Security Belt Forces

Historical background

The UAE gradually began establishing the SBF in March 2016.²United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68),’ 14 February 2018 Counter-terrorism units were initially formed in Aden, where the UAE had established a military camp in al-Burayqa as early as July 2015. Alongside their primary counter-terrorism mission, these units were also tasked with fighting crime.³United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council – Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2019/83),’ 13 February 2019 Additional SBF forces were established in Lahij, in June 2016, and Abyan, in August 2016, with approximately 2,500 fighters focused on countering al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) activity. However, SBF presence remained limited in al-Dali, with the governorate being mostly secured by local militias.⁴Peter Salisbury, ‘Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg,’ Chatham House, March 2018

During this early phase, the SBF counted around 15,000 fighters⁵United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68),’ 14 February 2018 and officially answered to the Ministry of Interior of the IRG. Erstwhile President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi decreed the establishment of SBF brigades under the Support and Reinforcement Brigades between April⁶United Nations Security Council, ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2020/326),’ 5 May 2020 and May⁷Aden Time, ‘Security Belt Forces.. an official force by a republican decision of 4 brigades (document),’ 5 October 2016 2016. Yet, in practice, the SBF operated under Abu Dhabi’s command and were being trained, supplied, and financially supported by the UAE.

This hybrid command-and-control persisted after the establishment of the STC, in May 2017.⁸Brian Carter, ‘Understanding Military Units in Southern Yemen,’ Critical Threats, 16 December 2022 In fact, the UAE subordinated the SBF brigades to the operational control of STC-aligned commanders, with STC fighters publicly manifesting their support for the secession of the south.⁹United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68),’ 14 February 2018 In 2017, the SBF intensified counter-terrorism operations in Abyan and Lahij, while sporadic infighting with the IRG forces emerged in Aden. In January 2018, when political tensions between the STC and the IRG erupted, the SBF sided with the former and played a crucial role in the battle of Aden.

On 1 August 2019, a Houthi missile struck a military parade in Aden, resulting in at least 40 fatalities including the SBF commander Abu Yamama al-Yafii.¹⁰The New York Times, ‘Dozens Killed in Yemen in Attacks on Military Parade and Police Station,’ 1 August 2019 The STC blamed the IRG for enabling the attack, sparking heavy clashes with military units in Aden and in the neighboring Abyan and Shabwa governorates. Despite the STC signing the Riyadh Agreement – a Saudi-brokered deal mandating a political and military overhaul – clashes between the SBF and IRG forces continued on high levels until December 2020, when President Hadi announced the establishment of a new cabinet.

In November 2021, STC President Zubaydi decreed the integration of the SBF under the IRG’s Ministry of Interior, assigning the forces “police and security missions”¹¹South 24, ‘The STC: Dynamic Change in the FACE of Complexities,’ 4 July 2021 and separating them from the Support and Reinforcement Brigades. Concomitantly, he appointed Brigadier Muhsin al-Wali as commander of the SBF, and Brigadier Mukhtar al-Nubi as his deputy.

The establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council preluded further integration of the STC-backed units into the IRG’s command-and-control structure. However, recent developments also point to an expansion of the SBF’s area of influence. In August 2022, pro-STC forces, including the SBF, redeployed to Abyan spearheading several offensives against AQAP. On 10 August 2023, during Operation Swords of Haws in the Mudiya district, AQAP elements killed the recently appointed commander of the SBF in Abyan, Abdullatif al-Sayyid, who was replaced by Haydara Muhammad Bafaqih on 13  August 2023. Since September 2023, AQAP activity has consistently decreased across Abyan and Shabwa, notwithstanding a few notable high-profile attacks.