Resistance Forces

Historical background

During the autumn of 2014, and gaining increased momentum since March 2015, the Houthi-Saleh alliance overran Yemen’s Sunni-majority governorates in the country’s central, western, and southern regions. This military advance sparked a wave of semi-spontaneous resistance, uniting individuals from tribal militias, political organizations, religious sects, and civil society under two main banners: the PR and the SR. These two groups have different backgrounds and compositions, and operate in Yemen with different geographical patterns.

The SR has a deeper and more homogeneous historical background. In 2007, former military officers from al-Dali established the Southern Movement (often referred to by its name in Arabic, al-Hirak al-Janubi, or just Hirak), advocating for the secession of the southern provinces²‘Southern provinces’ refers to the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) provinces, namely: Abyan, Aden, parts of al-Dali, al-Mahra, Hadramawt, Lahij, Shabwa, and Suqutra. from the north and seeking resolution for grievances dating back to the 1994 Yemeni civil war. Between 2012 and 2014, some of these officers started training guerrilla forces across southern provinces, also integrating Salafi elements.³Stephen W. Day, ‘The Role of Hirak and the Southern Transitional Council,’ in Stephen W. Day and Noel Brehony, ‘Global, regional, and local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis,’ Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 261 As early as 2013, militants from Lahij and al-Dali already referred to themselves as the ‘Southern Resistance.’⁴Peter Salisbury, ‘Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg,’ Chatham House, March 2018; Other sources date the emergence of the Southern Resistance to 2009, Al Araby, ‘“Resistance” in southern Yemen: one goal, multiple projects and designations,’ 20 June 2015

In March 2015, when the Houthi-Saleh alliance marched southwards and overran Aden, SR units emerged from the Hirak network. Aydarus al-Zubaydi – an SR commander from al-Dali, who later became president of the STC – led the fight with the Houthis in his homeland, subsequently contributing to the liberation of Lahij and Aden. Meanwhile, the SR militias were established in Abyan and Shabwah. In general, the forces of the SR aligned themselves with the anti-Houthi faction and collaborated with the Saudi-led Coalition to secure financial support and supplies. Nevertheless, these units held a secessionist position, with a considerable number declining to acknowledge the authority of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s Resistance Leadership Council.⁵Al Araby, ‘Formation of a council to lead the resistance in Aden,’ 27 April 2015 

After driving the Houthis away from Aden in 2015, the SR remained engaged in anti-Houthi operations across the south, with a primary focus on al-Dali, Aden, Abyan, Shabwah, and Lahij, and smaller engagements in al-Bayda, Taizz, and al-Hudayda. Some SR units were also deployed to the southern border of Saudi Arabia to support anti-Houthi operations in both 2016 and 2018. Critically, infighting incidents erupted between SR and IRG forces, primarily concentrated in Aden between 2015 and 2018, and then in Shabwah and Abyan in 2019-21. Since 2019, the bulk of the SR activity has been concentrated in the historic stronghold of al-Dali, where several SR units have also been integrated into the Ministry of Defense.⁶Brian Carter, ‘Understanding Military Units in Southern Yemen,’ Critical Threats, 16 December 2022

Separately, the PR name was adopted by a broader and more diverse range of actors opposing the Houthis. Since the autumn of 2014, various local tribal groups and political organizations resorted to violent resistance to oppose the Houthi advance in Ibb, Taizz, and al-Hudayda, billing themselves as PR. In April 2015, after the Houthis overran Aden, then-President Hadi attempted to coordinate the efforts of these groups by establishing the Resistance Leadership Council.⁷Al Araby, ‘Formation of a council to lead the resistance in Aden,’ 27 April 2015 Meanwhile, PR units from the most diverse backgrounds emerged across most Yemeni governorates.

In Abyan, for instance, Popular Committees that had mobilized in 2012 to counter al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) played a pivotal role in resisting the Houthis in 2015.⁸Peter Salisbury, ‘Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg,’ Chatham House, March 2018 In Ibb, shaykh Abdulwahid Duam – an Islah-leaning tribal leader from al-Radma district – rapidly emerged as a prominent PR leader after opposing the Houthis in 2014. Similarly, in various governorates across Yemen’s north, tribal groups closely aligned with Islah constituted the backbone of the anti-Houthi resistance. After Saleh’s assassination in December 2017, tribal groups affiliated with his political party, the General People’s Congress, also confronted the Houthis within the framework of the PR.

In 2015, most PR activity was concentrated in Marib, Taizz, al-Dali, Ibb, and al-Bayda. Yet, pockets of resistance were also active in Dhamar, Sanaa, Amran, and other Houthi-controlled governorates. After a dwindling phase between 2017 and 2019, PR activity skyrocketed in 2020 and 2021 during the Houthi advance in al-Jawf and Marib governorates.