Q&A | Twelve days that shook the region: Inside the Iran-Israel war

What can ACLED data tell us about the scale, intensity, and civilian toll of Israel’s attacks and Iran’s response?

The scale and intensity of Israel’s attack on Iran were unprecedented, presenting the most severe security challenge the Islamic Republic has faced since the Iran-Iraq War. In total, Israel carried out nearly 360 attacks across 27 Iranian provinces. Many of these attacks comprised multiple aerial strikes on different targets in the same city. Over 150 distinct locations were targeted over the course of 12 days. The intensity of the attacks on the Iranian capital, Tehran, was particularly notable: Nearly one-third of all violent events attributed to Israel occurred in Tehran province, and the majority were concentrated in the capital city (see map below). Seventeen of Tehran’s 22 districts were attacked.

Israel was quick to secure control of airspace from the country’s west to Tehran,¹Al Jazeera, “Israeli army says 70 jets took part in strikes on Iran,” 14 June 2025 giving it a decisive edge. It initially used its most advanced stealth aircraft and, with the help of precise intelligence in real time and the extensive use of small drones that Mossad had smuggled into Iran,²Miriam McNabb, “The Silent Invasion: How Israel’s Small Drones Infiltrated Iran,” Drone Life, 23 June 2025 it crippled Iran’s air defense radar installations³Amos Harel, “With Its Goals in Iran Out of Reach and Its Endgame Unclear, What’s Next for Israel?” Haaretz, 17 June 2025 and surface-to-air missile batteries.⁴Emanuel Fabian, “Israel has destroyed 70 air defense batteries in Iran so far, says IDF,” Times of Israel, 17 June 2025 Israeli jets were then able to enter Iranian territory without encountering significant resistance, allowing them to strike an expanding range of targets with relative ease. Iran was unable to shoot down any Israeli fighter jets, while it intercepted a few drones.⁵Emanuel Fabian, “The Israel-Iran war by the numbers, after 12 days of fighting,” Times of Israel, 24 June 2025 This resembled the freedom of action the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had previously established in Gaza and Lebanon, relying heavily on airpower to overwhelm adversaries. 

ACLED records over 160 Israeli strikes on military targets and 10 on police bases. Before the United States military attacked Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June, Israel had already carried out nearly a dozen strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In addition, Israel targeted several government buildings, including the ministries of Defense, Intelligence, and Petroleum, as well as the headquarters of Iran’s national broadcasting agency. It also inflicted heavy blows to Iran’s military chain of command, killing more than 30 senior commanders — many in targeted strikes on the first day of the war — and at least 11 nuclear scientists. 

Overall, Israeli strikes remained targeted and precise, although many civilians were also killed or injured. Human rights organizations have suggested that at least 40% of the fatalities — approximately 440 people out of over 1,100 killed — were civilians.⁶Human Rights Activists News Agency, “Twelve Days Under Fire: A Comprehensive Report on the Iran-Israel War,” 25 June 2025 (Persian)  Among the deadliest incidents was the strike on Evin Prison, where many political dissidents are held. Israel described the prison as a “symbol of tyranny,”⁷Femena, “Bombed and Shackled: How Israel’s War on Iran Ushered in a New Wave of Sweeping Crackdowns,” 27 June 2025 but the attack killed more than 70 people, including staff, inmates, and visiting family members. Thousands of residents also left Tehran, the Iranian capital home to at least 10 million people, to seek shelter from Israeli attacks. ACLED’s Conflict Exposure tool estimates that over 21 million people, nearly one-quarter of Iran’s population, were exposed to Israeli strikes during this period. This is a stark reminder that even so-called precision warfare carries a heavy human toll.

In Israel, key population centers also came under sustained missile attacks from the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). ACLED records at least 36 direct hits, excluding those that landed in open areas, that killed at least 28 people, all but one of whom were civilians (see map below). A further 3,000 people were injured. While Israeli officials claim that Iran deliberately targeted civilians,⁸Ynetnews.com, “In first, Israel reportedly strikes Iran’s critical infrastructure, hitting major gas field,” 14 June 2025 the hits on civilian areas may also be related to the limited accuracy of Iran’s ballistic missiles. But on at least three occasions, Iran also fired cluster munitions at populated areas. Cluster munitions spread over a wide area, which can increase harm to civilians.⁹Bar Peleg, Oded Yaron, and Eden Solomon, “How Three Iranian Cluster Missiles Hit Seven Israeli Cities,” Haaretz, 4 July 2025

Although the interception rate was reportedly around 80-90%,¹⁰Rachel Fink, “How Israel’s ‘Onion Defense’ Systems Intercept Missiles, Drones and Rockets,” Haaretz, 24 June 2025 the sophistication of Iran’s missile arsenal posed a more lethal threat to Israel during these 12 days than in any previous phases since the start of the Gaza war: Rocket, missile, and drone fire from Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen over more than 600 days resulted in just over 40 Israeli civilian deaths and over 3,000 injuries.¹¹Bar Peleg, “Israel’s Critical Failure in Its War With Iran,” Haaretz, 25 June 2025 While the war underscored the clear superiority of Israel’s military capabilities, it also revealed the country’s limitations when confronting a distant but powerful adversary.

How should we understand the historical context of Israel’s recent strikes?

The Israel-Iran conflict is rooted not in territorial or ethnic disputes, but in ideological hostility dating back to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers adopted an anti-imperialist worldview that quickly became synonymous with anti-Americanism, casting the US as a hegemonic power seeking to dominate the Middle East. Israel, seen as a US outpost and occupier of Muslim land, became a central pillar of this worldview. This ideological stance soon translated into material support for groups resisting Israel — most notably Hezbollah, and later Palestinian groups like Hamas. Over time, this support evolved from ideological alignment to strategic utility. Shaped by the traumatic experience of the Iran-Iraq War, compounded by US military encirclement and the 2003 invasion of Iraq — and lacking conventional military parity — Iran increasingly relied on asymmetric tools. By backing militant groups near Israel’s borders, Iran gained leverage and deterrence without direct confrontation.

For Israel, these alliances formed a threat network backed by a state that has, at least rhetorically, called for its destruction. The conflict became less about ideology alone and more about hard security — laying the groundwork for a decades-long shadow war that ultimately escalated into open confrontation.

Was the Israeli war on Iran really about an imminent nuclear threat?

While Israel framed the war as a response to an imminent nuclear threat from Iran, that justification is contested. Iran is reported to have expanded its nuclear program since the US withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, enriching uranium to 60%, just below weapons-grade. However, shortly before the outbreak of the war on 13 June, both US intelligence¹²Yashraj Sharma and John T Psaropoulos, “Is Iran ‘very close’ to building a nuclear bomb as Trump claims?” Al Jazeera, 18 June 2025 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)¹³The Economic Times, “Did not have any proof of Iran’s effort to move into a nuclear weapon: IAEA Chief,” 18 June 2025 concluded that Iran had not decided to restart its nuclear weapons program, which it had halted in 2003. For years, experts have stressed that the key variable is the political decision to weaponize. So far, there is no credible evidence that such a decision had been made, and Israel has not presented proof that contradicts this consensus.

Nevertheless, if at any point — even in the distant future — Iran were to decide to build a bomb, it would pose a potential threat to Israel. But the fear may lie less in the risk of an actual offensive nuclear strike — which is unlikely given Iran’s cautious posture and Israel’s own nuclear deterrent — and more in the strategic consequences. A nuclear-armed Iran would be harder to confront and more emboldened in supporting anti-Israeli actors across the region. The war, therefore, may be more about preserving Israel’s freedom of action than forestalling an imminent proliferation threat.

Why did Israel choose to strike Iran now?

The war on Iran is the culmination of a strategic shift in Israeli policy following the 7 October Hamas assault. In its aftermath, Israel adopted a far more aggressive posture, moving from defensive containment to proactive offense — not just to address immediate threats but to prevent future ones that could challenge its security or military and strategic dominance. 

On 7 October 2023, Israel faced its most severe security crisis in decades when Hamas launched a surprise attack on southern Israel. The conflict quickly expanded to multiple fronts as members of the Axis of Resistance — most notably Hezbollah — launched attacks in solidarity with Gaza. Yet, less than two years later, Israel has decisively changed the regional landscape in its favor. Hamas is fighting for its survival; Hezbollah is significantly weakened and a shadow of its former strength; and in Syria, once a corridor for transferring weapons to Hezbollah, Israel has expanded its footprint beyond the occupied Golan Heights following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. 

Between October 2023 and December 2024, Palestinian groups or other members of the Axis of Resistance launched between 600 and 1,100 attacks against Israel each quarter. In the first quarter of 2025, Israel’s significant military gains had reduced that number to fewer than 20 (see graph below). 

Israel had been preparing for military action against Iran for years, though this was delayed for several reasons, including opposition by successive US administrations.¹⁴David Horovitz, “Israel was facing destruction at the hands of Iran. This is how close it came, and how it saved itself,” Times of Israel, 30 June 2025 Now it perceived a moment of vulnerability: Iran’s partners in the Axis of Resistance were significantly weakened, or, in Syria’s case, collapsed, while Israeli airstrikes last October compromised Iran’s air defense systems. Israel seized this opportunity to deliver a decisive blow. 

Has Israel achieved its war objectives?

Israel’s main declared goals were to inflict maximal damage on Iran’s nuclear program and to prevent an expansion of its ballistic missile arsenal. It has achieved significant success in both areas. 

The US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities mark a major political achievement for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who successfully won over President Donald Trump despite the president’s initial preference for diplomacy. To what extent US strikes on three nuclear facilities have set back Iran’s program remains unclear. While Trump’s declaration of the complete obliteration of Iran’s nuclear facilities has been contested, there is consensus that significant damage was inflicted. Israel’s own bombing campaign — notably the strike on the enriched uranium metal processing facility in Isfahan on 13 June — also delivered a substantial setback to any potential future weaponization effort.¹⁵William J. Broad and Ronen Bergman, “Israel and U.S. Smashed Iran Nuclear Site That Grew After Trump Quit 2015 Accord,” New York Times, 28 June 2025

Furthermore, Iran’s missile arsenal was also significantly depleted. Israeli and US intelligence estimates suggest Iran began the war with 2,500¹⁶Ari Cicurel, “Iranian Ballistic Missile Estimates,” The Jewish Institute for National Security of America, 25 June 2025 to 3,000 ballistic missiles.¹⁷Nick Paton Walsh and Jo Shelley, “One number could define the Iran-Israel conflict’s outcome,” CNN, 17 June 2025 Over 500 were launched during the conflict,¹⁸Emanuel Fabian, “IDF: Sunday’s Haifa impact was not a failed interceptor, but undetected Iranian missile,” Times of Israel, 23 June 2025 and another 1,000 were destroyed by Israeli strikes, along with around 250 missile launchers.¹⁹Emanuel Fabian, “The Israel-Iran war by the numbers, after 12 days of fighting,” Times of Israel, 24 June 2025 ACLED records more than 20 instances in which missile infrastructure sites were hit (see map below). It could take years for Iran to rebuild its stockpile. 

While regime change was not an official objective, some Israeli officials floated it as a desirable outcome.²⁰Oliver Mizzi, “Israel eyes regime change in Tehran as war with Iran enters seventh day,” The New Arab, 19 June 2025 The hope appeared to be that by weakening the regime’s power base, Israel could help trigger internal unrest that might lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic.²¹Nadeen Ebrahim, “Netanyahu says Israel’s operation may lead to regime change in Iran. How likely is that?” 30 June 2025 But no signs of such unrest have emerged, for the time being. Nationalist sentiment appears to have overshadowed public dissatisfaction with the regime, and ACLED has recorded no protests or riots during or after the war.

What’s next? Is the Iran-Israel war over after the ceasefire?

The ceasefire announced by Trump on social media may have ended the active phase of hostilities, but it has not resolved the underlying conflict between Iran and Israel. The region now enters a period of strategic uncertainty, and multiple outcomes are still possible. For Israel to translate its battlefield successes into lasting strategic gains, it will need to ensure that Iran’s nuclear ambitions, long-range ballistic missile arsenal, and regional influence are curbed over the long term. 

Despite extensive damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, the fate of its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium remains unknown. Reports suggest it may have been hidden before the strikes — either to preserve leverage in future talks or to enable a potential dash toward weaponization. And crucially, while infrastructure can be bombed, nuclear know-how cannot be erased — even if key scientists are killed. According to the IAEA director-general, Tehran could resume uranium enrichment “in a matter of months.”²²Laura Sharman and Sophie Tanno, “UN nuclear watchdog chief says Iran could again begin enriching uranium in ‘matter of months,’” CNN, 30 June A US-brokered deal, one that Israel and Washington hope is more plausible now given the extent of Iran’s setbacks, is the most viable path to preventing a renewed escalation.

But even in a weakened state, Iran may not be ready to accept terms that severely constrain its strategic capabilities. Iran’s nuclear program and right to enrichment have long been turned into projects of national pride; its missile program is seen as essential to deterrence and survival; and its network of regional partners is deeply entrenched in its security doctrine. Reversing course would require a fundamental shift in Tehran’s strategic outlook. The events of recent weeks may instead lead Supreme Leader Khamenei — or, given his advanced age and uncertain health, the hardline factions around him — to decide that a dash to the bomb is a gamble worth taking.

But the Islamic Republic is not monolithic. Internal divides could empower more pragmatic factions, who may argue that diplomacy is the only path to stability. Iran has, in the past, demonstrated such pragmatism: During the tenure of President Hassan Rouhani, the Islamic Republic accepted significant limitations on its nuclear program. Given the new realities and recent setbacks, some within the leadership may now be open to stricter terms. 

They may also recognize that much of Iran’s regional strategy has fallen short. Iran’s regional allies — Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias — were not capable or willing to offer meaningful support. Even after a ceasefire with Lebanon, Israel has continued targeting Iran’s most important regional ally to prevent it from rebuilding its capabilities. What Tehran once considered strategic assets have increasingly turned into liabilities. The 7 October Hamas attack, which Iran did not direct, ultimately triggered a war it sought to avoid. What was once a central asset in Iran’s deterrence architecture has, for now, become a liability — exposed, vulnerable, and unable to shift the course of the conflict. In light of these setbacks, some within Iran’s leadership may conclude that prioritizing economic recovery and sanctions relief offers a more viable path to preserving the regime than continued reliance on regional militancy.

The ceasefire, meanwhile, is vague and lacks clear red lines, leaving it unclear what would constitute a breach of the agreement. The US and Israel may also have different thresholds for what would justify further direct military action against Iran — and what concessions they expect Tehran to make. While Washington may be willing to settle for long-term restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, backed by intrusive inspections, Israel seeks a broader agreement that also addresses Iran’s missile arsenal and regional influence. Given Israel’s aggressive strategy, maximalist posture, and low risk tolerance since the events of 7 October, it is unlikely to settle for anything short of fully ensuring that the Islamic Republic poses no challenge — even in the long term — to its security or strategic dominance in the region. If Iran does not agree to make significant concessions and chooses not to change course — including if it quietly resumes its nuclear program — it will, sooner or later, risk further Israeli or even US attacks. In any event, regional uncertainty is likely to endure, keeping tensions high and the risk of renewed conflict ever-present.