Conflict Watchlist 2024

Haiti: Gangs and Vigilantes Thrive Amid Political Deadlock

Posted: 17 January 2024

View the Haiti: Mid-year metrics 2024 infographic

In 2023, political violence in Haiti remained unabated as gangs’ territorial disputes continued to deteriorate the country’s security landscape. While overall violence levels only slightly increased in 2023 compared to 2022, violence grew significantly deadlier: ACLED records 1,980 reported fatalities, which represents a 39% increase. With gangs continuously seeking to strengthen their sources of revenue, they significantly expanded to new areas, prompting new outbreaks of violence within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and in the wider Ouest department, in the Artibonite department, and beyond. Faced with the government’s lack of capacity to address heightened violence, 2023 also saw a surge in self-defense activity, sending a worrying signal of the generalization of violence within Haitian society. Despite the expected deployment of a Kenya-led international security force approved by the UN, concerns that the security situation could worsen remain high, exacerbated by stalling negotiations between the interim government and the opposition over a way out of Haiti’s political crisis.

In the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, the ongoing turf war between the G-9 and G-Pèp gang alliances has continued to fuel violence including in Port-au-Prince and Cité Soleil communes. Territorial expansions of independent gangs also significantly contributed to deadly violence. Gangs such as Grand-Ravine and 5 Seconds have led incursions to contest control of the capital’s southern entrance, including in Carrefour’s Mariani neighborhood and Port-au-Prince’s Martissant and Carrefour Feuilles neighborhoods. Meanwhile, in the eastern Pétion-Ville and Kenscoff communes, ACLED records the expansion of the Kraze Baryè gang. Gang reach also intensified in the municipalities north of the capital, as the 5 Seconds, Titanyen, and Canaan gangs seek control over key economic assets such as the Lafiteau port, industrial areas, and Road 1, which connects the capital to the north of the country.¹

At the same time, gangs have intensified their activities beyond the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the wider Ouest department. In the Artibonite department, 2023 saw a 70% rise in gang-related fatalities compared to the year prior, with gangs such as Gran Grief de Savien, Kokorat San Ras, and 5 Seconds contesting control of farming lands and strategic road axes.² Violence has also gained ground in other regions, albeit at lower levels, especially in the Centre, Grande-Anse, and Nord departments amid increasing clashes involving law enforcement forces and self-defense groups seeking to contain gang activities.

In 2023, civilians continued to be targeted as part of gang turf wars and territorial expansions, with violence targeting civilians representing 53% of all recorded gang-related violence in the country. Gangs have used violence to subjugate populations residing in territories under their control or under dispute, and targeted civilians allegedly cooperating with rival gangs or bypassing the ruling gang’s authority. Gangs also continued to conduct abductions to generate revenues from ransoms, albeit at lower levels compared to 2022. Attacks on political figures — including government representatives, judges, politicians, and activists – were also twice as deadly in 2023 as in 2022, suggesting gangs’ increasing willingness to directly target officials for extortion or to pressure those denouncing gang activities.

Against this backdrop of deadlier violence targeting civilians and a general perception of the government’s inability to fight gangs, a surge in vigilante violence in 2023 added another layer to Haiti’s security landscape. Reported fatalities from vigilante events represent 15% of political violence in 2023. Most notably, on 24 April, mobs of vigilantes killed at least 57 gang members in several neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince. The multiplication of such events across the country prompted gangsters to retaliate, adding to the overall rise in deadly violence in 2023.

What to watch for in 2024

The intensification and ongoing spread of gang violence to new areas in the country highlights the government’s inability to address Haiti’s security crisis. The diffused nature of violence has pushed Haiti to the number eight ranking in the ACLED Conflict Index, a significant jump compared to the past year. In 2023, ACLED also records a 6% decrease in clashes between state forces and armed groups, but a 47% increase in reported fatalities. This increasing lethality reflects an intensification of gang offensives against police forces in territories they seek to control, notably with the targeting of police stations, but is also indicative of a growing number of reported fatalities among civilians caught in the crossfire, especially in densely populated neighborhoods. Vigilante groups joined police forces in conducting anti-gang operations, resulting in a high number of deaths among gang members. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti also documented several cases of extrajudicial killings conducted by the police.³ In 2024, Haiti’s police forces will continue to be subject to gang attacks as armed groups expand to new territories, and a severe shortage of staff and equipment will likely limit police response capacity and expose civilian populations to persistent vulnerability.

Haiti’s interim government has pinned its hopes on the deployment of a Kenya-led international security force to help tackle gang violence. However, after Kenya’s parliament approved the deployment, its high court blocked the move, saying it will issue a ruling in the matter on 26 January.⁴ Concerns have also remained over the Kenyan police forces’ poor human rights track record and their ability to operate effectively in urban settings like the Port-au-Prince gang landscape.⁵ Additionally, the international force will likely face heavy scrutiny from the population, as many reject interim Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s legitimacy and fear a repeat of the civilian killings and sexual abuses that occurred during previous international peacekeeping missions.⁶

Any large-scale security operation will likely yield short-lived results in the absence of measures to address key drivers of violence. Reforms that could lead to more lasting outcomes include reinforcing the rule of law and boosting state forces’ capacities to affect weapon and drug trafficking networks, which have gained momentum in recent years.⁷ Effective reforms would also seek to address corruption and collusion with gangs within police bodies and the political sphere, which remains the main obstacle to any progress in the fight against gangs.⁸ Such an initiative would echo the adoption of sanctions in the United States and Canada against high-profile gang leaders and politicians involved in crimes.

The adoption of long-lasting measures, however, remains contingent on political forces’ ability to find a way out of Haiti’s political crisis. Although a political agreement signed 21 December 2022 established a roadmap for the holding of elections in 2023, negotiations between political forces remain at a standstill.⁹ This deadlock could lead to additional unrest in February 2024, when the new government-elect had been set to take office. In addition, the return to Haiti of Guy Philippe, a former rebel leader who ousted the Aristide government in 2004, could destabilize the transition process. On 2 January, surrounded by armed men, he notably called for the resignation of the interim government.¹⁰

Without the restoration of state institutions and an end to the political crisis, gangs will continue to strengthen and professionalize. Gangs’ growth and expansion will likely continue to fuel rivalry and clashes with deadly consequences for civilians in 2024, exacerbated by the breakdown of a G9 and G-Pèp truce in November 2023 and the failure of the G-9-led Viv Ansanm (Live Together) operation launched in September, which called for an end to violence and for the safety of Haitians.¹¹

Finally, in the absence of improvements to the rule of law and the control of weapon flow, vigilante violence will continue amid criticism that self-defense groups have targeted civilians misidentified as gang members or collaborators. Experts have further highlighted a risk that vigilante organizations could turn to criminal activity, as observed elsewhere in Latin America.¹² This risk has raised concerns that the newly emerged Bwa Kale movement, a vigilante movement, could mark a period of informal groups using illegal use of force that will further complicate an already complex conflict landscape.

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Sandra Pellegrini

Sandra is ACLED’s Latin America & the CaribbeanSenior Analyst. In this capacity, she conducts and coordinates analysis, oversees the accuracy of conflict trends in the region, and serves as the main point of contact for partnerships and external engagement for Latin America and the Caribbean. Sandra has been with the organization since 2018, first starting as a researcher and supporting the expansion of ACLED’s coverage in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Prior to joining ACLED, Sandra has worked with international organizations in the field of conflict prevention and minority rights, and held several positions in the non-governmental organizations sector with experience in Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, and Honduras. Sandra holds an International Master in Russian, Central and East European Studies from the University of Glasgow and a Master of International Relations from KIMEP University Almaty. Her areas of research include political violence in Latin America, non-state actors, and organized crime dynamics.