Regional Overview
Middle East
June 2025
Posted: 5 June 2025
In this Regional Overview covering May 2025
- Gaza: Israel intensifies operations as May becomes deadliest month in over a year
- Iraq-Turkey: The PKK disbands as Turkish airstrikes decline, but tensions persist
- Lebanon: Israeli airstrikes escalate amid local elections and rising domestic pressure
- Syria: ISIL claims new wave of attacks amid recalibration under transitional government
- West Bank: Settler violence surges following rare Hamas attack
- Yemen: US-Houthi ceasefire holds as attacks on Israel reach new peak
Gaza: Israel intensifies operations as May becomes deadliest month in over a year
In May, Gaza witnessed its deadliest month of 2025 so far as Israeli forces launched Operation Gideon’s Chariots. The operation significantly escalated military activity amid a deadlock in US-led ceasefire negotiations. ACLED records over 900 Israeli airstrikes and shellings in May — the highest monthly figure since early 2024. Airstrikes targeted Hamas infrastructure and commanders, killing the head of Hamas’ military wing, Mohammad Sinwar, on 13 May. Mohammad Sinwar climbed through the ranks of the organization after his older brother and former Hamas leader Yahya was killed in combat operations.
The operation marked a strategic shift: Israeli forces have moved beyond temporary incursions to a deeper, prolonged ground presence in depopulated areas like Khan Yunis and North Gaza to prevent Hamas from regrouping.1Emanuel Fabian, “IDF division completes Rafah operations, pushes into Khan Younis in new offensive,” Times of Israel, 26 May 2025 Nonetheless, Hamas and other groups still engaged with Israeli troops in nearly 40 distinct incidents, resulting in the deaths of five Israeli soldiers at booby-trapped sites. The frequency of these attacks — most of which occurred after Sinwar’s assassination and during Israel’s occupation of territory — suggest Hamas retains operational capability despite leadership losses and territorial setbacks.
Simultaneously, violence associated with the distribution of aid surged: ACLED records at least 17 incidents of looting, clashes, and fatal force at distribution sites. On 27 May, Israeli troops opened fire during the inaugural distribution by the US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation in Rafah,2Sama Mednick, “How a US-backed body plans to handle Gaza’s food distribution and why aid groups oppose it,” The Associated Press, 28 May 2025 killing four civilians. These events coincided with growing friction between Hamas and emerging groups like the Anti-Terror Service, a local militia cooperating with Israel.3Nir Hasson, “’Anti-terror Service’: New Palestinian Militia Operating in South Gaza, Local Sources Say,” Haaretz, 26 May 2025 The aid strategy appears aimed at undermining Hamas’ control over relief flows amid a worsening humanitarian crisis.
The latest escalation in violence unfolded alongside renewed attempts at diplomacy. Hamas released a US-Israeli hostage in mid-May ahead of President Donald Trump’s Gulf visit, and on 30 May, Israel accepted a temporary ceasefire proposal, though Hamas demanded revisions to the hostage release timeline and war-ending guarantees.4Barbara Plett Usher and Rushdi Abualouf, “Hamas makes hostage pledge but demands changes to US Gaza ceasefire plan,” BBC, 31 May 2025 By month’s end, both military and diplomatic tracks remained unresolved, with Israel intensifying its offensive and Hamas seeking to bolster its leverage through international mediation.
For more information, see ACLED Gaza Monitor.
Iraq-Turkey: The PKK disbands as Turkish airstrikes decline, but tensions persist
On 12 May, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced it would disband following a call by its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, marking the end of a 40-year armed insurgency against Turkey.5Orla Guerin and Gabriela Pomeroy, “Kurdish group PKK says it is laying down arms and disbanding,” BBC, 12 May 2025 The announcement followed a unilateral ceasefire declared in March and months of indirect negotiations with Turkish officials. While previous peace efforts collapsed amid renewed violence, the dissolution of the group has led to an immediate decline in levels of violence.
Turkish military activity in northern Iraq declined significantly in May. ACLED records a total of 200 Turkish remote violence incidents in northern Iraq in May, including airstrikes and shelling. This resulted in a drop of more than 40% from April and over 50% from March. However, most attacks in May occurred before the PKK’s announcement. After the declaration, Turkish forces launched 57 attacks, 32 of which explicitly targeted PKK positions. Meanwhile, the PKK carried out eight attacks during the same period.
Despite the downturn in violence, the process remains fragile. Turkey has not outlined a formal political roadmap and continues to demand the dissolution of all PKK-affiliated groups, including those in Syria.6The Associated Press, “Turkey seeks dissolution of PKK-linked groups in Syria and Iraq, following leaders’ peace plea,” 28 February 2025 The PKK, for its part, has called for legal guarantees and recognition of Kurdish rights.7Orla Guerin and Gabriela Pomeroy, “Kurdish group PKK says it is laying down arms and disbanding,” BBC, 12 May 2025 As the disarmament unfolds — coordinated in part with the Kurdistan Regional Government — its durability will depend on reciprocal measures from Ankara and sustained de-escalation on the ground.
Lebanon: Israeli airstrikes escalate amid local elections and rising domestic pressure
Violence in Lebanon surged in May, with recorded incidents carried out by the Israel Defense Forces increasing by 47% after a relative lull in April: ACLED records over 112 Israeli airstrikes across southern governorates, up from 73 the previous month. The strikes targeted Hezbollah military sites and weapons depots, killing at least 15 fighters and commanders. Among them was Muhammad Jamoul, commander of Hezbollah’s rocket unit in the Beaufort Castle area, who was known for his efforts to re-establish the group’s operational capacity in the region.8Emanuel Fabian, “Local Hezbollah rocket unit commander killed in south Lebanon drone strike, IDF says,” Times of Israel, 31 May 2025
More than half of these strikes occurred in the final 10 days of May, coinciding with municipal elections in the South and al-Nabatieh governorates. The timing of these attacks suggests an Israeli effort to undermine Hezbollah’s electoral influence and deter it from consolidating control in southern Lebanon. Despite lower voter turnout than in 2016, the Hezbollah-Amal alliance won large majorities in Shia-majority municipalities, reflecting its resilience amid continued hostilities.9L’Orient Today, “Hezbollah victory in several villages in southern Lebanon,” 25 May 2025
For Hezbollah, the elections were a key opportunity to assert political legitimacy, especially as the southern Shia population remains heavily affected by cross-border conflict. The decisive victory for Hezbollah-Amal came as the Lebanese state renewed efforts to challenge the group’s military role.10Times of Israel, “Lebanese army said dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure more quickly than expected,” 29 May 2025 While Israel sustains its pressure campaign, Hezbollah appears focused on managing internal dynamics and avoiding further escalation in the short term.
Syria: ISIL claims new wave of attacks amid recalibration under transitional government
Islamic State (ISIL) attacks in Syria more than doubled in May, rising from 15 events in April to nearly 40 — the highest monthly total since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. While the longer-term trend remains downward — ISIL activity is down 70% in the last six months compared to the same period last year — the May uptick is notable. For the first time since December, ISIL explicitly claimed responsibility for two attacks targeting the new Syrian authorities, marking a shift in posture.11Tim Lester and Eyad Kourdi, “ISIS claims first attacks against forces loyal to new government in Syria.” 31 May 2025 Several other attacks against the government remain unclaimed, though some bear similarities to ISIL’s tactics.
This increase comes amid reports of ISIL’s strategic recalibration. The group continues to dismantle desert-based operations, as its Syrian fighters redeploy to urban peripheries and foreign members are increasingly rerouted to Iraq.12Zain al-Abidin al-Ekeidi, “ISIS in Syria: An Impossible Return or a Renewed Threat?” Noon Post, 23 May 2025 These movements reflect an adaptive response to tighter surveillance and increased pressure from Syrian and international forces. Although ISIL’s capabilities remain constrained, the May attacks signal an intent to reassert relevance and disrupt the fragile political transition.
Government and affiliated forces have conducted 11 anti-ISIL operations since December, including a US-assisted raid in Rural Damascus. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in coordination with the Global Coalition, launched 24 operations over the same period, targeting cells across northern and eastern Syria. While ISIL remains far weaker than during its 2014 to 2017 peak, the resurgence in claims and violence underscores the group’s continued ambition to reassert relevance and disrupt the fragile political transition and the risks facing Syria’s emerging political order.
West Bank: Settler violence surges following rare Hamas attack
Settler violence in the West Bank surged to its highest level since October 2023, with around 200 events recorded in May. The uptick followed a deadly 14 May attack by a Hamas operative, who opened fire on a settler vehicle near the Bruchin settlement, killing a pregnant woman and wounding her husband. In response, settlers launched a week-long rampage through the nearby village of Bruqin, burning homes, destroying property, and displacing residents.13Gideon Levy and Alex Levac, “The Palestinian Town Suffering a Double Rampage Following a Terrorist Attack,” Haaretz, 30 May 2025 These attacks occurred while the village was under a military-imposed curfew that restricted residents’ movements and access to essential services. Israeli forces killed the attacker after a three-day raid on Bruqin, but retaliatory settler attacks continued to spread across Salfit and other governorates.
The Hamas attack marks the first fatal assault on settlers since January, when Israel launched Operation Iron Wall to dismantle armed Palestinian networks in the northern West Bank. Since then, activity by armed groups has sharply declined, though isolated stabbings and car-ramming incidents persist. Israeli forces remain deployed in Jenin and Tulkarm camps, where they continue demolition operations, yet ACLED has not recorded any Palestinian armed group activity in these camps since early March.
Meanwhile, plans for further expansion of settlements seem set to inflame tensions. In May, the Israeli government announced it would establish 22 new settlements across the West Bank, including four in the Jenin area.14Peace Now, “The Cabinet Decided on the Establishment of 22 New Settlements in the West Bank,” 29 May 2025 These moves, coupled with the sharp rise in settler violence, risk reigniting broader confrontation in an already fragile security environment.
Yemen: US-Houthi ceasefire holds as attacks on Israel reach new peak
The ceasefire between US forces and the Houthis, announced on 6 May, remained intact throughout the month, halting one of the most intensive American air campaigns in Yemen since ACLED coverage began in 2015. Operation Rough Rider, which lasted from 15 March to 5 May, involved 461 airstrike and drone attack events and resulted in at least 515 fatalities, including 131 civilians killed. The US announced the pause in hostilities in exchange for a Houthi halt to attacks on US and allied shipping in the Red Sea and surrounding waters.15Francesca Chambers and Cybele Mayes-Osterman, “Trump says U.S. will stop bombing Houthi militants in Yemen,” US Today, 6 May 2025 No Houthi maritime attacks or US strikes were reported for the remainder of the month, underscoring an effective regional de-escalation.
However, Houthi attacks on Israel — not covered by the ceasefire — escalated significantly. The group launched 24 attacks throughout May, up nearly 33% from April, marking the highest monthly total since December 2024. On 19 May, the Houthis declared a symbolic naval blockade on Israel’s Haifa port, signaling their intent to link Red Sea operations with Israel’s Gaza campaign.16Reuters, “Yemen’s Houthis announce ‘maritime blockade’ on Israel’s Haifa port,’ 19 May 2025 In response, Israeli forces conducted 13 air and drone strikes targeting facilities in al-Hudayda, Amran, Amanat al-Asimah, and Sanaa — the second highest number of Israeli strikes in Yemen in a single month since retaliatory operations began in July 2024.
While the ceasefire has stabilized the Red Sea corridor, the surge in Houthi-Israel hostilities underscores the continued regional fallout from the Gaza war. With the US prioritizing maritime security and Israel responding forcefully to Houthi provocations, the risk of renewed escalation remains — particularly if ceasefire parameters are tested or expanded Houthi operations trigger broader intervention.
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