Conflict Watchlist 2024

Mexico: Confronting Deadly Political and Criminal Power Struggles in an Election Year

Posted: 17 January 2024

Mexico experienced persistently high levels of violence in 2023, driven by competition between more than 70 active armed groups vying for the control of lucrative illicit economies — including drug and human smuggling, and extortion. These groups, even though criminal in nature, hold control of large swaths of territory, are responsible for most violent events in the country, and have developed deep links with different institutional sectors, reasons for which ACLED considers their violence as political.¹ In fact, this violent dispute has seen Mexico rank among the world’s most extreme conflicts in the ACLED Conflict Index. It is unlikely to cede this position, as the flow of people and drugs to the United States — two key drivers of conflict between criminal groups — are at all-time highs, while the 2024 general elections are likely to kindle political violence.

In 2023, clashes between criminal groups and between state forces and criminal groups both increased, driven by an intensification of turf wars between criminal outfits, as well as a heightened state response. The latter, in particular, hints at a shift in President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s security policy, moving away from his “hugs, not bullets” approach² that had contributed to a progressive decrease in security forces clashing with criminal groups since 2018. ACLED records 872 armed interactions between state forces and criminal groups in 2023, a 24% increase from the 705 recorded in 2022. Fighting between rival armed groups similarly increased in 2023, as ACLED records 426 events, compared to 377 in 2022. Against this backdrop, drug cartels’ war tactics increasingly feature armored vehicles and long-distance aerial attacks, hinting at a growing sophistication of these groups and making it more difficult for security forces to tackle them.³

Similar to previous years, Nuevo León, Guanajuato, and Michoacán states experienced the highest levels of violence in 2023. In Michoacán, the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) continued to compete with other groups, mostly gathered under the United Cartels umbrella, for control of the following economic activities: avocado and lime production, the movement of goods at the port of Lázaro Cárdenas (key for drug trafficking and importing chemical precursors used to produce fentanyl), and iron ore mining.⁴ In Guanajuato, the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel, and CJNG fight each other for control of drug trafficking and drug peddling activities. In Nuevo León, competition over smuggling routes toward the US and the Monterrey economic hub fuels violence between the Gulf Cartel, Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, and Cartel del Noreste (CDN).⁵

Turf wars between criminal groups have also intensified outside of these states, most notably in Guerrero, Chiapas, and Tamaulipas. Increased armed interactions in Guerrero inverted a downward trend in past years, with La Familia Michoacana Cartel fighting local groups for access to gold mines. In Chiapas, armed interactions almost quadrupled compared to 2022, driven by fighting between the CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel, forcing the government to send over 1,500 army and police officers in May to re-establish order in the area.⁶ The dispute between the two outfits has also increasingly transcended the country’s borders into proxy wars in Ecuador and Colombia.⁷ In Tamaulipas, territorial disputes over smuggling routes into the US and infighting between splintering Gulf Clan factions drove heightened violence, with deadly targeting of security forces.

The civilian burden of these turf wars continued to be immense in 2023, with Mexico ranking as the most dangerous country in the world for civilians in the ACLED Conflict Index. Even though violence targeting civilians decreased by 13% in 2023, it remains at disturbingly high levels, with nearly 5,200 recorded events. Organized crime violence has spurred an increase in Mexicans migrating toward the US. They accounted for a fifth of migrants traveling in family groups encountered by US border authorities in the 2023 fiscal year (October to September), part of the unprecedented 3.2 million migrant encounters reported in the same period.⁸ While violence targeting migrants often goes unreported, criminal groups prey on them, using them as mules and charging transit fees, as well as extorting, kidnapping, and sexually assaulting them.⁹

What to watch for in 2024

With regional drug production at an all-time high, unprecedented migration, expanding cartel disputes, and uncertain relations with the US, political violence is likely to increase in 2024. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s latest figures, coca crops in Colombia expanded by 13% in 2021, reaching 230,000 hectares, while also increasing in Peru and Bolivia.¹⁰ The increased production is leading to the diversification of trafficking routes and subsequent competition between criminal groups in transit countries, particularly those where Mexican cartels have a footprint. Furthermore, the consumption of fentanyl, produced by Mexican cartels using chemical precursors from China, continues to climb in the US, where over 100,000 people died of overdose in 2021, despite promises by the Mexican and Chinese governments to help stem the flow of this substance¹¹ and an alleged fentanyl production ban announced by the Sinaloa Cartel.¹²

As demand for and offer of illicit substances increases in Western countries, the control for their production and trafficking is likely to continue fueling violent inter-cartel disputes both in Mexico and countries of origin and transit. This is particularly true for the most powerful drug gangs, such as the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG, who are increasingly projecting their violent dispute even outside the country’s boundaries. Likewise, the number of people transiting through Mexico to reach the US is unlikely to decrease, providing criminal groups with additional revenue streams and subsequent reasons to fight, particularly in the southern state of Chiapas, the country’s doorway for migrants transiting through Central America.¹³ Armed groups will continue expanding their protection rackets, impacting public security and economic activities, and worsening the civilian toll, particularly in states where ever more atomized groups struggle to establish dominance, such as Michoacán, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas.

In addition to this, Mexico will hold one of its largest elections ever on 2 June 2024, with close to 20,000 public posts in contest, including the presidency, congressional seats, municipal positions, and eight governorships. This poll will likely catalyze further political violence, with ACLED data suggesting that levels of violence targeting local officials often peak around electoral processes in Mexico. In 2018, when the latest general elections were held, ACLED records nearly 400 violent incidents targeting politicians and local administrators, a figure higher than any year since. Violence against local officials is often linked with criminal activities but it is also driven by other factors, such as local political disputes and even inter-personal rivalries. The interplay between traditional politics’ violent habits and criminal groups’ interests to maximize their territorial control provides a fertile ground for violence targeting officials to grow in 2024, particularly around election day. In fact, at least four candidates have already been killed as of early 2024.¹⁴

The wiggle room for the upcoming president of Mexico is going to be narrow. Both the government and the main opposition presidential candidates, Claudia Sheinbaum and Xóchitl Gálvez, have promised to gradually downscale the military’s involvement in public security tasks.¹⁵ However, the successful candidate will inherit a complex, ever-changing security situation wherein a mix of thriving illicit activities and widespread corruption and collusion with criminal groups will hinder the implementation of any comprehensive policy. Any initiative launched by the central government is also unlikely to succeed without the necessary support of and coordination with governors and municipal authorities, who share responsibilities in implementing public security policies but are more exposed to being infiltrated by criminal interests.¹⁶

The next government’s odds of successfully tackling organized crime will also be significantly influenced by another general election: that of the United States. Both Democrats and Republicans back tough-on-crime policies that focus on drug supply rather than demand. However, the Biden administration favors fostering judicial cooperation and has taken small steps to reduce the southbound arms trafficking that contributes to the perpetration of violence in Mexico.¹⁷ A growing number of Republicans, including the party’s main presidential candidates, have instead aired the idea of a direct US military intervention against Mexican cartels, particularly after an attack on four US citizens in Matamoros, two of whom were killed, by hitmen of the Gulf Cartel in March 2023.¹⁸ Several lawmakers have also sponsored legislation that would grant the US the right to intervene in the country. While these remain mostly rhetorical tools, a change in the White House could imply greater assertiveness on this issue, straining relations with Mexico and harshening the conflict without providing long-term solutions to the drug trafficking issue.¹⁹

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Tiziano Breda

Tiziano Breda is Associate Analysis Coordinator for Latin America at ACLED and has been with the organization since January 2024. In this role, he contributes to the analysis of conflict, demonstration, and political violence patterns in Latin America. Prior to joining ACLED, he spent over seven years carrying out research on Latin American politics and security for the International Crisis Group and IAI, five of which living in Colombia and Guatemala. Tiziano holds a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology from the University of Padua and a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of Bolonia, Campus Forlì, enriched by conflict resolution studies at the Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) and the Universidad Nacional de Colombia.