Sudan: Setting the Stage for a Long War

In April 2023, war broke out in the capital Khartoum between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as ‘Hemedti’. In 2024, peace remains as elusive as ever in Sudan. What started as a power struggle between rival warlords has since escalated into a nationwide conflict that has drawn in rebel groups, ethnic militias, and international actors. Over 13,000 people¹This number is a conservative estimate due to methodological limitations of real-time reporting in a conflict of this nature. For more, see the Fatalities FAQ in the ACLED Knowledge Base. have reportedly died in Sudan since fighting began in April — though this is likely a significant underestimate of the conflict’s human toll. Additionally, over 7 million have been displaced, amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation and claims of ethnic cleansing and widespread human rights violations against the civilian population.²United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Sudan Situation Report,’ last updated on 28 December 2023

Burhan and Hemedti were, respectively, the chairman and deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council, which has served as Sudan’s executive body since August 2019. In October 2021, they led a military coup that dissolved the government and ousted the civilian members of the Transitional Council, turning it into a military junta. Although military and political actors committed to relaunch the transitional process in December 2022, tensions between the SAF and the RSF mounted over a proposed plan to dissolve the RSF and integrate it into the army. On 15 April, heavy clashes broke out between Hemedti’s RSF and army troops in Khartoum’s tri-city area and other parts of the country. In response, the Sudanese Air Force, under the control of Burhan, closed Sudan’s airspace and hit multiple RSF positions on the outskirts of the capital.

In the months since, the RSF has entrenched its position in Khartoum, laying a siege on the SAF headquarters in the capital and forcing Burhan to relocate to the coastal city of Port Sudan. West of the capital, Darfur became a hotbed of some of the most violent war events to date. Darfur is home to Hemedti and the RSF, which was assembled in 2013 from the ashes of the Janjaweed militias used by the Sudanese government against rebel movements in Darfur.³Elian Peltier and Abdi Latif Dahir, ‘Who are the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitaries fighting Sudan’s Army?,’ 17 April 2023 In 2023, four out of the five capital cities of Darfur (Nyala, Zalingei, El Geneina, and El Daein) fell to the RSF, which is now preparing to capture the North Darfur capital, El Fasher.⁴Sudan War Monitor and Mohamed Hajj Nur, ‘RSF deputy leader: ‘We decided to control all of Darfur, and El Fasher is no exception’,’ 27 November 2023 Beyond Darfur, the RSF also controls parts of North and West Kordofan, where it has secured its grip over Sudan’s biggest oil fields and strategic supply routes from and to the capital.

The ACLED Conflict Index highlights the intensity of the war in Sudan, with the country ranking fourth in the indicator for the deadliness of reported violence. Airstrikes and shelling targeting residential neighborhoods have claimed thousands of civilian lives in Khartoum’s tri-city area, home to some of the most intense fighting since April 2023. In Darfur, where the RSF is allied with ethnic Arab militias, evidence has emerged of mass atrocities perpetrated against non-Arab ethnic groups, sparking accusations of ethnic cleansing and war crimes.⁵Human Rights Watch, ‘Darfur: Rapid Support Forces, Allied Militias Rape Dozens,’ 17 August 2023; United States Department of State, ‘War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Ethnic Cleansing Determination in Sudan,’ 6 December 2023 After the killing of no fewer than 800 people of the Masalit group at the hands of the RSF and allied militias in the Ardamata refugee camps, the European Union High Representative, Josep Borrell, linked the killings to “a wider ethnic cleansing campaign conducted by the RSF with the aim to eradicate the non-Arab Masalit community from West Darfur” and warned of “another genocide” unfolding in the region.⁶European External Action Service, ‘Sudan: Statement by the High Representative on the atrocities in Ardamta Darfur,’ 12 November 2023; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Sudan: Killings in Ardamata,’ 17 November 2023

What to watch for in 2024

The RSF notched up significant successes at the end of 2023. It has tightened its stranglehold over the tri-city area, wearing out SAF defenses in Omdurman and in the south of Khartoum. The town of Jabal Awlia, some 40 kilometers south of Khartoum on the east bank of the White Nile river, had been the site of a months-long siege by the RSF, before its eventual fall in November. Shortly after overtaking Jabal Awlia, the RSF marched southward in the direction of Wad Madani, the capital of al-Jazirah state, home to half a million displaced people from Khartoum and a critical humanitarian hub. The SAF withdrew from the city, leaving it defenseless against widespread looting committed by the RSF militiamen.⁷Agence France Presse, ‘Sudan: RSF militiamen accused of widespread looting in Wad Madani,’ 26 December 2023; Reuters, ‘Aid agencies report looting, suspend operations in Sudanese state,’ 29 December 2023 The RSF is also closing in on Sennar, the capital of the eponymous state, and is likely preparing for a new offensive on the neighboring White Nile state.

The RSF also has virtual control of almost all of Darfur after pressuring the SAF into withdrawing from its positions in South and West Darfur. Local authorities, however, warned that an RSF attack on the North Darfur capital, El Fasher, may lead to a further escalation, drawing the Zaghawa tribe and the Darfur joint rebel forces into a conflict with Hemedti’s troops.⁸Radio Dabanga, ‘‘Last redoubt’ – North Darfur capital braces for RSF onslaught,’ 27 November 2023; Sudan Tribune, ‘Darfur leaders urged RSF to cease attack on El-Fasher, Idris says,’ 12 December 2023 While Khartoum is arguably the center of political and economic power in Sudan, Darfur is a considerable source of income, alliances, and recruitment for the RSF, and is home to Hemedti’s support base.⁹Gerrit Kurtz, ‘The Spoilers of Darfur: Sudan’s protracted political crisis and the intensifying violence in Darfur are closely connected’, SWP-Berlin, 7 September 2023 This support base consists of a network of heavily armed Arab ethnic militias fighting alongside the RSF, which entrusted them to administer local communities across Darfur. RSF-aligned militias are, therefore, likely to be among the greatest beneficiaries of the RSF’s takeover of Darfur. However, their empowerment may eventually sanction additional violence and stoke internecine fighting among the militias themselves over the spoils of war, in a violent spiral that the RSF may not be capable of preventing. 

International efforts to stop the war in Sudan have been remarkably lackluster. Former South African President and African Union mediator for Sudan, Thabo Mbeki, described the African and international responses to the conflict as “woefully inadequate.”¹⁰Sudan War Monitor, ‘Mbeki: ‘African and international response to Sudan disaster woefully inadequate’,’ 23 November 2023 The United Nations Security Council voted on 1 December to terminate the UN political mission to Sudan after the Sudanese government dismissed its performance as “disappointing.”¹¹UN, ‘Security Council agrees to terminate UN mission in Sudan,’ 1 December 2023 Attempts by the United States and Saudi Arabia to broker a ceasefire have repeatedly failed, while peace talks in Jeddah halted indefinitely due to a failure to implement confidence-building measures between the SAF and the RSF. Although Hemedti declared his openness to an unconditional ceasefire as recently as January 2024, civil society activists have expressed doubts over the parties’ genuine commitment to a negotiated end to the war.¹²Reuters, ‘Sudan’s RSF open to talks on immediate ceasefire with army,’ 2 January 2024; Radio Dabanga, ‘Sudan activists: El Burhan and Hemedti speeches ‘deny reality’,’ 2 January 2024 Meanwhile, foreign meddling, most notably the United Arab Emirates’ support to the RSF, is further prolonging the conflict and hindering the effectiveness of US sanctions.¹³Yasir Zaidan, ‘U.S. Sudan Sanctions Won’t Work Without the UAE’s Help,’ Foreign Policy, 21 September 2023 

Against this backdrop, the war in Sudan is unlikely to end soon. Emboldened by its successes in Khartoum and Darfur, and the lack of diplomatic efforts to achieve a complete ceasefire, the RSF is moving southward and eastward to force the SAF into submission. While the SAF continues to retain air superiority, the army faces a crisis of legitimacy, unable to resist the RSF advances and instead accused of pounding residential areas with airstrikes. Amid increasing factionalism within the SAF, Burhan is facing calls to step down.¹⁴Mat Nashed, ‘‘Remove him’: Sudan army chief al-Burhan faces calls to go after RSF gains,’ Al Jazeera, 20 December 2023 Across the country, the dissolution of the SAF has prompted the formation of self-defense militias, with thousands of people reportedly taking up arms against the RSF.¹⁵Mat Nashed, ‘Sudan’s civilians pick up arms, as RSF gains and army stumbles,’ Al Jazeera, 24 December 2023; France 24, ‘Sudan civilians rush for arms as paramilitaries advance,’ 28 December 2023 A fragmented Sudan, however, will not be more peaceful nor stable and may instead set the stage for ethnic cleansing, internecine fighting within each camp, and a prolonged power struggle.

An indefinite continuation of the war will also have catastrophic consequences for the civilian population. Nearly 25 million people — over half of Sudan’s population — require humanitarian assistance, with over 20 million facing acute food insecurity. 7.2 million people have been displaced in the first eight months of the conflict, including 1.4 million crossing into neighboring Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia.¹⁶UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Sudan Situation Report,’ last updated on 28 December 2023 In addition to sparking a regional refugee crisis, the fallout from the war in Sudan may have significant implications, especially for Chad, whose government is under mounting pressure to support either non-Arab tribes in Darfur or the UAE-backed RSF.¹⁷Enrica Picco, ‘The Fallout in Chad from the Fighting in Darfur,’ Crisis Group, 10 August 2023 Far from being confined to the country’s borders, the war in Sudan will have far-reaching regional and international effects.