Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion

The analysis in this report draws on ACLED data and observations of militant propaganda material provided to ACLED by MENASTREAM, a data partner. The author has also drawn additional information from ad hoc research and non-open-source reports from local sources/networks that have asked to remain anonymous.

A series of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in recent years have transformed military dynamics in the region, shifting bilateral assistance from traditional Western partners like France and the United States to Russia, through mercenaries from the Wagner Group and its successor, Africa Corps. Despite these seismic changes, both the Islamist insurgency spearheaded by the local al-Qaeda offshoot, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and the Sahel province of the Islamic State (thereafter, IS Sahel) conflict have intensified and increased. In the first half of 2024, reported fatalities across the three Sahelian states reached a record-high 7,620 — an increase of 9% compared to the same period in 2023, 37% compared to 2022, and a staggering 190% compared to 2021.

Within a deteriorating security context, IS Sahel is one of the region’s most violent and active armed actors. It has strategically exploited the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of French troops to expand its sphere of influence in the tri-state border region of Liptako-Gourma, particularly in the northern parts of Mali’s Menaka region. ACLED’s January 2023 report traced the evolution of IS Sahel in three distinct periods, from its emergence to its rise as a key armed non-state actor in the Sahel: IS Sahel’s initial operations under the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) banner (2015-2019), its integration and expansion as part of Islamic State West Africa Province (2019-2022), and its establishment as the autonomous ‘Sahel Province’ of the Islamic State with a focus on consolidating territorial control (2022-present).

Since the release of that report, IS Sahel has continued to shift away from mass violence to more structured governance and expanded territorial control, particularly in the Malian regions of Menaka and Gao (see timeline below). The group has confronted challenges since becoming more ‘territorial,’ exposing the group and communities living under its control to airstrikes and military operations, resulting in the loss of several local leaders and senior members.

This new report delves into IS Sahel’s underexplored internal structure and military organization, and its shift from mass violence toward territorial control. It examines the external pressures and internal factional tensions within IS Sahel, drawing on various observations to assess the likely future trajectories and focus of the group.

IS Sahel’s evolving organizational structure and areas of activity

Internal group structure and chains of command

Since the death of the group’s founding leader, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, in August 2021, IS Sahel has continued its restructuring, integrating foreign and local leadership from various ethnic backgrounds, including Fulani and Arab militants, and maintaining a diverse leadership cadre despite significant losses from French military operations. The group’s composition mirrors the ethnic diversity in the regions in which it operates, including members from the Fulani, Arab, Tuareg, Dawsahak, Songhai, and Djerma ethnic groups.

IS Sahel’s leadership consists of a Shura council presided over by a wali (or governor), identified as Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi.¹ Underneath him, the organizational structure includes several offices: the Military/Operations Office, Logistics Office, Law and Sanctions Office (including roles such as judges and Islamic police), Foreign Fighters Office, and Media Office (which is managed centrally by the core leadership responsible for communicating and propagating IS Sahel’s activities directly linked with IS Central’s media branch) (see graph below).

Historically, the core leadership largely consisted of Western Saharan militants. However, a large segment of this leadership was eliminated during French military operations, leading to a notable reduction in their presence. While the now-defunct French counter-terrorism mission Operation Barkhane withdrew its last troops from Mali by August 2022, IS Sahel continues to lose high-ranking members and local commanders, particularly through operations of the Wagner Group and the Malian armed forces.

It is important to point out that since the French withdrawal and the death of Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, IS Sahel has reorganized itself and consolidated its chain of command. Despite these losses, senior roles continue to be held by Western Saharan and Malian Arabs, including Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi, who, in addition to serving as the current governor, is the emir (leader) in one of the core military zones, operating out of the In-Araban area of Mali.

Despite internal restructuring, IS Sahel continues to face attrition, as evidenced by the elimination of senior cadres in two core military zones. For instance, in the zone of Menaka-Anderamboukane-Abala (Zone 4), the former emir, known as ‘Moussa MNLA,’ was eliminated along with several military subcommanders.² While the emir has been replaced, no replacements for the subcommanders have been identified beyond the influence of Mourtala Magadji of the neighboring Azawagh zone that extends into this military zone.

New generations of IS Sahel fighters have also been groomed, and a new cadre of commanders has emerged to replace the historical leadership. The group’s use of child soldiers provides ample evidence of this generational shift.³ IS Sahel has been actively recruiting and training child soldiers for years, integrating them into its ranks to ensure a continuous supply of fighters and future leaders.

The use of child soldiers by both IS Sahel and its rival JNIM is a deeply entrenched issue and part of a broader trend that has been well-documented since at least 2016.⁴ The practice has intensified, with child soldiers increasingly appearing in the propaganda of these groups.⁵ This material often shows training camps where children undergo military drills and routines and participate in graduation ceremonies and parades to emphasize their readiness and indoctrination to become jihadist fighters. The systematic recruitment and militarization of children indicate a deliberate strategy by these groups to sustain their operations and embed a culture of ‘jihad’ among new generations of fighters.

Areas of activity and regional setbacks

Mapping IS Sahel’s military zones

According to the group’s own media and propaganda, IS Sahel’s organizational structure is divided into four regions: Burkina Faso, Muthalath (triangle or tri-state border region),⁶ Anderamboukane (named after the border town with the same name in Mali’s Menaka region), and Azawagh (the Tuareg name referring to the Mali-Niger borderlands between Menaka, Tillaberi, and Tahoua regions). However, five distinct military zones can be identified at the operational level, each with specific geographic and operational responsibilities. Each zone is governed by an emir, a cadi (or judge), and military commanders. These zones include areas in Burkina Faso and the Gourma (Zone 1), the Haoussa area (Zone 2), the area between Amalaoulaou, Akabar, and In-Delimane (Zone 3), the area comprised between Menaka, Anderamboukane and Abala (Zone 4), and the Eastern zone, or Azawagh (Zone 5) (see map below). In addition, IS Sahel militants use a vast area as a support zone and supply corridor, which stretches from the regional border area between Tillaberi, Tahoua, and Dosso in southwestern Niger and extends down to Sokoto and Kebbi states in northwestern Nigeria.

Burkina Faso and the Gourma, which straddles the Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien borderlands, form an IS Sahel region that could be best described as peripheral, even though it was in Burkina Faso that the then-ISGS claimed its first attacks in 2016. Geographically, IS Sahel has established a sphere of influence and consolidated control in most of the Oudalan and Seno provinces. At the same time, JNIM largely pushed IS Sahel out of the provinces of Soum and Yagha and the Center-North region, although the group occasionally attacks JNIM positions in these areas. The geographic development of the region is clearly limited. At present, IS Sahel is stagnant in the face of continued resistance from JNIM, Burkina Faso’s military, and the pro-government Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), with IS Sahel militants occasionally raiding JNIM-controlled territory. However, the region’s importance lies in its remote location (as most of IS Sahel’s military zones) and rugged terrain in the tri-state border region, which offers the group a strategic haven in the long term. The minimal state and weak military presence, as well as the historically marginalized populations, weaken resistance and provide the group with recruits in this area where IS Sahel has been gaining influence and ingratiating themselves with local communities for nearly a decade.

The Haoussa area, located on the left bank of the Niger River in the Gao and Ansongo cercles, is a region where IS Sahel fighters have not yet consolidated their control. They continue to use a higher level of violence in this area in an attempt to subjugate and install themselves among communities they consider pro-government. Compared to other IS Sahel zones, the presence of Wagner and Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) is also greater in this area, causing significant disruption to IS Sahel activities.

The IS Sahel zone comprising the border villages of Akabar, Tabankort, and In-Araban in the Menaka region, and Amalaoulou and In-Delimane in the Gao region along the border with Niger, represents IS Sahel’s long-standing strategic base and is home to the group’s core leadership. While it has served as a remote strategic sanctuary, it was a frequent target of French military operations and, since their withdrawal, has become the site of counter-terrorism campaigns spearheaded by Wagner, Malian, and Nigerien forces.

The Menaka-Anderamboukane-Abala zone is a core area within the IS Sahel operational area. The border town of Anderamboukane has served as the de facto administrative capital since the group was granted provincial status in March 2022. The regional capital, Menaka, is also located in this military zone and would be the ‘crown jewel’ of a full-fledged territorialized IS Sahel province. Proof of this is the fact that IS Sahel fighters attacked FAMa, Wagner, and militia positions in the town of Menaka four times in 2023 and 2024. During this time, the group imposed trade embargoes on traffic in and out of Menaka and temporarily surrounded and isolated the town from all sides. In addition, they carried out several assassinations, targeting officers from the ethnic Dawsahak faction of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA-D) militia, and attacked IDP camps on the town’s outskirts.

Azawagh is a peripheral IS Sahel zone but has gained importance in recent years due to its remote and strategic location on the border between Mali and Niger. It was in this area that IS Sahel fighters crushed the formation of local Nigerien militias in the Tillia area in 2021. Since then, the group has gained control of most of rural Tillia, with the exception of the administrative capital, where Nigerien and German forces were stationed.⁷ From this area, IS Sahel fighters launched an offensive in the Menaka region of Mali in March 2022 and managed to take control of the Anderamboukane cercle. The group has also been working to establish a supply corridor from here to northwestern Nigeria for years. However, this supply corridor has recently become an important support zone and rear base.

Beyond the tri-state border

The relative remoteness of most of IS Sahel’s military zones means that the group does not pose the same existential threat to the regimes in Bamako and Ouagadougou as JNIM does. However, the exception is Niamey, where IS Sahel has conducted sporadic operations,⁸ including armed assaults involving suicide bombers in 2016 and 2019 that were successfully repelled, and a prison break at the Koutoukale high-security prison in 2024,⁹ about 40 kilometers northwest of Niger’s capital.

An important aspect of IS Sahel’s military organization is the spatial proximity and fluidity between the military zones, making them highly interconnected. This is reinforced by the high mobility of IS Sahel fighters in their operations and the coordination of major attacks and offensives between the different military zones across larger geographical areas. However, the proximity, particularly between the two core zones in Menaka on the border with Niger and the Azawagh zone, allows IS Sahel to achieve force concentration by mobilizing large numbers of fighters from different zones in the same general area, which has helped to make it the dominant force in the tri-state border region. Another important aspect is that, although four of the group’s military zones are centered in Mali, they overlap and influence the surrounding areas in northern and southern directions, as evidenced by the group’s influence across large parts of northwestern Niger’s Tillaberi, Tahoua, and Dosso regions extending as far as northwestern Nigeria.

IS Sahel also claimed two operations in Benin’s northern Alibori department in July 2022.¹⁰ However, the group’s attempt to establish itself in Benin has been largely unsuccessful due to several factors, including strong inter-jihadist dynamics with JNIM.¹¹ In the area of Tanda in Niger, near the border with Benin, IS Sahel tried to capitalize on local conflicts and recruit youths, particularly Fulani, into their ranks. However, internal conflicts, targeted assassinations — including a key IS Sahel recruiter — and JNIM’s stronger presence and aggressive tactics undermined these efforts. These dynamics and the subsequent fear they instilled in the communities eventually prevented IS Sahel from gaining a foothold in Benin.

While IS Sahel has demonstrated its transnational intent through activities in Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria, its regional expansion has largely failed compared to JNIM’s (see maps below). Over the past year, IS Sahel activities were recorded only in Nigeria.¹² In contrast, JNIM has made significant inroads in several West African littoral states and established a presence in countries including Guinea,¹³ Senegal,¹⁴ and Mauritania.¹⁵ JNIM’s expansion strategy reveals a focus on embedding its operations within the broader West African context, illustrated by violent actions in Ivory Coast, Benin,¹⁶ and Togo,¹⁷ and expanding operations to Mali’s western borders with Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal.¹⁸

From mass violence to territorial control

IS Sahel’s campaign of violence in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso illustrates the level of violence the group is willing to use to achieve its strategic goals. Over the years, the group has launched deadly campaigns against state forces, local armed groups, and civilian populations. An episode from 2018 illustrates these dynamics. IS Sahel (then operating as ISGS) targeted the Tuareg and Dawsahak communities in the Menaka region, marking a strategic shift in the group’s approach toward civilians. Initially, this escalation to mass violence was a response to the communities’ perceived support for French-backed local militias. Those who resisted Islamist advances, or were seen as supportive of the state and its auxiliary forces, faced the group’s violence, signaling a deliberate strategy to spread fear among communities hostile to the group’s growing influence. These attacks, which peaked in 2019 but have continued on a smaller scale ever since, have increasingly spread to Burkina Faso, where IS Sahel carried out systematic massacres of various ethnic and religious communities.¹⁹ Similarly, IS Sahel carried out large-scale killings of Djerma and Tuareg communities in the Nigerien regions of Tillaberi and Tahoua throughout 2021, triggered by resistance to IS Sahel’s extortion practices and aggressive tactics through the formation of pro-government self-defense militias.

However, since the last offensive in Menaka launched in March 2022, IS Sahel has undergone a significant transition from tactics of mass violence to more structured forms of territorial control, particularly in northeastern Mali. This shift began in late 2022, as evidenced by a steady decrease in IS Sahel attacks and fatalities in the Menaka region, which marked the group’s efforts to normalize relations with local communities previously affected by its violent actions. IS Sahel has aimed to establish a self-styled system of jihadist governance that stabilizes the areas under its control and regulates relations with communities through coercive and reconciliatory measures.

To support its rule, IS Sahel has implemented market regulations, including reopening weekly markets to boost economic activity and facilitate trade, which is essential for the group’s sustenance. These markets, located in towns such as Anderamboukane, Inchinane, and Tamalat, were initially closed down when IS Sahel fighters looted and burned them in attacks during their March 2022 offensive.²⁰ However, they are strategic and crucial for maintaining supply lines and ensuring a steady flow of goods and resources into IS Sahel-controlled territory. To this end, the group ensures local and foreign traders comply with their rules so as not to disrupt this supply of goods and resources.

The group has also introduced measures to regulate social life in the areas it controls. IS Sahel has often imposed embargoes on commercial activities and transit routes to and from towns outside its control, particularly the town of Menaka. It also enforced a strict interpretation of Sharia law through self-styled Islamic courts, often at the weekly markets. These courts are known for harsh punishments, such as beheadings, mutilations, and stonings,²¹ which are used to enforce the group’s code of rules and morality. Gender segregation measures and confiscations of drugs and cigarettes have also been enforced at markets in the group’s key strongholds like Anderamboukane, Tin-Hama, Fafa, and Ouatagouna.

The group’s capture of the village of Tidarmene, north of Menaka, in April 2023 marked another important shift toward more established governance practices in northeastern Mali. Following the capture of Tidarmene, dawa (or proselytizing) and community outreach have become more important.²² For instance, IS Sahel announced that its members had arrived in the area of Tedjerit for the first time between mid-July and early August 2023 to conduct preaching tours.²³ In addition, IS Sahel is likely seeking to stabilize and fortify its bases in the Tidarmene area, where it has even allowed local Tuareg militiamen from the Tuareg Chamanamass faction of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA-C) to keep their weapons to defend themselves against bandits in Tedjerit. In early April 2024, it announced that the group had expanded its outreach to towns and villages under its control across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger during Ramadan.²⁴ This has been done to gain local support and consolidate the group’s presence and influence in the communities. Through dawa, the group seeks to spread its ideological beliefs and gain legitimacy among the local population to consolidate its regional governance structure further.

External pressure and internal challenges

The central Sahel has been marked by significant political upheaval characterized by a series of military coups. The government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in Mali was the first to fall to a coup in 2020, before another coup unseated President Bah Ndaw in 2021. Two other coups d’état took place in Burkina Faso in 2022. Finally, a military takeover removed President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger in the summer of 2023.

Following these upheavals, the new military regimes concluded a defense pact named the Alliance of Sahel States.²⁵ Despite their declared intention to fight Islamist insurgents, violence has surged across these countries. Both IS Sahel and JNIM have exploited the resulting security gaps and intensified their operations in an attempt to assert that their governance models are the only viable alternative to the previous quasi-democratic and existing military-led regimes. However, since IS Sahel has entrenched territorial control over large parts of the Liptako-Gourma, government forces, assisted by Wagner mercenaries and pro-government militias, have ramped up ground and air operations to dislodge the group. These efforts have led to significant losses for IS Sahel, including the killing or capture of several commanders and senior members.

For instance, in Niger, the number of air and drone strikes targeting IS Sahel and related fatalities reached an all-time high in December 2023. Operations by Nigerien forces have also extended across the border into Mali’s Menaka region, as was the case in October 2023 when the Nigerien air force carried out a drone strike that reportedly killed over 160 people, including civilians and militants in the IS Sahel stronghold of Tabankort. Similarly, Malian forces have killed several IS Sahel commanders and senior members in a series of operations. For example, in January 2024 a joint FAMa and Wagner operation in the area of In-Araban in the Menaka region resulted in the deaths of several militants, including a leader named Abdul Wahab Ould Chouaib and two lieutenants from the Arab community. Additionally, in April 2024, FAMa and MSA forces neutralized an IS Sahel leader known as ‘Abou Houzeifa’ (or ‘Higo’) in the area of In-Delimane in the Gao region.

A major bulwark against IS Sahel’s expansion is represented by its jihadist rival, JNIM. In the first half of 2020, clashes with JNIM drove IS Sahel out of central Mali, central and eastern Burkina Faso, and the strategically important W-Arly Pendjari (WAP) complex, where the borders of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin intersect. The conflict between IS Sahel and JNIM escalated in 2023 as the two groups vied for supremacy in the tri-state border region, resulting in more than 300 reported deaths (see graph below). After several deadly IS Sahel attacks at the beginning of 2023, JNIM mobilized hundreds of fighters from different regions for a major offensive in the Gourma of Mali between April and July, successfully overtaking several abandoned IS Sahel bases. In retaliation, IS Sahel attacked several JNIM positions in the Boulikessi area, killing dozens of JNIM fighters.

IS Sahel was the dominant force in many of these battles, including in Mali’s Menaka region and Burkina Faso’s Seno and Yagha provinces. Visual evidence supports this, as weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and other equipment captured by IS Sahel were shown alongside numerous killed JNIM fighters in the Islamic State weekly news bulletin al-Naba and on photosets diffused across Islamic State social media channels.²⁶ Despite IS Sahel’s victories in many major battles, JNIM continues to present a significant challenge to the group. The ongoing conflict between IS Sahel and JNIM has resulted in high casualties on both sides.

In contrast to 2023, the intensity of the conflict between the two jihadist groups has waned in 2024. So far, around 50 fighters have been killed in the internecine fighting this year as of 31 July. The deadliest clashes occurred in July in Yebelba, in the Seno province, and in March in Doreye, in the Gao region. In Doreye, for example, IS Sahel killed 17 JNIM fighters, including commander Amadou Moussa (known by his nom de guerre Ilyassou) in Doreye. In June, JNIM reported the killing of an IS Sahel commander named Abdel Aziz Maza in Fitili, also in the Gao region.²⁷ This persistent rivalry has limited IS Sahel’s ability to expand, demonstrating the limitations of the group’s expansionist project and highlighting the difficulties it faces in extending its control beyond its established strongholds.

Over time, IS Sahel has developed internal factionalism due to factors such as prolonged command over certain military zones and the deep-rooted loyalties that result from such tenure. Commanders who have overseen the same region for a long time have built up strong followings, which has led to the formation of distinct factions within the group, each with their own interests and loyalties. These commanders wield considerable power and reinforce a rigid chain of command that both maintains order and promotes factionalism. The hierarchical structure of IS Sahel, particularly the dominance of its core military zones, also significantly influences the group’s internal dynamics. This factionalization has contributed to an internal dynamic in which tensions between the factions of Oubel Boureima and Moussa Djibo, who primarily operate in the Haoussa area, and the factions of Moussa Moumini and Oumaya in neighboring Gourma have intensified significantly.

Boureima’s faction, which operates in areas with a strong presence of FAMa and Wagner forces, has faced severe military pressure that other IS Sahel factions have not faced. Its commanders and fighters often come from local pro-government, ethnic, and communal militias, are less ideologically oriented, and operate more like criminal or mafia-style groups. These differences influence their operations, which often involve cattle theft and looting, providing financial and logistical support but also causing friction with other IS Sahel factions. In September 2023, for example, members of the IS Sahel hisbah (morality police) amputated fighters from Boureima’s faction accused of cattle theft, triggering armed retaliation and resulting in at least 40 deaths over two days of fighting.

A key factor in the ongoing infighting is the Boureima faction’s propensity for defections. This is evident in numerous cases where fighters have surrendered to FAMa in towns and villages such as Ansongo, Lellehoye, Fafa, and Tessit. FAMa and Wagner have extensively targeted the group’s support network, including those involved in logistical operations such as cattle theft. Even non-combatant relatives of members of the faction have been killed in retaliation after clashes between IS Sahel fighters and FAMa and Wagner forces. In May 2024, accusations against Boureima of encouraging defections led to violent clashes with fighters from Oumaya’s faction in Tin Anor in the Gao region.

Where is IS Sahel heading?

IS Sahel has faced significant challenges in its attempts to expand regionally. The group has failed to gain a foothold in central Mali, or in most of Burkina Faso except for the extreme north, and has made no significant inroads into the littoral states. These setbacks highlight the group’s geographical limitations and underscore the effective resistance of rival forces, particularly JNIM, which have thwarted its plans for broader regional expansion and dominance. Given these challenges, it is likely that IS Sahel will consolidate and possibly expand its presence in Mali and Niger, focusing on strengthening its bases in areas where it has already established a degree of control and influence. The group’s strategic focus appears to be shifting to regions within Mali that offer opportunities for consolidation rather than large-scale expansion. In Mali, there is the possibility of expansion northward into the Kidal region or further into the Gao region, where IS Sahel has already begun activities such as collecting zakat (alms or taxes) in the commune of Sonni Aliber.

In Niger, the group is moving eastward, possibly expanding further toward Nigeria, as its traditional supply corridor is gradually turning into a key support zone, which could represent a strategic realignment given the failures to expand toward the Gulf of Guinea, large parts of Burkina Faso, and central Mali. In addition, IS Sahel is methodically establishing itself in areas such as Tassara, which lies beyond the established stronghold of Tillia in the Tahoua region. This gradual entrenchment in certain locations suggests that the group is seeking to establish positions that can serve as reliable mid- to long-term strongholds to support sustained operations and potentially enable further expansion in Mali, Niger, and well into Nigeria. These strategic adjustments indicate a recalibration of IS Sahel’s objectives by focusing on entrenching and expanding in specific areas where it can maintain control and influence rather than overextending into regions where its presence will be effectively countered.

Despite reorganization efforts, IS Sahel suffers from continued attrition, particularly from the operations of the Malian and Nigerien military forces and Wagner. Especially the vulnerabilities since the group became more territorial could indicate weaknesses in their ranks that could be further exploited by counterinsurgency forces. Future projections should consider how continued leadership could disrupt operational continuity or lead to further divisions within the group, as the various factions within IS Sahel demonstrate how internal power dynamics are shaped by external military pressure. Understanding these internal factions can shed light on potential fractures that could weaken the group and lead to fragmentation.

Correction: An earlier version of this report mistakenly referred to the emir of IS Sahel as Ibba al-Sahrawi. The correct name is Abu al-Bara al-Sahrawi.

Watch the recorded webinar exploring the deteriorating security context that has positioned IS Sahel as one of the region’s most violent and active armed actorswith ACLED President & CEO Clionadh Raleigh, ACLED Associate Analysis Coordinator Héni Nsaibia and Yvan Guichaoua, an independent researcher on international conflict analysis.

Visuals produced by Christian Jaffe.