Central Yemen

Conflict background

The frontlines have largely been frozen since mid-2021 when the Houthis retook control over all of al-Bayda governorate, and have remained unchanged since the UN-mediated truce and throughout the subsequent unofficial ceasefire that has held since April 2022. Although these lines of control have not been challenged, border areas remain contested, primarily in eastern and southern al-Bayda and central al-Dhali, where Houthi and IRG forces engage in regular, though limited, confrontations despite the truce.

Houthi forces first moved into Ibb in October 2014 after they had overrun al-Hudayda and Dhamar. They entered Ibb’s capital without facing any resistance from IRG forces.²Al-Jazeera, ‘The Houthis enter Ibb after taking control of Hodeidah and Dhamar,’ 15 October 2014 The group’s takeover of the rest of the governorate also encountered little opposition, facilitated by the Houthi alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his affiliated forces and tribal network. Unlike the neighboring governorates of al-Bayda and al-Dhali, Ibb has not been a frontline in the war, although has experienced localized violence since the start of the current conflict, as well as spillover hostilities from the fronts in al-Dhali and Taizz. Local opposition to Houthi consolidation has flared up intermittently in the governorate but has not escalated into sustained confrontations.

Houthi forces faced more resistance in al-Bayda as they sought to take over the governorate in late 2014 and that thwarted their efforts to secure key districts. But, due to the internal divisions within the anti-Houthi factions and their lack of external support, the group managed to take control over most of the governorate in 2015. The situation was largely stable for several years as the Houthis co-opted and coerced local tribes to accept their presence in exchange for some degree of autonomy.³Maged Al-Madhaji, ‘Al-Baydha Governorate: Too Strategic to be Forgotten,’ Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, 4 June 2020  

The front was reopened in mid-2021 when IRG forces launched an offensive in an attempt to ease pressure in neighboring Marib. The operation backfired, allowing the Houthis to advance into the remaining areas south of the governorate and claim the rest of al-Bayda by September.⁴International Crisis Group, ‘After al-Baydha, the Beginning of the Endgame for Northern Yemen?,’ 14 October 2021 The borders of the governorate remain restive. Houthi and southern forces are engaged in small-scale skirmishes between al-Bayda and Shabwa, which have been gradually increasing in intensity,⁵Al-Masdar, ‘Continuous mobilization of forces to Bayhan in Shabwa. “Giants” says it has broken an attack launched by the Houthis from several axes,’ 24 January 2024 and in the south into Abyan. Al-Bayda’s southwestern border on Lahij has also been the site of long-running clashes with local tribes, but these have been limited since 2021. 

Houthi forces lost their foothold in southern al-Dhali at the same time as they were pushed out of most of neighboring Lahij in 2015. The Houthis were forced to retreat to the north of Damt district by what was then known as the Southern Resistance, but crucially, they managed to hold on to key points along the Sanaa-Aden and al-Dhali-Ibb roads. They subsequently lost more ground in 2018, including areas in the south of Damt and Qaataba, to STC-aligned forces, but retook most of them in March 2019. The frontlines have changed little since, but remain among the most active in the country due to their strategic importance in providing access to Ibb and the central highland.