Chapitos and El Mayo factions. Notably, the factions and cells that have maintained relevant ties with the founding leaders of the cartel are the Gente del Guano criminal group, led by El Chapo’s brother Aureliano Guzmán Loera, known as “El Guano,” and one led by the Cabrera Sarabia family, traditional partners of El Mayo.¹⁰

By virtue of its federal structure and system of alliances, the Sinaloa Cartel has been able to consolidate its presence in several states, especially along the northern border. However, its presence along this strategic trafficking corridor has constantly generated rivalries as other criminal organizations have aimed to leverage the cartel’s internal tensions to challenge its hegemony in its stronghold. Although the cartel had managed to maintain relative unity, the arrest of El Mayo, which his supporters blame on El Chapo’s sons, marked a turning point. They claim the Los Chapitos leader, Joaquín Guzmán López, betrayed El Mayo to US authorities in the hopes of gaining leverage for himself and his brother, Ovidio Guzmán López. Both are facing charges in the US.¹¹ The dispute sparked an open war that threatens the federation’s stability.

Sinaloa’s factional turf war spreads across the cartel’s stronghold

Los Chapitos’ alleged treason triggered an open conflict with the El Mayo faction in Sinaloa, the hotbed of the dispute. While the cartel had gone through internal disputes in the past, El Mayo and other cartel leaders were known for their role as mediators who helped to reduce the risk of direct conflict between the factions.¹² Following a period of adjustment after El Mayo’s July 2024 arrest, during which limited violent incidents involving rival cartel members occurred, the factions engaged in a wave of clashes and attacks that started in earnest on 9 September. Between July 2024 and March 2025, gang targeting of civilians and gang-on-gang clashes nearly quadrupled compared to the period from 19 November 2023 to 24 July 2024, the previous eight months, reaching a peak in October and November. The violence reached levels never seen in this state since ACLED began coverage of Mexico in 2018.

The escalation of the conflict seems to be driven by the El Mayo faction’s interest in increasing its control in towns and cities along the coast, where the Los Chapitos faction has maintained more influence, in order to broaden the scope of its operations, which have traditionally been concentrated in areas bordering the state of Durango.¹³ Violent actions in Sinaloa had concentrated mainly in the state’s capital city, Culiacán, which, even before the outbreak of the conflict, was the scene of disputes by these factions and smaller groups that fought for the control of extortion operations and the local drug market.¹⁴ However, violence has since spread into rural areas of the Culiacán municipality and other southern municipalities as the factions seek to redraw the borderlines of their respective zones of influence. Notably, after El Mayo’s arrest, violence has intensified in the south along the Pacific coast following the state’s main roads, including the federal highways 15 and 15D that connect Culiacán to the second main city, Mazatlán, which has an important touristic and commercial port controlled by the cartel (see map below).¹⁵

Sinaloa has become the stage of alarming levels of violence targeting civilians. ACLED records a high number of killings since September, which is at odds with the Sinaloa Cartel’s reputation for using less overt violence against civilians.¹⁶ Civilians have been targeted in retaliatory attacks for their suspected links with any of the rival factions. Kidnappings and forced disappearances have also been on the rise, as these groups seek to instill fear and extort ransoms from relatives.¹⁷

Public displays of violence and targeted attacks on prominent figures believed to be connected to or critical of the cartel’s leaders, including social media influencers, have served to advertise the strength of the different factions and intimidate their followers.¹⁸ The factions have further targeted politicians and political authorities to establish control over localities and diminish their rivals’ political influence. Since El Mayo’s arrest on 25 July 2024, ACLED records at least 10 targeted attacks against political figures in Sinaloa, some of whom are believed to have ties with one of the cartel’s factions.¹⁹ The number of such attacks surpasses the levels recorded in the previous eight months in a state where the relative hegemony of the Sinaloa Cartel contributed to fewer attacks, even during electoral periods.

Outside of Sinaloa, the cartel’s turf war has also affected Sonora and Baja California, where ongoing disputes between allies of each faction involved in cross-border drug, weapons, and human trafficking escalated.²⁰ After the outbreak of the infighting following El Mayo’s arrest, violence in the neighboring municipalities of San Luis Rio Colorado in Sonora and Mexicali in Baja California has intensified amid disputes between Los Rusos (allies of El Mayo), Los Chapitos, and Los Salazar (a former partner of Los Chapitos) (see graph below).²¹

There are also growing signs that the dispute between rival factions could be spilling into other areas, such as the state of Durango, where violence levels have been relatively low in recent years.²² In the eight months since El Mayo’s arrest, attacks and explosions perpetrated by non-state armed groups have increased, spurred by the greater use of drones. ACLED records at least 15 actions by armed groups that included the use of a drone charged with explosives,²³ more than double the number of events recorded in the eight preceding months.

Rival criminal organizations seek to exploit the Sinaloa Cartel rift

The consequences of the Sinaloa Cartel’s rift extend beyond internal dynamics as other criminal groups leverage the cartel’s strained operational capacities to make territorial advances or forge new alliances.²⁴

One of the groups seemingly seeking advantage from the Sinaloa Cartel’s internal rift is its main rival, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). Since the Sinaloa Cartel’s fracture, ACLED data point to an intensification of the conflict between the two cartels in areas of illicit activities. A notable example is Tijuana, Baja California, where clashes between non-state armed groups and their targeting of civilians increased by 16% between 25 July 2024 and 31 March 2025, compared to the eight months prior. The surge has particularly affected the city’s northern districts along the US border, where the Sinaloa Cartel and other criminal groups — including the Tijuana Cartel and CJNG, which has expanded in the state since at least 2014²⁵ — compete for the control of cross-border trafficking activities in this critical corridor. Similar dynamics are also at play in Manzanillo, Colima, where the dispute between the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel over control of the port — a key hub for drug trafficking — has intensified. Meanwhile, in the Huajicori municipality in Nayarit, the El Mayo faction of the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG have both sought to secure the route connecting the state of Sinaloa with Zacatecas, a crucial link between the Pacific coast and the northern trafficking corridor. The escalation in violence in localized and highly strategic areas suggests a deliberate effort to concentrate their warring power and assert dominance in vital trafficking points.

However, the CJNG’s behavior in other areas under dispute with the Sinaloa Cartel is not uniquely offensive. In Chiapas, gang-related violence decreased by 51% between 25 July 2024 and 31 March 2025 compared to the previous eight-month period (see graph below). This happened even though Chiapas has been the epicenter of a turf war between the two cartels over the control of migrant trafficking routes from Central America. While the decrease can be partly attributed to state-led efforts to curb insecurity and increased collaboration between state and military forces,²⁶ the CJNG may also have adopted strategic patience; it is either waiting for the Sinaloa Cartel to weaken or is seeking an arrangement with local power brokers to preserve its key operations without resorting to violence. Part of the reason for this may be that the US designated the CJNG a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), alongside the Sinaloa Cartel and four other Mexican criminal groups, exposing the group to heightened scrutiny from the Mexican government. At the same time, it remains actively engaged in turf wars and clashes with security forces in the state of Michoacán, which provides an additional incentive for the CJNG to maintain a low profile and concentrate its efforts on high-priority fronts.

Nevertheless, Chiapas and other highly contested areas remain at risk of a violent escalation in conflict. In Zacatecas, violence has remained constant since the onset of the Sinaloa Cartel’s internecine conflict, despite the convergence of CJNG’s interest and territorial expansion in this state since 2020. As criminal dynamics shift, the CJNG might seek to take advantage of the redeployment of Cabrera Sarabia forces — a Sinaloa Cartel affiliate aligned with El Mayo — to neighboring Durango, where they are thought to support El Mayo against Los Chapitos.²⁷

The CJNG is not the only criminal group likely to exploit the Sinaloa Cartel’s fragmentation. In Sonora, the cartel’s factions face pressure from the Sonora Independent Cartel, an alliance formed in 2023 by three Sinaloa Cartel offshoots to stop the cartel’s expansion.²⁸ Another group, La Línea, has reportedly taken advantage of the relocation of Sinaloa Cartel’s forces to Culiacán to intensify its incursion in Chihuahua against Los Salgueiro, a cell affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel (see map and graph below).²⁹ This drove a resurgence of violence and the displacement of local residents in the Sierra Tarahumara region, particularly in the Guadalupe y Calvo municipality.

State response: Is this the end of ‘Hugs, not Bullets’?

Upon taking office on 1 October, Sheinbaum inherited heightened violence levels that many have attributed to the security strategy of her predecessor and mentor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), whose “Hugs, not Bullets” policy prioritized social programs and prevention over a militarized response. Shortly after coming to power, Sheinbaum unveiled her security plan.³⁰ While Sheinbaum’s plan remains aligned with AMLO’s approach, domestic demands to contain the escalation of violence and US pressure to stem drug trafficking and migration flows have contributed to a change in tone from the federal government.

ACLED data from Sheinbaum’s first six months in office point to a change in trend. Armed confrontations between non-state armed groups and security forces experienced a 33% increase compared to the previous six months. This increase has remained largely confined to Sinaloa and has been driven by the internecine fighting in the Sinaloa Cartel, which prompted a heightened security response from state actors as early as September, well before Sheinbaum’s swearing-in. Initial efforts to contain the rise in violence in Sinaloa were followed by the government’s heavy-handed security response in the first quarter of 2025, during which clashes were concentrated in states bordering the US, especially in Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, and in traditional hotspots of violence such as Michoacán (see graph and map below). Armed clashes have further increased alongside intelligence-driven operations, which have been closely aligned with the federal security strategy, as is evidenced by a surge in the destruction of criminal assets such as narco laboratories, drugs, and surveillance systems.

The federal government’s response and the intensification thereof in the first quarter of 2025 were largely shaped by President Donald Trump taking office in January. He swiftly designated several Mexican criminal groups, including the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG, as FTOs and pressured the Mexican government to curb migration and drug trafficking flows under the threat of tariffs on Mexican products.³¹ The US pressure prompted the Mexican federal government to deploy 10,000 military and National Guard officers³² and to launch Operation Northern Border on 5 February. As a result of this security operation, Mexican authorities have reportedly arrested thousands of people and have seized over 1,900 weapons and 25 tonnes of drugs as of 3 April.³³ The arrests of criminal group leaders conducted by the Mexican authorities in recent months suggest that the Mexican authorities may gradually mirror elements of the same kingpin strategy implemented under President Calderón’s administration, which consisted of taking down top leadership to dismantle criminal groups. Although these efforts may serve as a valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with the US, they have sparked debate about their efficacy in curbing organized crime and potentially contributing to further violence.

Criminal organizations may also be adapting their tactics to survive under pressure. In Sinaloa, the spike in clashes between security forces and armed groups since September 2024 has coincided with a decrease in gang-on-gang violence and targeting of civilians in the first quarter of 2025. Similarly, federal authorities highlighted a 27% decrease in intentional homicide between October 2024 and February 2025.³⁴ While these figures could be attributed to the success of security operations in the area and indicate a degree of de-escalation of the conflict, they also signal that criminal groups may have opted for other expressions of violence, such as forced disappearances, which have skyrocketed in Sinaloa in the first quarter of 2025 relative to the same period in 2024.³⁵ Other forms of pervasive criminal activity have begun gaining momentum in the state, including extortion, in order to finance the Sinaloa Cartel’s war. In practice, these shifts are indicative of the rapid adaptability of criminal groups and could well apply to other areas under intense security scrutiny.

There is also growing skepticism around the efficiency of operations targeting criminal assets, including the seizure of drug laboratories, which rarely lead to the arrests of members of criminal groups and are very likely to trigger the movement of those groups to establish their production operations elsewhere.³⁶ Alongside the reorganization of criminal groups, the concentration of security operations along Mexico’s northern border risks leaving other areas vulnerable to escalating criminal disputes, particularly in the country’s center and south.

Perhaps most strikingly, though, the arrest of Sinaloa Cartel leader El Mayo and the subsequent wave of violence between the cartel’s factions serve as an example of how these operations have the potential to lead to gang-on-gang violence. Further US pressure on criminal groups and possible demands for the arrest of high-profile leaders, particularly the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel, may foment further fragmentation with the potential to worsen levels of violence. As a result of the fragmentation of large groups, local criminal groups are likely to grow autonomous, which could lead to a new phase of violence.³⁷

A violent escalation in the making

The fracture within the Sinaloa Cartel marks a structural turning point in Mexico’s criminal landscape. There are rising signs that it will have repercussions well beyond the cartel’s traditional strongholds. Some journalists have questioned whether the cartel as a cohesive identity will continue to exist.³⁸ Another plausible outcome is the cartel’s deliberate excision of its weakened cells, allowing the organization to survive, albeit in a different form, as its internal structure and system of alliances shift.

As the Sinaloa Cartel is forced to draw on its resources to sustain its internal power struggle, it has become more vulnerable to external threats. Other groups, such as the CJNG, smaller criminal organizations, and newly formed alliances, could exploit the Sinaloa Cartel’s weakened position and continue their own territorial expansion. The Mexican press has reported that the CJNG might have forged a new alliance with Los Chapitos against El Mayo’s faction, with the aim of redistributing areas controlled by El Mayo.³⁹ Other sources indicate that the CJNG might take its time before choosing a side as it waits for the factions to wear each other down.⁴⁰ Either path signals a shift in criminal dynamics that could fuel further violence. However, the CJNG is not immune to pressure. The discovery of mass detention sites in Jalisco,⁴¹ believed to belong to the CJNG, and increased scrutiny from US authorities suggest that its expansion may face growing obstacles, leaving space for local criminal actors to assert themselves more aggressively.

Meanwhile, under pressure from the Trump administration, the Mexican government appears to be responding to organized criminal activity and violence in the country using familiar kingpin-style strategies, which carry additional risks of further fragmenting the criminal landscape and creating power vacuums. In this volatile context, the security response has become part of the shifting dynamics, influencing territorial contests and emerging alliances. Along the northern border, which is strategic for trafficking activities, there are already signs that local criminal groups may be gaining in strength and autonomy. Sustained criminal disputes are likely to persist until a hegemonic force emerges.

A potential future scenario involves heightened risks for civilians, as violence threatens to reach new areas. The intensification of the conflict in Sinaloa has exposed civilians to heightened violence for siding with the wrong group and rising levels of extortion as criminal groups seek sources of revenue to finance their warfare. Were violence to spread further, the prospects for civilians would be gloomy. Similarly, political figures are particularly vulnerable to shifting power balances in their localities as armed groups seek to consolidate their territorial control through criminal governance and to mitigate law enforcement operations against their interests.

More concerning is the possibility that US pressure on security developments in Mexico could extend beyond threats of economic sanctions. The US ambassador to Mexico has not ruled out the possibility of concerted or unilateral US intervention on Mexican soil at a time when surveillance drone flights in Mexico are on the rise.⁴² Such a scenario would amount to a full-blown return to the kingpin strategy, an approach that has historically led to criminal groups’ splintering and intensified violence in contested and localized territories, the consequences of which may run against the Mexican government’s stated goals.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco and Ciro Murillo.

English

The Sinaloa Cartel, its operations, and internal divisions

Sinaloa’s factional turf war spreads across the cartel’s stronghold

Rival criminal organizations seek to exploit the Sinaloa Cartel rift

State response: Is this the end of ‘Hugs, not Bullets’?

A violent escalation in the making

María Fernanda Arocha

Sandra Pellegrini

How the Sinaloa Cartel rift is redrawing Mexico’s criminal map

English

The Sinaloa Cartel, its operations, and internal divisions

Sinaloa’s factional turf war spreads across the cartel’s stronghold

Rival criminal organizations seek to exploit the Sinaloa Cartel rift

State response: Is this the end of ‘Hugs, not Bullets’?

A violent escalation in the making

María Fernanda Arocha

Sandra Pellegrini

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