Situation Update | May 2024

Somalia: Renewed counter-insurgency operations expected as al-Shabaab regroups

31 May 2024

Somalia at a Glance: 20 April to 24 May 2024

VITAL TRENDS

ACLED records more than 207 political violence events and 432 reported fatalities from 20 April to 24 May 2024. Most political violence centered in the Lower Shabelle region, where al-Shabaab increased attacks targeting security forces.
Mudug region had the highest number of reported fatalities, with 105 recorded during the reporting period. Middle Juba region followed, with 70 reported fatalities.
The most common event type was battles, with over 119 events, followed by explosions/remote violence, with 55 events.

Infograph - Somalia situation update - 20 April to 24 May 2024

Renewed counter-insurgency operations expected as al-Shabaab regroups

In its mission to combat al-Shabaab, the government announced plans for another round of counter-insurgency operations in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. The campaign aims to eradicate al-Shabaab from central and southern Somalia, where they hold large swaths of territory. However, this operation continues to grapple with long-standing issues that have hampered the effectiveness of counter-insurgency, including inter-clan disputes and corruption in public procurement. In the meantime, al-Shabaab militants have been regrouping and expanding in remote villages in the Middle Shabelle region since March and continue operations along the Mogadishu-Balcad main supply routes. In doing so, their aim seems to be to gain control of strategic areas along the main supply routes between the Middle Shabelle and Banadir regions.

The third round of the counter-insurgency operation and its challenges

The Somali government announced the third round of the counter-insurgency operation against al-Shabaab.¹ The announcement comes at a time when the government is losing the support and backing of clan elders and militias, some of which have either entered into non-aggression pacts or decided to support the militant group. The first and second rounds of the operation — which began in August 2022 and August 2023, respectively — were mired with various disputes among different stakeholders of the counter-insurgency that delayed the planned expansion to Jubaland and Southwest. The Somali government initially regained territory from al-Shabaab in the central Hirshabelle and Galmudug states, also thanks to the critical support provided by the Hawiye clan. Indeed, the first round of the government’s counter-insurgency operation was launched after the Hawadle Macawiisley clan² — itself a sub-group of the Hawiye — clashed with al-Shabaab in July 2022 over the taxation imposed by the militant group in Hiiraan

Since June 2023, infighting among clans and animosity towards the federal government have weakened the coalition supporting the counter-insurgency. Disputes between the Hawadle and Abgal clans over power-sharing arrangements and access to land in Hirshabelle state have undermined the effectiveness of the military campaign. Since June 2023, ACLED records at least six armed clashes between the Hawadle and Abgal clan militias in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle, reflecting the fragile order reigning in the coalition. The sacking of Hiiraan governor Ali Jeyte Osman by the Hirshabelle administration, and the lack of financial support from Mogadishu, led segments of the Hawadle clan to distance themselves from the government. As a result, clan militias fighting alongside government troops started vacating security bases in Hiiraan, causing the offensive to slow down and al-Shabaab to regain lost territories. These shifts within the coalition prevented the counter-insurgency operation from expanding into the southern Jubaland and Southwest states.

In recent weeks, however, the government attempted to revive clan support for a third round of the counter-insurgency operation. On 11 May, some members of the Somali parliament and the director of the Somali National Security and Intelligence Agency met with residents and traditional elders in Belet Weyne, Hiiraan’s regional capital, to discuss the Hawadle clan’s participation in the fight against al-Shabaab.³ The Hawadle clan, and especially the Ali Madaxweyne sub-clan, announced holding consultative meetings in Maxaas to discuss their cooperation with the government and interest in the Hirshabelle administration. On 26 May, delegates, including politicians and clan elders, began arriving in town for the meetings.⁴

Power-sharing disputes were not the only challenges affecting the first two rounds of the counter-operation. Corruption involving senior military officials who diverted the food rations donated by the United States to the elite Danab forces for commercial uses has serious implications for the operations. On 25 April, the government suspended and detained several members of the Danab forces in connection with the corruption scandal.⁵ This action was taken days after the US announced the suspension of food rations to Danab forces due to corruption.⁶ Despite this measure, the US Department of Defense continued to support the forces in other ways, including with equipment. On 15 May, it donated 96 vehicles, including 11 ambulances, to Somali National Army (SNA) forces.⁷

The fallout of the corruption scandal led to the withdrawal of security forces from several strategic villages and their subsequent recapture by al-Shabaab. Among the villages seized by the militants are Caad, Shabeelow, Camaara, Xinlabi, and Badaweyne in the southern part of Mudug and Masagaway in Galgaduud.⁸ Danab forces play a critical role in support of the Somali National Army (SNA), conducting reconnaissance activities on al-Shabaab positions. The Danab forces are trained and equipped by the US, thus enhancing the forces’ counterterrorism capabilities.⁹

Additionally, long-standing coordination issues between the SNA command center and the Ministry of Defence continue to hamper the ability of the security forces to hold the territory seized from al-Shabaab. Throughout both phases of the counter-insurgency operations, special forces like Danab and Gorgor — trained by the US and Turkey, respectively — and clan militias were used as holding forces at government-controlled bases, while the SNA advanced towards the more remote al-Shabaab-controlled areas. However, the government failed to deploy more holding forces in newly liberated areas and conduct a coordinated operation across southern and central Somalia. In this regard, there is evident indication that al-Shabaab has been taking advantage of the government strategies by advancing toward Southwest, Jubaland, and Puntland states when the operations intensified in Galmudug and Hirshabelle.¹⁰

Al-Shabaab prepares for a new phase of counter-insurgency operations

Al-Shabaab militants have begun to regroup in response to the government’s preparations to launch the third round of the counter-insurgency operation. During the reporting period, militants began mobilization activities in the remote border villages between the Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle regions, where the Somali army — with the support of international partners — has intensified its efforts to target al-Shabaab hideouts. Al-Shabaab has also waged several attacks against army troops and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces in Lower Shabelle and Banadir regions, where government operations have been reduced (see map below). Militants are positioned along the main routes connecting the two regions. Between 19 April and 24 May, ACLED records 98 events targeting Somali security forces and ATMIS forces, with 50 in Lower Shabelle. Among the targets of al-Shabaab attacks are the Ugandan forces operating ATMIS bases and logistics convoys. The Ugandan contingent, which runs several military bases in Lower Shabelle and operates airport security, faces the most al-Shabaab attacks compared to other ATMIS forces in Somalia.

In Middle Shabelle, al-Shabaab adopted an offensive rather than a defensive tactic as security forces and clan militia operations against the group increased in Balcad and Jowhar districts. The militants are expanding their control over strategic areas and routes, exploiting the SNA’s inability to maintain coordination of the holding forces. On 26 April, al-Shabaab took control over three villages in the Jowhar district, followed by the arrival of around 200 militants in Cali Fool Dheere village to set up hideout positions. In this case, the SNA and clan militia managed to recapture the three villages the next day as the militants regrouped elsewhere in Jowhar district. The SNA continued the efforts there by conducting a joint operation with the Abgal clan militia, which resulted in taking control over several villages from al-Shabaab without any confrontations on 2 May.

Al-Shabaab has also been regrouping and planning attacks against security forces in the border areas in Galgaduud and Ceel Dheer districts. In response, security forces intensified their targeting of militant hideouts in the area. On 14 May, US forces and the SNA conducted two joint airstrikes against al-Shabaab positions in Cali Xayle and Baraag Sheekh Caamir villages, killing at least nine militants. A day later, militants assaulted SNA/ATMIS forward operating bases situated near Xawaadleey village in Middle Shabelle. Al-Shabaab has previously resorted to similar tactics, forcing the government to redeploy its forces and slow down the counterinsurgency.