Democratic Republic of Congo: Re-elected President Tshisekedi Faces Regional Crisis in the East

Long standing conflicts in the restive eastern provinces, including the March 23 Movement (M23) insurgency and countrywide violence surrounding the December general elections, fuelled another turbulent year in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Across the country, disputes over land and authority between the Teke and Yaka communities also continued in the west, spreading to Kwango territory in 2023. Taken together, while the ACLED Conflict Index registers an overall improving trend, the fragmented nature and wider ramifications of its conflicts highlight the importance of the DRC in the regional system.

North Kivu province accounted for the largest share of violent events, driven by political rivalries, disputes over land, mineral interests, and foreign intervention. Ceasefire agreements brokered in April with the M23, a rebel group with reported backing from Rwanda,¹UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 16 December 2022 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ 16 December 2022, p. 11-12 reduced hostilities for several months. However, levels of violence in North Kivu again rose in October following a breakdown of the peace agreements between the Kinshasa government and the M23, contributing to a 29% increase in political violence involving M23 from 2022. By the end of the year, the M23 had become the most active non-state armed group in the country. The M23 also gained control over more territory in 2023 than the previous year, part of an overall rise in non-state actors overtaking territory in the DRC. The rise of the M23 since late 2021 has brought increased tensions between the Kinshasa and Kigali governments, with Rwandan military forces accused of supporting and fighting alongside M23 militants.²See for example, statements by Congolese and Rwandan representatives; UN Security Council, ‘Mission Drawdown in Democratic Republic of Congo Must Not Create Stability Vacuum, Jeopardize Civilian Protection, Senior Official Tells Security Council,’ 9358th meeting, 26 June 2023 Rwandan military forces’ (RDF) direct involvement with the M23 diminished from February 2023 but surged again in the last quarter of 2023 as fighting resumed. 

Part of the reason the armistice failed in October was a spike in confrontations between M23 and the Wazalendo, also known as the Awakening of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo. The Wazalendo emerged as localized youth self-defense groups but has increasingly incorporated existing armed groups.³Christophe Rigaud, ‘Contre le M23, Kinshasa fait le pari risqué des groupes armés,’ Afrikarabia, 29 October 2023 Clashes between the Wazalendo and M23 sparked renewed tensions between the Congolese and Rwandan governments, which accused one another of using the Wazalendo and M23 as proxy forces, respectively.⁴Mary Wambui, ‘EAC raises concerns over new hostilities in Eastern DR Congo,’ The East African, 13 October 2023; Michela Wrong, ‘Kagame’s Revenge: Why Rwanda’s Leader Is Sowing Chaos in Congo,’ Foreign Affairs, 13 April 2023 The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) also reportedly fought under the Wazalendo coalition — exacerbating tensions with Kigali due to the FDLR’s links to the former Hutu regime in Rwanda, which carried out the 1993 genocide.⁵Vincent Duhem, ‘M23, FARDC, milices… Regain de tensions autour de Goma,’ Jeune Afrique, 6 October 2023; Christophe Rigaud, ‘Contre le M23, Kinshasa fait le pari risqué des groupes armés,’ Afrikarabia, 29 October 2023 

For the first time since 2013, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) — an armed group operating in eastern DRC and Uganda with reported ties to the Islamic State⁶Congo Research Group, ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion,’ Center on International Cooperation, New York University, November 2018, p. 5; Lindsay Scorgie-Porter, ‘Economic Survival and Borderland Rebellion: The Case of the Allied Democratic Forces on the Uganda-Congo Border,’ The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 30 July 2015 — was involved in fewer violent events than the M23. The ADF remains the most deadly threat to civilians in DRC and was responsible for over 1,000 reported fatalities in 2023. Strategic ADF positions in DRC also allowed for increased cross-border attacks into Uganda compared to the previous year, with fatalities arising from cross-border violence doubling in 2023.

What to watch for in 2024

After the national elections in December, the recently re-elected President Félix Tshisekedi will oversee multiple security threats, the drawdown of international military and peacekeeping forces, and a troubled relationship with several eastern neighbors — especially Rwanda.⁷UN Security Council, ‘Mission Drawdown in Democratic Republic of Congo Must Not Create Stability Vacuum, Jeopardize Civilian Protection, Senior Official Tells Security Council,’ 9358th meeting, 26 June 2023 The escalating M23 violence in the last quarter of 2023 and a myriad of other conflicts are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. However, evidence from 2023 shows that ceasefire agreements can indeed lead to reduced levels of violence — at least in the short term. Regional mediation demonstrated some effectiveness in easing tensions between Kinshasa, Kigali, and the M23, with the United States placing increasing pressure to reduce hostilities.⁸Erin Banco, ‘The US is scrambling to avoid another foreign policy crisis — this time in Congo,’ Politico, 1 December 2023 If military or diplomatic strategies bring a conclusion to M23 and RDF hostilities, Kinshasa may be able to turn momentum and form a unified front against the ADF. After stopping the M23 expansion in late 2013, the Congolese military (FARDC) turned its attention to the ADF, inflicting heavy fatalities and pushing many fighters to leave the country or flee into rural forested areas.⁹Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, Ryan Cummings, ‘The Islamic State in Africa,’ Hurst, December 2021, p. 227 – 228 

As it stands, though, the FARDC and international military focus on the M23 glosses over other associated challenges in the region. The rising direct confrontations between the FARDC and RDF in late 2023 continue to pose risks for escalation between the two countries. The expanding Wazalendo coalition may also counter the M23 militarily, but the army’s strategy of supporting and fighting alongside non-state armed groups often results in arming potential adversaries.¹⁰Congo Research Group, ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion,’ Center on International Cooperation, New York University, November 2018, p. 5; Gerard Prunier, ‘Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe,’ Oxford University Press, 2009 Armed groups such as the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo joined the Wazalendo coalition but had previously fought against state forces, especially in 2020 and 2021. The precarious relationships among Wazalendo groups and with the FARDC — both fighting against and alongside soldiers in 2023 — may break down and lead to exacerbated violence over the next few months. 

The efficacy of the FARDC in 2024 is also likely to be significantly influenced by the changing dynamics of international military support. Escalating demonstrations against the failure of East African Community (EAC) forces and United Nations peacekeeping troops (MONUSCO) to end violence brought about withdrawal policies and critical political rhetoric aimed at international forces.¹¹Africa News, ‘East DRC: Commencement of East African Regional Force Withdrawal Amidst Criticisms,’ 3 December 2023; Patick Ilunga, ‘DRC signs deal for SADC troops deployment,’ The East African, 18 November 2023 Troop drawdowns by EAC forces and MONUSCO likely arose from a political desire by Kinshasa to gain support among the population in the restive eastern region. However, reduced political pressure after the election may permit more flexibility in the timeline for troop drawdowns or even allow President Tshisekedi to reverse the decision to remove international forces. Evidence of new military operations between FARDC and MONUSCO in late 2023 suggests that collaboration may continue into 2024.¹²UN Peacekeeping, ‘North Kivu: MONUSCO and FARDC launch codenamed Operation Springbok to protect the city of Goma,’ 8 November 2023 Bilateral military operations by Burundi and Uganda in DRC will also likely expand in the year ahead. The EAC withdrawal permits an expanded mandate for the Ugandan and Burundian militaries, as operations in North Kivu province had previously been reserved for the EAC forces.¹³Xinhua, ‘Uganda’s military says withdrawal of regional force from DRC won’t affect operation against ADF,’ 4 December 2023 The cross-border violence by ADF creates risks for Uganda, and the M23’s support from Rwanda incentivizes Burundi to stop their expansion. 

At the same time, a contested election resulted in widespread unrest, violence against perceived illegitimate winners, and suppression of political opposition by those in power, suggesting that the domestic political situation in the post-election environment will likely maintain its volatility in 2024. Demonstrations against the electoral process and violence targeting electoral workers, offices, and materials rose as a way for political groups to disrupt the voting process or voice discontent with the process in 2023. The escalation of the M23 violence and support from Rwanda has reinvigorated rhetoric over identity frequently adopted by political figures and their supporters during the election cycle  — drawing clear lines between people considered genuinely Congolese and others viewed as outsiders.¹⁴Coralie Pierret, ‘En RDC, la “congolité” au cœur des crispations de la campagne présidentielle,’ Le Monde, 27 November 2023 This rhetoric may contribute to the escalation of violence targeting groups such as the Banyamulenge or others with perceived Rwandan heritage.