Yemen Conflict Observatory
Regional Profile
Marib
Updated: 31 January 2024
More information
- Methodology
Territorial Control Maps
Territorial control maps are generated through the expert assessment of the Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO) team and they are updated on a quarterly basis. ‘Contested areas’ are defined on the district level (Admin2) and encompass active frontlines and territories disputed by the warring parties. Each map corresponds to a 'region' as defined by the YCO, potentially crossing governorate (Admin1) boundaries.
Links
Find links to relevant methodology docs below:
Coding decisions around the Yemen war
- A brief overview of ACLED’s coding and sourcing methodology for Yemen
- A brief overview of the most frequently asked questions by users of ACLED data
- Guides for using and accessing ACLED data and documentation for ACLED’s core methodology
This regional profile provides information about the Marib governorate. For more on the YCO and the ACLED methodology on Yemen, see the ‘More information’ tab to the right.
Overview
Marib is a landlocked governorate in the Sarawat mountain region, bordered by Sanaa to the west (roughly 120 kilometers from Sanaa city), al-Jawf to the north, Hadramawt to the east, and Shabwa and al-Bayda to the south. Marib city, the governorate capital, lies on a major junction point between all of the neighboring governorates, including one of the main routes leading to the al-Wadia border crossing with Saudi Arabia, which also links with the oilfields in eastern Marib.
Eastern and central parts of Marib, including Marib city, remain under the control of Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) forces, the last bastion of government control in the north of the country. Consequently, areas just to the west and south of the capital – overlooked by mountainous Houthi-controlled territory – are heavily contested. Eastern parts of the governorate extend out into sparsely populated, arid, and desert-like terrain with undulating topography. It is here that Marib’s oil and gas reserves are located, adding another dynamic to the strategically important governorate.
Interactive Map
This dashboard includes political violence events recorded within this YCO-defined region since the start of the regional conflict on 26 March 2015. By default, the map displays data for the period beginning with the UN-mediated truce, on 2 April 2022, up to the most recent week.
Filters on the left allow users to define a time range and analyze trends in more detail. The toggle at the bottom of the dashboard activates markers indicating relevant infrastructure such as oil fields, airports, and military camps.
Conflict background
Frontlines in the north of the country had been largely static over the previous four years. However, an IRG offensive on Nihm district in eastern Sanaa in January 2020 backfired,1Al-Masdar Online, ‘‘Unprecedented’ escalation east of Sana’a signals potential shift in Yemen war,’ 5 February 2020 and two-pronged Houthi counter-offensives saw them pushing north and east, making significant gains in al-Jawf and Marib, capturing IRG military bases and large swathes of territory. After Houthi forces seized control of al-Jawf’s governorate capital of al-Hazm in March 2020,2Al-Jazeera, ‘Officials say Yemen’s rebels seize strategic northern city,’ 1 March 2020 the main frontlines shifted south to Marib, but eventually stalled out in the summer months in the mountain ranges to the west of Marib city and along the borders with al-Jawf and al-Bayda.3dCasey Coombs and Ali al-Sakani, ‘Marib: A Yemeni Government Stronghold Increasingly Vulnerable to Houthi Advances,’ Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, 22 October 2020
The offensive re-escalated in early 2021 as Houthi forces drew closer to Marib city, approaching from the high ground that lines the two asphalted routes to the west. At the same time, frontlines to the north, on the border with al-Jawf, and to the south, near al-Bayda, also remained active. However, after some initial gains in February and March, the renewed Houthi push stalled, and the lines of control hardened.4Michael Knights and Alex Almeida, ‘Saving the Yemen Peace Process by Blunting the Houthi Push for Marib,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 March 2021
Missile launches and drone strikes continued on Marib city and the surrounding frontlines during the pause in the Houthi offensive, which renewed again in August, this time in the south of the governorate and directed towards neighboring Shabwa. In coordination with an assault from al-Bayda,5SABA NET, ‘Army reveals details of “Dawn of Freedom” Operation to liberate Bayda,’ 23 September 2021 Houthi forces entered Shabwa for the first time since 2017, capturing several districts along its northern border and securing the remaining areas in southern Marib that connect the three governorates.6Reuters,’“Yemen’s Houthis advance in Shabwa and Marib,’ 17 October 2021
The southern offensive left the group within 25 km of Marib city, just southeast of the Balaq mountain range that runs from the northern end of the Marib dam across the edge of al-Juba district and overlooks the city from the southwest.7Mohammed Ghobari and Ghaida Ghantous, ‘Yemen’s Marib city battens down as Houthis advance through energy-rich province,’ Reuters, 3 November 2021 This left the governorate capital facing a multi-axis Houthi front stretching from the city’s northwest to its southeast extremities. But, since entering the Balaq mountains, Houthi forces have been unable to fully traverse or circumvent the hilltops in the face of heavy Saudi-led Coalition bombing and staunch resistance from IRG forces and local tribes.8Saeed al-Batati, ‘At least 200 Houthis killed in fighting, airstrikes in Marib, Jouf,’ Arab News, 28 November 2021
The group’s advances were further stymied at the start of 2022 by a Southern Giants Brigade (SGB) counter-offensive, Operation Hurricane, in northern Shabwa that quickly retook all of the territory captured by the Houthis in the previous year. The SGB continued to advance into the border areas in southern Marib, pushing the Houthis out of firing range of Shabwa by the end of January, but the southern forces then stopped at the base of the Harib mountains, uninterested in moving into the northern governorate.9Middle East Eye, ‘UAE-backed Giants Brigades begin withdrawing from Shabwah,’ 28 January 2022 They subsequently established new brigades10Nayef al-Qadassi, ‘‘Redif Army’ under coalition management,’ The New Arab, 17 February 2022 to hold the line at the edges of the Marib-Shabwa border as divisions within the IRG and the Coalition undermined efforts to organize a combined defense of Marib City.
The frontlines then stabilized in the months leading up to the April 2022 truce. Post-ceasefire, hostilities in Marib have been characterized by low-level skirmishes and Houthi rocket and drone attacks, but no changes to the lines of control. Hostilities, though, began to steadily increase in late 2023 and early 2024, mainly in the south of the governorate near the Shabwa border, where Houthi forces have been mobilizing.
However, away from the front, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks on the security forces, mainly in and around Marib city, along with tensions between the various tribal groupings and the local authorities over checkpoints and fuel, have picked up.112 December Agency, ‘Marib.. A terrorist cell linked to the so-called Preventive Security Service of the Houthi militia was seized,’ 3 September 2023 The issues driving the fighting, which more often than not have been financial in nature, are a long-standing factor and will remain a source of friction – especially as the economic situation remains dire and the authorities lack the capacity to address the financial problems.
Timeline
- 2015
- Sep. | IRG forces take control over most of western Marib, moving frontlines to borders of Sanaa governorate
- 4 Sep. | Houthi-launched OTR-21 Tochka missile kills at least 100 soldiers (52 Emirati, 10 Saudi, five Bahraini, and 33 Yemeni soldiers) at the Coalition’s Safer military camp
- 2020
- 18 Jan. | Houthi-launched missile kills at least 111 IRG soldiers at military training camp
- Jan. | Houthis reverse the IRG’s offensive into northwestern Sanaa and push into western Marib and al-Jawf
- 2021
- Feb. | Renewed Houthi attack reaches western edges of Marib city, surrounding governorate on three sides
- Aug. | Houthi forces advance south from Marib, entering northern Shabwa for first time since 2017
- 2022
- Jan. | SGB-led Operation Hurricane swiftly pushes Houthi forces out of Shabwa, moving frontlines back into southern Marib
- Apr. | United Nations-mediated truce
- Oct. | UN truce ends, but unofficial truce between sides as negotiations continue
Regional Context
Marib is the site of significant oil and gas resources, including the largest source of natural gas for domestic use in Yemen. Before the war broke out, Marib provided almost all of the country’s domestic fuel production and almost 90% of its liquified petroleum gas.12International Crisis Group, ‘Crisis in Marib: Averting a Chain Reaction in Yemen,’ 22 February 2021 The state-run Safer Exploration and Production Operations Company (SEPOC) operates the Block 18 concession, along with the central processing facilities that collect and refine oil produced in the area and the main Marib-Ras Isa pipeline.13Middle East Business Intelligence, ‘Yemen to build new oil pipeline and storage tanks,’ 6 January 2019 However, the pipeline has been closed since Houthi forces took over the export terminal in al-Hudayda in 2015.14Casey Coombs and Majd Ibrahim, ‘Recoversing Lost Ground in Shabwa’s Oil Sector,’ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 27 August 2023, p.15
After being refined at the floating storage and offloading unit (FSO) Safer, much of the crude is sold on the domestic market, including into Houthi-controlled territory. The Marib administration reached an agreement with the IRG to keep 20% of the governorate’s oil and gas revenues, which has allowed the local administration to implement many infrastructure projects and act with a significant degree of autonomy.15Adam Baron, ‘The Marib paradox: How one province succeeds in the midst of Yemen’s war,’ European Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2018 As such, the governorate has been seen as a critical objective for both the Houthis and the IRG, representing a key source of revenue that could be decisive in the outcome of the conflict.
The impact of hostilities on internally displaced persons (IDPs) has also been a particularly significant concern in Marib. Even before the fighting escalated on the northern frontlines in 2020, high numbers of IDPs have fled into Marib since 2015. The population of the governorate had increased from roughly 300,000 pre-conflict to more than 3 million,16UN Habitat, ‘Marib Urban Profile,’ March 2021 putting tremendous pressure on the governorate’s public services, schools, and hospitals. More than 70% live in Marib city and the surrounding district of Marib al-Wadi where the vast majority of the IDPs have been relocated by the advancing frontlines, contributing to severe overcrowding.17ACAPS, ‘Conflict Escalation In Marib And Potential Humanitarian And Economic Impacts,’ July 2021, p.4