Yemen Conflict Observatory
Regional Profile
Northwestern Highlands
Updated: 31 January 2024
More information
- Methodology
Territorial Control Maps
Territorial control maps are generated through the expert assessment of the Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO) team and they are updated on a quarterly basis. ‘Contested areas’ are defined on the district level (Admin2) and encompass active frontlines and territories disputed by the warring parties. Each map corresponds to a 'region' as defined by the YCO, potentially crossing governorate (Admin1) boundaries.
Links
Find links to relevant methodology docs below:
Coding decisions around the Yemen war
- A brief overview of ACLED’s coding and sourcing methodology for Yemen
- A brief overview of the most frequently asked questions by users of ACLED data
- Guides for using and accessing ACLED data and documentation for ACLED’s core methodology
This regional profile provides information about the Northwestern Highlands region, as classified by the YCO, which includes al-Mahwit, Dhamar, and Rayma governorates. For more on the YCO and the ACLED methodology on Yemen, see the ‘More information’ tab to the right.
Overview
The Northwestern Highlands region is a large mountainous area within the wider Yemeni highlands that covers most of the center of the country. The northwestern stretch consists of four governorates – Amran, al-Mahwit, Dhamar, and Rayma – that encircle the city of Sanaa on three sides. All four governorates have been under the control of the Houthis since the group’s ascent in 2014. Hostilities in the region have been limited throughout the conflict. However, several governorates, including Amran and Dhamar, were regularly targeted by Saudi-led Coalition airstrikes prior to the United Nations-mediated truce in 2022 due to the presence of key routes connecting Sanaa to several fronts. Tensions between local tribes and Houthi-appointed officials and security forces or disputes between tribal groups have largely driven incidents on the ground.
Interactive Map
This dashboard includes political violence events recorded within this YCO-defined region since the start of the regional conflict on 26 March 2015. By default, the map displays data for the period beginning with the UN-mediated truce, on 2 April 2022, up to the most recent week.
Filters on the left allow users to define a time range and analyze trends in more detail. The toggle at the bottom of the dashboard activates markers indicating relevant infrastructure such as oil fields, airports, and military camps.
Conflict background
Before the start of the current conflict, the northern-most governorate of the region, Amran, witnessed fierce battles between Houthi and pro-Islah forces of the 310th Armored Brigade, led by the senior commander of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) Hamid al-Qushaybi,1Al-Masdar, ‘Al-Qushaybi, hours before his martyrdom: We will defend and fight, and we will die on the fields of honor, and the eyes of the cowards will not sleep,’ 9 July 2014 in 2014 as the Houthis advanced south from Saada towards the capital city of Sanaa. The battle, during which over 200 people were reportedly killed and injured on both sides,2Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Houthis expand presence in Amran amid humanitarian crisis,’ 10 July 2014 was eventually won by the Houthis in July and proved decisive in the defeat of government forces, allowing the group to enter Sanaa.3International Crisis Group, ‘The Huthis: From Sa’ada to Sana’a’, 10 June 2014, pp.3-4
Since then, the Northwestern Highland region has seen limited clashes between the warring parties even after the war broke out in early 2015 as most of the region was already under Houthi control by then. However, although there was little ground fighting, the region was subjected to regular Coalition airstrikes, although not to the extent of most of the other Houthi-controlled regions in the north of the country as none of the governorates in the Northwestern Highlands were active frontlines. Most of the strikes in the region were concentrated on Amran and Dhamar due to their proximity and connections to some of the main fronts in the conflict, in particular al-Jawf, Marib, and al-Bayda.4Casey Coombs and Salah Ali Salah, ‘The War on Yemen’s Roads,’ Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, 16 January 2023, pp.19-20
The airstrikes resulted in several high-casualty incidents in the region. Most notably, strikes that hit a Houthi detention center housing prisoners of war inside a former community college in Dhamar city in September 2019 left over 130 reported fatalities and another 40 injured in one of the deadliest bombings of the war. The site had reportedly been visited several times by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which had reportedly included the facility on a no-strike list provided to the Coalition, but spokesperson Turki al-Maliki denied they had ever been informed of the facility, which they considered a legitimate military target as it was housing weapons.
As the bombing campaign quickly exhausted fixed targets of military value, the targeting for the aerial operation expanded to include retaliatory strikes and suspected Houthi gathering places and weapons stores, increasingly in populated areas. Other notable incidents during these high points of the bombing campaign that resulted in civilian casualties, for which the Coalition denied any culpability citing, included airstrikes on a wedding gathering in Mayfaa Ans district in southeastern Dhamar that caused at least 43 reported fatalities in October 2015, and strikes on markets in Jabal Iyal Yazid district that resulted in 29 fatalities in July 2015 and another in Qafla Udhar district in January 2018 with nine deaths, both in Amran governorate. Moreover, in early 2022 in the months before the UN-mediated truce, Dhamar and Amran, in addition to other governorates in the country, saw a round of airstrikes that targeted telecommunications networks, with the Coalition accusing the Houthis of using these to coordinate launching points for drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Airstrikes have decreased with time and completely ceased after the start of the truce in April 2022.
Local tribal conflicts have since been the main cause of clashes in the region’s four governorates. Armed clashes had intermittently broken out between different groups of tribesmen over land disputes and revenge issues. Although the clashes are usually ended by local mediation, the grudges can remain within the conflicting tribes and may erupt a few days, months, or even years later. Disagreements with Houthi-appointed supervisors and officials, often over levies and taxes, are another common source of unrest but are usually strongly and quickly suppressed by Houthi security forces.
Timeline
- 2014
- Jul. | Houthis capture Amran governorate after clashes with IRG forces
- 2015
- Aug. | Houthis gain control of Utmah district in western Dhamar after clashes with Azal Resistance, giving them control over the whole Northwestern Highland region
- 2019
- Aug. | A Coalition airstrike on a Houthi prison inside a Community College in Dhamar leaves at least 134 dead
Regional Context
A main road connects all four governorates of the region. This road runs from Dhamar in the south to Amran in the north and continues to Saada before eventually reaching Saudi Arabia – though this has been blocked at the Alab border crossing since hostilities broke out in 2015. The road also extends further south and branches to two main roads in Ibb, leading to al-Dhali and Taizz and then rejoining in Lahij and reaching Aden on the south coast. Houthi control over the region means that the routes are heavily controlled by checkpoints,5Nabil al-Tairi, ‘The Road Transport Sector In Yemen: Critical Issues And Priority Policies,’ Rethinking Yemen’s Economy, March 2022, p.19 especially where they cross the lines of control into IRG territory, but they remain critical for the transport of goods, particularly the Dhamar roads that connect to Sanaa.6Casey Coombs and Salah Ali Salah, ‘The War on Yemen’s Roads,’ Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, 16 January 2023, pp. 15-19