Houthis

Historical background

The Houthis engaged in six rounds of war with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh between 2004 and 2010, known as the Saada wars.²Husayn al-Houthi strongly criticized Saleh’s alliance with the United States in the global war on terrorism. In response, the regime suppressed dissent in Saada and killed Husayn al-Houthi in September 2004, sparking the Saada wars. The conflict escalated as the Houthis gained local support, with the regime accusing them of receiving Iranian support. In 2009, the war reached its climax, trespassing the Saudi border. For more, see Marieke Brandt, ‘Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A history of the Houthi Conflict,’ Oxford University Press, 2017. During the Youth Uprising in 2011, they gained popularity and became known as Ansar Allah. They later formed an alliance with their former arch-enemy Saleh,³Saleh and the Houthis had shared interests and mutual enemies, such as First Armored Division Commander Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, who led the six Saada wars. Their ‘marriage of convenience’ aimed to weaken al-Ahmar and President Abdurabbuh Mansur Hadi. For more, see Luca Nevola and Baraa Shiban, ‘The Role of “Coup Forces,” Saleh and the Houthis,’ Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis, 2020, pp.233-51. overrunning the capital Sanaa in September 2014 and signing the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA)⁴United Nations Peacemaker, ‘The Peace and National Partnership Agreement,’ 21 September 2014 with then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi – a power-sharing agreement that granted the Houthis access to government institutions.

On 6 February 2015, the Houthis issued the ‘Constitutional Declaration,’⁵The New Khalij, ‘With names.. 15 members of the “Supreme Revolutionary Committee” ruling Yemen after the coup,’ 19 February 2015 dissolved the parliament, and established the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC)⁶The New Khalij, ‘With names.. 15 members of the “Supreme Revolutionary Committee” ruling Yemen after the coup,’ 19 February 2015 under the leadership of Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, Abdulmalik’s cousin. They subsequently marched southwards in response to deadly bombing attacks against Zaydi mosques in Sanaa, which they attributed to the Islamic State. The Houthi-Saleh forces surrounded the southern port city of Aden triggering fierce clashes with the remnants of the Yemeni army and poorly armed resistance forces. In response, the Saudi-led Coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm on 26 March⁷The UN Security Council sanctioned the operation retrospectively, through resolution 2216. in support of President Hadi’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG).

The conflict dragged on until back-channel talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia facilitated a United Nations-brokered nationwide ceasefire, leading to the Kuwait Talks in April 2016. Yet, the breakdown of the talks in August 2016 marked a new phase of military and political developments. The Houthis and Saleh established the Supreme Political Council (SPC), led by then-President Saleh al-Sammad. Separately, the Houthis intensified aerial warfare, culminating in their first strike on Riyadh in February 2017. Tensions with the GPC escalated, resulting in clashes throughout 2017. Eventually, on 2 December, Saleh broke the alliance with the Houthis and engaged in dialogue with Saudi Arabia. In the ensuing battle of Sanaa, the Houthis eliminated Saleh and initiated a campaign to purge the GPC leadership.

In 2018, the Houthis consolidated their control over state institutions. However, in April, SPC President al-Sammad was killed by a Coalition airstrike and replaced by Mahdi al-Mashat. Around the same time, the Coalition launched a decisive offensive on the West Coast, besieging al-Hudayda. However, the Stockholm Agreement, established on 13 December 2018, effectively halted the Coalition’s advance.

Throughout 2019, the conflict in Yemen reached a stalemate, with decreased cross-border political violence due to talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. However, in early 2020, the Houthis advanced into al-Jawf governorate, posing a threat to the IRG by approaching the capital of Marib governorate, while resuming cross-border attacks. Between 2020 and January 2022, they dedicated substantial resources to capture Marib, but fell short of their objective and reacted to this setback with missile and drone attacks against the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, exposing their vulnerabilities and forcing them into a stalemate.

In light of these developments, the UN secured a truce between the Houthis and the IRG, which lasted from 2 April to 2 October 2022. Since the end of the truce, the Houthis have regularly engaged in tit-for-tat clashes on the frontlines, while also targeting economic infrastructure with long-range drones. Despite threatening a new escalation on several occasions, the Houthis have continued to engage in negotiations over the release of prisoners, the re-opening of transportation routes, and a new ceasefire. In a historic event, on 9 April  2023, a Saudi-Omani delegation, including Saudi Ambassador Muhammad Bin Said al-Jabir, visited Sanaa and met with SPC President Mashat, setting the stage for a major prisoner exchange. This diplomatic gesture was reciprocated in September, with the first visit of President al-Mashat to Riyadh. The talks culminated in December, with the UN announcing that the warring parties committed to measures to implement a nationwide ceasefire plan.⁸Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, ‘Update on efforts to secure a UN roadmap to end the war in Yemen,’ 23 December 2023

However, the eruption of the Israel-Gaza conflict on 7 October overshadowed and derailed the peace talks. Starting on 19 October, the Houthis opened a new theater of war in the Red Sea, launching drone and missile attacks against Israel, and targeting international shipping lanes transiting through the Bab al-Mandab strait. In response, Washington formed an international coalition to safeguard freedom of navigation. From January 12 onward, several rounds of US-UK strikes targeted Houthi military objectives. In retaliation, the Sanaa government declared US and UK interests as military targets, all the while persisting with their assaults in the Red Sea.