Abyan

Conflict background

As the Houthi-Saleh forces advanced south in 2015, they reached Abyan in March of that year, entering the governorate capital of Zinjibar. However, their gains were short-lived as IRG-backed Popular Committees joined forces with AQAP to retake the city and push them out of the governorate. The frontlines shifted to the northern border with al-Bayda, where they have remained relatively static in the years since. The frontlines in the Thira area are still seeing intermittent exchanges of shelling between the Houthis and STC-affiliated forces, but despite the periodic hostilities, the frontlines have remained unmoved. Already one of the quieter frontlines in the country, hostilities de-escalated further after the country-wide truce came into effect in April 2022. 

Away from the frontlines, the governorate faces several local drivers of insecurity, ranging from tensions between the IRG and the STC to tribal divisions, the activities of AQAP, and economic challenges. However, in 2019, tensions escalated between STC- and IRG-aligned forces in the south of the country, manifesting in clashes in Aden and neighboring Abyan, only ending with the signing of the Riyadh Agreement in November.¹Ibrahim Jalal, ‘The Riyadh Agreement: Yemen’s new cabinet and what remains to be done,’ Middle East Institute, 1 February 2021 The situation was further aggravated by the STC’s declaration of self-rule in April 2020, which further polarized groups in the south.²Maged Al-Madhaji, ‘STC Declaration of Self-Rule in Southern Yemen Airs Sour Relations with Riyadh,’ Sana’a Centre, 28 April 2020 

Fighting continued throughout 2020, with both sides pouring reinforcements into Abyan: Emirati-sponsored STC-aligned forces deployed eastbound from Aden and Saudi-backed units pushed southwest from Shabwa. In a bid to keep hostilities at bay, the Giants Brigades were sent to the governorate at the start of 2021 to form a buffer between the opposing sides, but fighting continued around the STC and IRG forces’ respective strongholds of Zinjibar and Shuqra, as well as in nearby towns including Jaar and Lawdar, with Qarn al-Kulasi near Shuqra marking the dividing line between the two sides. 

Neither side, though, was able to break the deadlock and the lines of control calcified in the governorate over the next 12 months amid regional efforts to reinvigorate the Riyadh Agreement and de-escalate the tensions between the STC and IRG. Fighting between STC and IRG forces saw a brief, but fierce, escalation in August 2022 in both Abyan and neighboring Shabwa, with STC-aligned forces receiving air support from the United Arab Emirates. Hostilities were subsequently quelled through mediation efforts that saw IRG forces agree to relinquish their positions in Shuqra and other eastern parts of Abyan to the STC, allowing them to peacefully take over the majority of the governorate.³Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, ‘UAE- and STC-Affiliated Forces Win the Second Battle for Shabwa,’ 8 September 2022 However, their deployment faced resistance from AQAP, which had established a safe haven in the border areas of Abyan. 

AQAP initially gained a foothold in Abyan in December 2015 when they took advantage of the power vacuum left by the conflict between the IRG and the Houthis to seize control of the governorate capital, Zinjibar. Years of AQAP activity in the governorate followed, characterized by IED attacks, armed ambushes, and localized clashes. These were met with counter-measures by local factions and the United States, which carried out drone strikes on Abyan, peaking in 2017.⁴Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Melissa Salyk-Virk, ‘America’s Counterterrorism Wars: The War in Yemen,’ New America, 17 June 2021 More recently, in February 2022, AQAP kidnapped five UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) staff members in the north of the governorate, including one international staff member, who were only released over a year later.⁵Spokesperson for the UN Secretary General, ‘Expressing Profound Relief, Secretary-General Hails Release of Five Abducted United Department Safety and Security Personnel in Yemen,’ UNSG, 11 August 2023 

In August 2022, southern forces launched Operation Eastern Arrows in a bid to clear AQAP elements from Abyan. Within days of mounting the campaign, STC-aligned forces claimed an early success, securing the majority of the governorate and capturing Wadi Awimran, an AQAP hotbed in the governorate’s east in September.⁶Middle East Eye,’“STC forces take advantage of Houthi truce to turn fire on al-Qaeda,’ 16 September 2022 However, AQAP defenses were fierce and the southern forces suffered heavy casualties. AQAP succeeded in maintaining a lingering presence in Abyan, and despite a relative lull in late 2022, attacks once again started picking up in 2023. 

In the most high-profile attack, commander Abdulatif al-Sayyid was killed in an IED bombing less than a week after having been appointed by the STC as the commander of the Security Belt Forces (SBF) in the governorate.⁷Ahmed al-Haj, ‘Yemeni military commander and 3 others killed in a suspected al-Qaida attack in southern Yemen,’ Associated Press, 10 August 2023 This prompted a renewal of the counter-terrorism campaign, now dubbed Operation Swords of Haws, in August 2023, which saw STC-aligned forces making swift gains against AQAP again. However, AQAP remains active, particularly in the governorate’s eastern districts of al-Mahfad and Mudiya, where IED attacks against southern troops remain frequent occurrences. After September 2023, AQAP activity steadily declined in Abyan and Shabwa, with only a few high-profile attacks, such as the assassination by car bombing of Maj. Gen. Fadl Baash, head of the Special Security Forces for Aden, Lahj, al-Dhali, and Abyan.