A year of multi-front conflict: Israeli military operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon

2024 marked one of the most intense periods of conflict in decades for the Middle East. The repercussions of Hamas’ attack in October 2023 continued to shape events in the region, with Israel showing a clear willingness to escalate the conflict on multiple fronts. Seeking to reshape and impose a new order in the Middle East, Israel launched a major offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon while continuing to engage in a protracted and destructive war in Gaza and intensifying crackdowns on armed groups in the West Bank. As a result of these multifront operations, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ranked the third-most operationally active military force globally in 2024.

ACLED’s Conflict Index ranks Palestine as the most dangerous and violent place in the world in 2024, topping the index for geographic diffusion of conflict and danger to civilians. Palestine remained the scene of the IDF’s most lethal operations in 2024; more than 28,000 people were killed in over 17,000 distinct incidents of violence in Gaza and the West Bank in the first 11 months of the year. This brought the total fatality toll of Palestinians killed since 7 October 2023 to more than 45,000. While the IDF pressed on with a grinding war in Gaza, the intensity of its operations decreased as Israel gained greater operational control over the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces targeted all five governorates of Gaza, but the highest number of attacks hit Gaza City and Dayr al-Balah. With Gaza reduced to piles of rubble and the IDF issuing multiple evacuation orders throughout the year, over 2 million Palestinians in Gaza have sought shelter in makeshift tents. Yet, no place has remained entirely safe for the population. Indeed, between January and the end of November 2024, Israeli strikes directly hit locations housing displaced people across the Gaza Strip in at least 380 instances. 

Despite significant losses, including the decimation of its political and military leadership, Hamas continues to maintain some operational capability in Gaza, mainly using guerrilla warfare tactics. Hamas has engaged in gunbattles or ambushed Israeli soldiers with explosives in over 1,600 instances in 2024 up until the end of November, causing hundreds of reported fatalities and thousands of injuries among Israeli forces.¹Alastair McCready, et al., ‘Updates: Israel attacks desperate Palestinians seeking food aid in Gaza, Al Jazeera,’ 30 November 2024 Hamas has also been able to regroup in several areas where the IDF had previously announced it had established control, such as in North Gaza, where Israeli forces launched their third ground offensive in October. 

Meanwhile, Palestinians in the West Bank continued to live in the shadow of the war in Gaza as the IDF tightened its grip with military raids and sweeping arrests. While IDF activity in the West Bank decreased from the all-time high recorded by ACLED in the last quarter of 2023, it remained at elevated levels, with over 4,000 incidents reported in the first 11 months of 2024. The IDF has increasingly resorted to war-like tactics and weaponry, including drone strikes and airstrikes, as well as ENERGA anti-tank missiles. This escalation included the IDF’s largest military operation in the West Bank since 2002, which was carried out in late August. IDF operations primarily targeted urban refugee camps in Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, and Tubas, where the Israeli military has targeted Palestinian armed groups since March 2022. Palestinian armed groups — mainly linked with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Hamas — have escalated their confrontations with the IDF during raids and have responded with frequent armed attacks on military checkpoints and settlements.

Nearly a year after Hezbollah attempted to pressure Israel into ceasing the war in Gaza, tit-for-tat skirmishes between Hezbollah and the IDF significantly escalated in mid-September. The Shiite group’s communication network was damaged through a series of attacks on pagers and walkie-talkies, while its top leadership, including secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, was killed. The IDF pummeled Lebanon with an unprecedented airstrike campaign, conducting over 5,700 airstrike events between mid-September and November, bringing the total number of Israeli attacks in Lebanon in the first 11 months of 2024 to over 12,6500. The number of airstrike events in Lebanon during September, October, and November was higher than in any other month recorded by ACLED in the region since 2017. While the majority of IDF strikes were concentrated in southern Lebanon previously, after mid-September, Israel also targeted other Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley in the east, as well as the capital, Beirut. 

Despite the wide scale of its air campaign, Israel refrained from targeting infrastructure such as the country’s sole international airport, seaports, fuel reservoirs, power stations, and bridges. On 1 October, the IDF launched a limited ground offensive in southern Lebanon, operating in at least 34 towns and villages along Lebanon’s border. By 27 November, when Israel and Lebanon had reached a ceasefire, IDF forces had advanced to the Litani River in the eastern sector and the Wadi Saluki area, approximately four and 10 kilometers north of the border, respectively.²Emanuel Fabian, ‘IDF troops reach key Litani River for first time since 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon,’ The Times of Israel, 26 November 2024 

What to watch for in 2025

While the IDF has managed to inflict substantial damage on Hamas and Hezbollah, the prospects for lasting peace remain bleak. Military operations continue in Gaza, the truce in Lebanon remains fragile, while Israeli forces and armed settlers ramp up attacks in the West Bank and have taken over parts of the Golan Heights in Syrian-controlled territory. With no realistic prospects for a political solution in Palestine or the disarmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the short to medium-term, any temporary measures may only mark the beginning of preparations for the next wars.

Nearly 14 months of fighting in the Palestinian coastal enclave has significantly diminished Hamas’ military and governing capabilities, but it appears increasingly unlikely that the group will be fully eliminated. Many security officials, including ousted Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, have suggested that Israel has militarily achieved all it can in Gaza, as the prospect of further weakening Hamas is diminishing.³Kat Lonsdorf and Itay Stern, ‘Israel’s ousted defense minister says the military has done all it can in Gaza,’ NPR, 10 November 2024 However, Israel’s political leadership, which has made shifting demands and reportedly derailed a hostage and ceasefire agreement in July by adding a new condition — that the IDF retain indefinite control over the Philadelphi Corridor⁴Mick Krever, et al., ‘Netanyahu derailed a potential Gaza hostage deal in July, Israeli newspaper reports,’ CNN, 4 September 2024 — does not appear ready to conclude a deal. At the same time, the IDF’s ongoing operations in North Gaza, which have raised fears of depopulation, and reports of the construction of critical Israeli infrastructure in an expanded Netzarim corridor dividing the strip suggest plans for prolonged military occupation.⁵Yoav Zeyton, ‘Cellcom antenna, new water line and “Terminal 3”: the largest Israeli territory in Gaza – an inside look,’ Ynet, 9 November 2024 

With Donald Trump set to assume the United States presidency in January, it remains uncertain whether Benjamin Netanyahu will have a freer hand in Gaza or face reduced support due to the isolationist stance of key figures in Trump’s circle, including Vice President-elect James David Vance. Trump has called broadly for ending the war in Gaza without a clear plan while simultaneously telling Netanyahu to “do what you have to do.”⁶Isaac Arnsdorf, et al., ‘Trump signals support in call with Netanyahu: ‘Do what you have to do,’ The Washington Post, 25 October 2024 Even if Trump is serious in his quest for peace in the Middle East and Israel declares an end to the war, fighting in Gaza is likely to persist in some form, as the IDF appears intent on maintaining a presence in northern Gaza.

Palestinians living in the West Bank are also likely to remain trapped in a cycle of violence, with little indication that IDF strategy, settlement expansion policies, settler violence, or Palestinian armed group activity are about to change. The IDF’s raids face fierce resistance, with armed groups resorting to planting larger bombs beneath roads. In response, using bulldozers, Israeli forces have destroyed roads and vital infrastructure, including utilities and communication lines. The West Bank’s economy has sharply declined due to damaged infrastructure, land confiscation, checkpoints, revoked work permits, and withheld tax payments, fueling a sense of collective punishment. With increasing grievances among Palestinians, armed groups like PIJ and Hamas are likely to continue pushing an agenda of violence. The potential smuggling of more advanced weapons into the West Bank using Iranian funding⁷Neomi Neumann, ‘Prioritizing the West Bank Amid Escalation and Deterioration,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 30 August 2024 could create an even more challenging security situation.

Furthermore, Trump’s history of supporting Israel, including recognizing Jerusalem as its capital and backing settlements, suggests his second term could empower the settlement movement. A full annexation may conflict with Trump’s efforts for a wider deal under the Abraham Accords diplomatic agreements to normalize Israel’s ties with Saudi Arabia. However, a more permissive approach from the US administration and Netanyahu’s desire to keep the far-right in the governing coalition could further deepen the entrenchment of the settler movement in the West Bank by enabling the expansion of housing, roads, and industrial zones. The rapid growth of settlements can, in turn, further fuel violence involving settlers.

Along the Lebanese-Israeli border, the truce is expected to ensure a period of relative calm. Within the initial 60-day stage of the ceasefire, Hezbollah is set to move its fighters north of the Litani River, and Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. However, significant long-term challenges remain. Negotiations over land border demarcation still lie ahead. But even before reaching that point, the implementation of the truce remains fragile. As part of the agreement, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are set to deploy troops south of the Litani River to help enforce the ceasefire and prevent Hezbollah from rearming or rebuilding infrastructure near the border. But despite significant degradation, the group’s military strength surpasses that of the LAF. Furthermore, domestically, Hezbollah continues to hold seats in both the Lebanese cabinet and parliament, ensuring its enduring political influence. Therefore, the LAF, which has many Hezbollah loyalists among its ranks,⁸Nayla Moussa, ‘Loyalties and Group Formation in the Lebanese Officer Corps,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 February 2016 remains constrained by the risk of internal unrest — rendering it unwilling or unable to fully disarm Hezbollah. 

Although the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has dealt another major blow to Hezbollah and deprived it of a key supply route for weapons from Iran, the implementation of the ceasefire continues to largely depend on Hezbollah’s willingness to comply and Iran’s resolve to ensure its adherence. This underscores the precarious nature of the deal and provides no guarantee of long-term stability, especially as Israel has vowed to react forcefully to any violations, including striking deeper into Lebanon and targeting the Lebanese state.⁹Laila Bassam, Maya Gebeily and Steven Scheer, ‘Israel threatens to expand war if Hezbollah truce collapses,’ Reuters, 3 December 2024

Israel’s recent activity in Syria — including taking over a previously demilitarized buffer zone in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights and targeting military positions inside Syria — suggests an attempt to secure the northernmost borders against enemy infiltrations and prevent armed groups from seizing Syrian army’s weaponry. Whether Israel’s moves in the Golan are a temporary measure designed to bolster its short-term security or an opportunistic bid to expand territory remains to be seen.

Fourteen months of fighting on multiple fronts have brought Israel notable military achievements and drastically shifted the current regional balance of power in its favor. However, neither Israel’s reliance on brute force nor the united front among members of the Axis of Resistance has yet to succeed in imposing a new strategic reality in the region that would be enduring. A fundamental reshaping of the regional order will require addressing critical political issues, including the ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories, which continues to fuel armed resistance against Israel, and the challenge posed by Hezbollah’s armament. In the absence of a comprehensive strategy encompassing political, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts, the cycle of violence will persist.