Kenya: Al-Shabaab, Pastoralist Militias, and the M23

Al-Shabaab, Pastoralist Militias, and the M23 

In Kenya, low-scale violence continued to sweep across several counties, amid reports of continued activity by al-Shabaab in the regions bordering Somalia and sporadic violence by armed pastoralists. The government announced expanding operations against pastoralist militias in the North Rift region into Marsabit, Isiolo, and Meru counties. In the northeast, operations against al-Shabaab continue, parallel to international intervention on the Somalia side. 

Regionally, tensions between the Kenyan government and the Democratic Republic of Congo escalated after the launch of the Congo River Alliance (ACF) in Nairobi, Kenya. ACF aims to topple the newly re-elected Congolese president Félix Tshisekedi by joining forces with other armed groups operating in eastern DRC. 

Militants Remain Active in Border Counties

Violence involving al-Shabaab in the reporting period was largely concentrated in the border counties of Mandera, Wajir, and especially Garissa (see graph below). Over the last four weeks, ACLED records seven events involving al-Shabaab in Kenya. In December 2023, ACLED records al-Shabaab engagement in 11 political violence events, slightly above average for the year, though well below spikes of 18 events recorded both in June and October. 

Levels of political violence are partly dependent on operations across the border of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Its operations have intensified in preparation for the end of the ATMIS mandate in December 2024.¹Harun Maruf, ‘Somalia’s Neighbors to Send Additional Troops to Fight Al-Shabab,’ Voice of America, 2 March 2023 These operations may have driven al-Shabaab operatives into Kenya. Changes in the leadership of Kenya’s state intelligence agencies in April and May are also thought to have negatively affected those agencies’ counterterrorism work mid-year.²Matthew Ndungu, ‘Why al-Shabaab attacks are back in North Eastern,’ People Daily, 22 June 2023 

Over the reporting period, five civilians were killed by violence involving al-Shabaab in Garissa county. One boy died in an al-Shabaab ambush on public transport on 3 January, while four health officials died in an IED incident on 15 December, in Dadaab sub-county. On 2 January, also in Dadaab sub-county, a multi-agency security team — likely consisting of Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) and National Police Service forces — conducted an operation against an al-Shabaab explosive team. One bombmaker was arrested, while several other members of the group managed to escape with injuries. The following day, police were injured in another explosive incident in Dadaab. In late December, al-Shabaab attacked a police Quick Reaction Unit in Mandera county and destroyed a communications mast guarded by the National Police Reserve in Wajir county. In 2023, al-Shabaab conducted 37 remote violence attacks overall — with 11 targeting civilians and 26 targeting security forces. Throughout the last year, such attacks have been increasing. 

Pastoralist Militia Violence Declines, If Unevenly

Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration, Kithure Kindiki, announced on 28 December 2023, his intention to expand Operation Maliza Uhalifu into parts of Isiolo, Meru, and Marsabit counties in Kenya’s northeast region.³Citizen TV Kenya, ‘CS Kindiki says operation ‘Maliza Uhalifu’ to extend to Isiolo, Marsabit and Meru,’ 28 December 2023 Following requests from local leaders, the expansion of the operation was not immediately gazetted.⁴KBC Channel 1, ‘8 suspected bandits identified by community after mobilization by MCAs in Isiolo and Samburu,’ 16 January 2023 The operation, which brings together the KDF and the National Police Service, is aimed at tackling banditry and cattle rustling in North Rift region. Launched in February 2023, it initially covered the Baringo, Elgeyo Maraket, Laikipia, Samburu, Turkana, and West Pokot counties.⁵Citizen Digital, ‘President Ruto orders joint military, police operation in Turkana as bandits terrorise the North,’ 13 February 2023 

The Interior Ministry was correct when it referred to the operation’s “progressive successes.”⁶X @InteriorKE, 28 December 2023 There was a significant spike in political violence events involving pastoralist militias in the first three months of 2023. A few months after the launch of Operation Maliza Uhalifu a considerable decline in events involving pastoralist militias was observed. The operation involved the gazetting of areas of concern within the concerned counties as being “disturbed and dangerous,”⁷Kenya Subsidiary Legislation, ’Kenya Gazette Supplement no. 12,’ 13 February 2023 the deployment of the KDF, and the recruitment of people to serve in the National Police Reserve (NPR). The NPR is an auxiliary force that can be recruited locally in areas where police resources are thin. The operation has been characterized by dusk-to-dawn curfews, tracking of militias, and the seizure of stolen livestock. 

Overall success in the original six targeted counties is undeniable. ACLED records the number of political violence events involving pastoralist militias as having fallen by over 50%, comparing the first and final quarters of 2023 (see graph below). However, while there has been progress, it has not been uniform. Baringo has seen a decline in such recorded violence by over 50%, while for Turkana, ACLED records a fall of over 90% in Turkana county. For West Pokot, on the other hand, ACLED records an increase in such events in the fourth quarter compared to the first quarter. Six of the seven events recorded in the final quarter of 2023 are attributable to Turkana ethnic militia. There was no Pokot ethnic militia activity recorded by ACLED in Turkana in the final quarter, compared to 17 such events in the first quarter of 2023. 

Recent research in northern Kenya highlights that banditry and livestock rustling are fundamentally political in nature, driven by political elites. This may be through gaining access to resources for allied interest groups or even through transfer of population, or “vote shipping,” a term used to describe transfer of population from one area to another for electoral gain.⁸Flora McCrone, ‘‘I have opened the land for you’: pastoralist politics and election-related violence in Kenya’s arid north,’ Journal of Eastern Africa Studies, pp. 121-140, 2023 

The M23 Mobilizes Congolese Opposition Groups in Nairobi

Bertrand Bisimwa, president of the March 23 Movement (M23), spoke at the launch of the Congo River Alliance (ACF) in Nairobi, Kenya, and announced the M23’s membership in that alliance. The ACF is headed by Corneille Nangaa, former head of DRC’s Independent National Electoral Commission, and is a new platform that brings together armed groups and political parties in northeast DRC looking to oust President Félix Tshishekedi from power.⁹Armand Mouko Boudombo, ‘Insécurité dans l’Est de la RDC : Ce qu’il faut savoir sur “l’Alliance du Fleuve Congo” lancée par Corneille Nangaa,’ BBC News Afrique, 15 December 2023 According to the United Nations Group of Experts, the Rwanda Defence Force is operating in DRC in support of the M23, including in Rutshuru territory.¹⁰United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 15 December 2023 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ 30 December 2023 Rutshuru town is where Nangaa, and presumably the ACF, are now based.¹¹Esther Muhozi, ‘Corneille Nangaa establishes office in Rutshuru,’ IGIHE, 29 December 2023 

DRC, Kenya, and Rwanda are all members of the East African Community (EAC). The Kenya-led East African Community Reaction Force (EACRF) withdrew from the DRC in December 2023 under pressure from President Tshisekedi. The ACF event sparked a diplomatic crisis between Kenya and DRC, illustrating the limitations faced by the EAC in addressing conflict, and Kenya’s capacity to navigate complex regional relations. 

In response to the launch of ACF, DRC recalled for consultations its ambassadors in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam — who represent DRC to the EAC headquarters in Tanzania — though Kenya-DRC relations have been poor for some time. The EACRF was first deployed in DRC in November 2022,¹²EAC, ‘East African Community Regional Force (EACRF),’ accessed on 18 January 2024 but by April 2023, the force commander, Maj. Gen, Jeff Nyaga, stepped down, citing security threats and DRC’s lack of cooperation.¹³Betty Njeru, ‘EACRF Commander Major-General Jeff Nyagah exits DRC mission over safety concerns,’ The Standard, 28 April 2023 In May 2023, President Tshishekedi spoke of “cohabitation” between the EACRF and the M23.¹⁴Nation, ‘Felix Tshisekedi slams regional force in east, hints at June exit,’ 13 May 2023 While allowing the M23 to mobilize in Nairobi may be reckless from a foreign policy point of view, it suggests that Kenya does not see the EAC as a peacebuilding mechanism. This is pertinent beyond DRC, given Somalia’s accession to the EAC last month.

Kenya contributes troops to the ATMIS. It also faces al-Shabaab on its side of the border. As ATMIS continues to draw down troops, the EAC has a potentially important role in brokering between states with interests in Somalia. These include Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya as well as Somalia itself. However, experience in DRC suggests that the EAC would not be the best mechanism for this. The diplomatic dispute between DRC and Kenya also suggests that Kenya’s diplomatic skills will be challenged in such a complex environment. This will have real implications for Kenya’s own security. Last month, al-Shabaab killed five people in Kenya, a situation that will only change if a solution is reached in Somalia.