Democratic Republic of the Congo: Wazalendo activity increases ahead of a US-led peace agreement in the east

After six months of the March 23 Movement (M23) and Rwandan military forces (RDF) occupation of Goma, Rwandan and Congolese officials signed a peace agreement in the United States to broker an end to the violence.¹Chinedu Asadu, Matthew Lee, and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Congo and Rwanda sign a US-mediated peace deal aimed at ending decades of bloody conflict,” The Associated Press, 28 June 2025 While the DRC and Rwanda agreed to several points to end hostilities, the peace agreement did not address the M23’s involvement in the conflict, instead stating that a Qatar-led process in Doha would handle negotiations regarding the M23.²United States Department of State, “Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda,” 27 June 2025 Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo, the national coordinator of the Congo River Alliance (AFC), of which the M23 is part, criticized the US-led process as having failed to address the true causes of the conflict by focusing only on the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.³X @LawrenceKanyuka, 30 June 2025 (French)

Leading up to the signing of the agreement, militias under the Wazalendo coalition increasingly attempted to push the M23 onto the back foot. While the M23 pursued a westward expansion in North and South Kivu in recent months, it was forced to limit expansion efforts in June in the face of a barrage of incursions by Wazalendo militias. The Congolese military offered minimal support to the Wazalendo, with clashes in M23-held areas most common in the southern areas of North Kivu and areas of South Kivu surrounding Bukavu city. The Wazalendo managed to gain control over only a few areas, but likely aimed to strengthen their bargaining position ahead of the US and Qatar-led peace processes. 

For more on how the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) capitalized on the M23 insurgency, see this ACLED report.

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Kenya: Anti-government demonstrations surge following blogger’s death

Demonstrations in Kenya spiked last month, after initially being sparked by teacher-led marches following the death of a teacher and blogger in police custody on 8 June. Later, on 25 June, anti-government demonstrations escalated using extensive social media mobilization.⁴Perpetua Etyang, “How #SiriNiNumbers mobilised thousands for Wednesday’s protests,” The Star, 25 June 2025 These demonstrations coincided with the anniversary of the Gen-Z protest movement against the 2024 Finance Bill. The commemorative anti-government mobilization and demands to end police brutality⁵Larry Madowo and Nimi Princewill, “16 dead and hundreds injured in Kenya protests, Amnesty International says,” CNN, 26 June 2025 on 25 June contributed to ACLED recording over 170 demonstrations in 39 Kenyan counties last month. Nairobi accounted for the highest number, followed by the nearby central counties of Kiambu and Nakuru. 

ACLED records over 65 cases of demonstrators using various forms of violence to target both private businesses and government establishments. In response, state forces used a range of tactics to disperse gatherings, including using live ammunition and tear gas and spanning razor wire around government buildings.⁶Jacinta Mutura, “Barricades, bullets, media blackout signal Kenya’s descent into repression,” The Standard, 27 June 2025 Police crackdowns led to at least 20 reported civilian fatalities. Two civilians were killed by counter-demonstrators, and at least 485 people were later arrested in connection with the riots.⁷Steve Otieno, “485 arrested over June 25 protests chaos, DCI boss Mohamed Amin says,” Daily Nation, 30 June 2025 Government agencies went as far as to shut down media outlets covering the demonstrations to dissuade additional civilians from joining the gatherings.⁸Steve Otieno, “Stop the live coverage: Communications Authority orders,” Daily Nation, 25 June 2025 Demonstrations subsided after 25 June, but they will likely continue in the coming days with the annual Saba Saba day pro-democracy gatherings.⁹Andrew Wasike and Cai Nebe, “Kenya’s July 7 protest legacy: ‘We reclaimed our voice,’” Deutsche Welle, 2 July 2025

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Mali: A violent transition takes place as Africa Corps replaces the Wagner Group

June marked a violent turning point in Mali’s conflict, as the Wagner Group’s mercenaries exited the country to be replaced by Africa Corps under more direct organizational supervision from the Russian Ministry of Defense. The deployment of Africa Corps coincided with a sharp escalation of violence on several fronts. Over the course of the month, Africa Corps and the Malian armed forces (FAMa) launched a series of airstrikes and ground offensives targeting the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) strongholds in the northern and central regions. 

In Kidal, Malian military and Africa Corps forces were accused of mass atrocities. Civilians were reportedly executed, burned alive, or thrown into wells during operations in Ibdakan, Eghacher-Sediden, and Abelel between 25 and 26 June. Airpower also played an important role as both parties carried out several aerial and drone strikes in central and northern Mali, some of which resulted in civilian casualties. With this intensified military offensive, June is Mali’s deadliest month so far in 2025. ACLED last records similar levels of deadliness in March 2022 when IS militants launched a particularly deadly offensive in the Menaka region.

JNIM continued its operations against FAMa and Africa Corps throughout June, maintaining a steady pace of attacks despite a decrease in the total number of incidents compared to the previous month against FAMa and Wagner mercenaries. The group continued to deploy IEDs and guided IEDs and launched drone strikes in several regions, including Segou, Mopti, Koulikoro, and Kidal. From May onward, JNIM explicitly began referring to Africa Corps as “Faylaq al-Russi” (the Russian Legion) in its media statements, a propaganda shift aimed at framing Africa Corps as a distinct foreign occupying force. JNIM also carried out several large-scale attacks, most notably in Timbuktu, Mahou, and Boulkessi, demonstrating its ongoing ability to launch complex, high-impact operations against military convoys and fixed positions.

June marked one of the most active months for the FLA since the start of renewed hostilities in August 2023. Operations were concentrated in the Kidal region. The group’s most significant action was a large-scale ambush on a FAMa and Africa Corps logistics convoy near Aguelhok on 13 June, during which the FLA claimed to have destroyed over 20 vehicles and inflicted dozens of fatalities, including among Africa Corps personnel. FAMa initially denied the incident, but later confirmed that the convoy had come under attack, reporting a counter-attack supported by airstrikes. In addition, the FLA used landmines against troops. ACLED records at least two strikes on convoys in Eghacher-Sediden and Kal Relle Tadjmart. The group also engaged in information warfare and claimed responsibility for forcing down a Malian Su-24M fighter jet near Gao on 14 June, although the army attributed the crash to bad weather. The FLA further amplified its messaging with renewed accusations against FAMa and Africa Corps of targeting civilians in the north of the country, reinforcing its long-standing narrative of defending the people of Azawad.

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Niger: An ISSP offensive drives reported fatalities and civilian targeting to record levels

Last month, Niger experienced one of its deadliest months on record when the ISSP launched a major offensive that drove reported fatalities from civilian targeting to a peak surpassed only once before in March 2021 when IS militants killed over 140 people from the Tuareg community in the area of Tillia in the Tahoua region. The Tillaberi region was the hotbed of violence. Here, the ISSP carried out a series of mass-casualty attacks, including the killing of at least 71 civilians during evening prayers in Manda. Earlier, on 19 June, the ISSP attacked military positions and reportedly overran the town of Banibangou,¹⁰X @Hamid Amadou N’gadé, 27 June 2025 (French) resulting in the deaths of dozens of soldiers and militants in an attack that appears to have been coordinated with diversionary rocket fire on the In-Ates military base. The violence also spread further south to the Dosso region, where militants killed 17 civilians during prayers in the village of Abdouladji on 22 June. 

ISSP’s campaign in June marked a clear return to committing mass atrocities in rural areas by targeting prayer gatherings, markets, and entire communities, leading to mass displacement. At the same time, its use of IEDs, indirect fire, and multi-front attacks underscores the group’s growing capabilities on the battlefield and its ability to challenge military capacities. The attacks also sparked mutinies among Nigerien military units stationed in Filingue and Tera and raised concerns about the army’s ability to contain the threat.

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Nigeria: Communal militia violence contributes to a surge in fatalities in Benue state

Deadly clashes between communal-based armed groups in the central Benue state drove a surge in conflict-related fatalities. The cycle of violence began escalating back in February after a Fulani pastoralist militia clashed with a group of hunters. This resulted in a retaliatory attack by the armed Fulani against an All Progressives Congress (APC) party aspirant and the killing of another APC leader in May. The APC has been advocating for a more intense federal response to violence in Benue state, calling for the announcement of a national emergency and military action.¹¹Bayo Wahab, “APC chieftain condemns Benue killings, dismisses farmers-herders clash narrative,” Vanguard, 17 June 2025; John Charles, “Benue APC seeks Tinubu’s help over insecurity,” Nigeria Punch, 27 May 2025; Ochogwu Sunday, “Plateau, Benue massacre: ‘Clear the mess, this shame can’t continue’ – APC chieftain tells NSA,” Daily Post, 16 April 2025 However, militias opposing the APC may be trying to dissuade leaders from taking such militarized action in the state. Skirmishes between farmers and pastoralists have long posed a challenge in Benue, but APC leaders claim the violence has become increasingly organized as better-equipped militias carry out rising violence in the state.¹²Bayo Wahab, “APC chieftain condemns Benue killings, dismisses farmers-herders clash narrative,” Vanguard Nigeria, 17 June 2025 In June, most deadly fighting took place in the northwest of the state. The governor claimed the armed groups moved into the state from neighboring Nasarawa state using the Benue River. 

This conflict in Benue state has been compounded by complex military partnerships with local armed groups and overlapping political and communal dimensions to the violence.¹³Oluwole Ojewale and Freedom Onuoha, “Nigeria’s North Central violence reveals systemic state failure,” Institute for Security Studies, 26 June 2025 These overlapping dimensions also played out on 20 June in Tarka Local Government Area when an unidentified armed group reportedly killed the commander of the Nigeria Hunters and Forest Security Services (NHFSS), who was also the former chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party. The NHFSS operates alongside the state security forces as a militarized forest and wildlife protection unit and is viewed as disruptive by many actors using these protected areas to further their economic interests.¹⁴Vanguard Nigeria, “INSECURITY: NHFSS transforms into Nigerian Forest Security Service to fight crimes, others,” 1 December 2024 Together, this violence resulted in June being the deadliest month in Benue state since an outbreak of clashes between militias in February 2016. In 2025, Benue ranks fourth for the number of conflict-related fatalities in Nigeria, behind Borno, Zamfara, and Katsina, a testament to the escalation of armed violence in the state.

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Sudan: Battles halve as the conflicting parties race to control strategic locations 

In mid-June, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized the Libyan-Egyptian-Sudanese triangle border area and other territories in the Northern state, securing a key corridor from Darfur to the north and onward to Libya and Egypt. Though battles in Sudan fell by about 55% in June, fierce competition between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF and their allies for strategic ground, especially in the Darfur and Kordofan regions, persisted. As the SAF solidifies its hold over central and eastern Sudan, it has shifted focus to Kordofan’s key transit points en route to Darfur. The RSF, whose fighters are largely drawn from these regions, seeks to cement its rival government formed in February by fully controlling these regions.¹⁵Khalid Abdelaziz, “Sudan’s RSF, allies sign charter to form parallel government, two signatories say,” Reuters, 23 February 2025

In Darfur, clashes centered in and around El Fasher, Darfur’s last SAF-held capital, while Babanusa in West Kordofan continues to be under siege from the RSF. Sitting on the main Khartoum-Darfur supply road, Babanusa enables both groups to funnel troops and materiel from and to central Sudan. For the RSF, its capture would block the SAF’s push toward Darfur by consolidating its control in West Kordofan. Attacks against civilians also continued to exact a high casualty toll, primarily in North Darfur, North Kordofan, West Kordofan, and South Darfur. In the former three states, civilian harm mirrored the territorial tug-of-war; in South Darfur — the capital of the RSF’s operations — however, most of the violence targeting civilians was conducted by the RSF troops and is not linked with the fight to control strategic areas.

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