One year after the onset of the current crisis in the Middle East, following Hamas’ deadly attack on southern Israel on 7 October, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vow of “complete victory” and the “elimination” of Hamas as a threat to Israel¹Jason Burke, ‘Benjamin Netanyahu warns war will continue until Hamas is eliminated,’ The Guardian, 22 November 2023 remains unfulfilled. While Israeli officials claim that Hamas no longer exists as a military force in Gaza, ACLED data show that Hamas still retains some operational capabilities and continues to engage with Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Hamas has also escalated its military activities in the West Bank. With the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently having shifted focus to confronting Hezbollah in the north and no ceasefire in Gaza in sight, Hamas continues to remain a significant actor in Palestine despite its now-diminished military capabilities and the significant humanitarian toll on Palestinians in Gaza. 

The group may still retain nearly half of its fighters

Israel claims it has killed 17,000 gunmen out of Hamas’ 25,000 to 30,000 fighters, but detailed reports identify only nearly 8,500 militant fatalities.

While Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip have significantly reduced Hamas’ military manpower,²Emanuel Fabian, ‘Gallant reveals document from top Hamas commander warning Sinwar of dire losses,’ Times of Israel, 11 September 2024 the exact number of fighters it has lost remains uncertain. Israel claims to have killed around 17,000 gunmen,³Bassam Hatoum, Melanie Lidman, and Bassem Mroue, ‘Israeli strikes kill hundreds in Lebanon’s deadliest day of conflict since 2006,’ PBS, 23 September 2024 dismantling most of Hamas’ 24 battalions,⁴Emanuel Fabian, ‘IDF rejects CNN claim many Hamas battalions remain operational, says most dismantled,’ Times of Israel, 5 August 2024 along with killing dozens of commanders and key leaders.⁵Mark Mazzetti et al., ‘Israel’s Hunt for the Elusive Leader of Hamas,’ New York Times, 25 August 2024 However, more detailed IDF reports on the killing of militants containing specifics on timeframes, locations, or operations, recorded by ACLED, account for approximately 8,500 fatalities.⁶In ACLED’s disaggregated event-based dataset, fatalities are recorded when they can be attributed to specific events, based on the information reported. However, the information on fatalities attributed to specific incidents in Gaza since 7 October are limited and incomplete. Thus, ACLED also incorporates reported fatalities from reports by the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MOH) and the IDF. Both sources provide aggregate fatality estimates over a specified period of time. For more on ACLED’s methodology for coding IDF claims regarding Palestinian militant fatalities, see Coding of fatalities in Gaza since 7 October 2023 on the ACLED Knowledge Base. This figure also includes militants from other armed groups and possibly other non-combatant Hamas members. Based on pre-war estimates, Hamas’ military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, had between 25,000 and 30,000 fighters.⁷Daniel Byman, ‘A War They Both Are Losing: Israel, Hamas and the Plight of Gaza,’ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 4 June 2024 Given that Hamas likely continues to recruit thousands of new members,⁸Rachel Fink, ‘Hamas Strengthens in Gaza Despite Ten Months of War, CNN Reports,’ Haaretz, 5 August 2024 the group may still retain up to nearly half the number of its pre-war fighters.

The ability to regroup

Hamas is battling the IDF in multiple areas where Israel announced it had established control.

The IDF launched ground offensives and announced the establishment of operational control in four of the Gaza Strip’s five governorates over the past 12 months. In the northern governorates of Gaza City and North Gaza, as well as Khan Yunis — where the IDF announced the dismantling of Hamas brigades and the establishment of control on 22 January⁹Emanuel Fabian, ‘In largely conquered northern Gaza, troops comb rubble in hunt for rocket launchers,’ Times of Israel, 22 January 2024 and 7 April,¹⁰Emanuel Fabian, ‘IDF withdraws ground troops from south Gaza, leaving just one brigade in whole enclave,’ Times of Israel, 7 April 2024 respectively — Hamas has demonstrated its ability to regroup. This forced the IDF to continue launching smaller ground raids to prevent Hamas from re-establishing a full presence. Armed clashes have continued in these areas with fluctuating intensity (see graph above). For example, between February and September, Israeli ground forces carried out at least five smaller raids in Gaza City’s al-Zaytun neighborhood north of the Netzarim axis, where the IDF has constructed bases and command centers. In Rafah, shortly after the IDF announced on 12 September that it had decimated Hamas’ Rafah brigade and established control,¹¹Emanuel Fabian, ‘IDF declares Hamas’s Rafah Brigade defeated; no active cross-border tunnels found,’ Times of Israel, 12 September 2024 Hamas resumed activities east of Rafah city.

 A shift toward guerrilla warfare tactics

Hamas has increasingly relied on the use of explosives to combat the IDF. Asymmetric attacks on Israeli forces have become the group’s dominant form of warfare since May.

As its capabilities dwindle and many of its brigades are dismantled, Hamas has increasingly shifted toward guerrilla warfare tactics, ambushing Israeli soldiers with explosives. In several cases, Hamas militants detonated landmines, buildings, and tunnel shafts as Israeli soldiers approached targeted sites. Hamas’ extensive tunnel network, which remains functional in many areas,¹²Times of Israel, ‘IDF assesses much of Hamas tunnel network still in “good functional state” – report,’ 8 July 2024 likely played a significant role in enabling its fighters to carry out hit-and-run operations. Following the most intense phase of the war in December and January, armed clashes between Hamas and IDF forces began to decrease, but one-sided explosive attacks by Hamas and its allies have remained at heightened levels, ACLED data show. Since May, when the IDF started its ground offensive in Rafah, Hamas and its allies have attacked Israeli soldiers using explosives in nearly 160 instances. In the latest fatal incident, four IDF soldiers were reportedly killed on 17 September when Hamas claimed to have targeted a building with guided missiles in Tal al-Sultan, west of Rafah. By engaging in a war of attrition rather than directly confronting an army with vastly superior firepower, Hamas is likely attempting to improve its chances of survival.

Spike in Hamas-linked violence in the West Bank 

Hamas was involved in approximately 130 violent incidents in the West Bank in the past year, more than double the number from the preceding 12 months.

Beyond Gaza, Hamas’ armed activity in the West Bank — which surged in 2022 after more than 15 years of relative dormancy — has further intensified since October 2023. Hamas was involved in approximately 130 violent incidents in the past year, a nearly 135% increase compared to the previous 12 months. This represents over 13% of all violence linked to identified Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank during this period. Hamas may also be connected to some of the hundreds of other unclaimed acts of violence, as the group often takes responsibility only when operatives are killed, likely to shield them from Israeli retaliation. For instance, Hamas only acknowledged involvement in a 22 June shooting that killed an Israeli civilian after its operatives were killed in a drone strike in Tulkarm in August.¹³RT, ‘Al-Ghassam: We killed Amnon Mukhtar,’ 3 August 2024

Intensified high-impact and explosive operations in the West Bank

Hamas elements from the West Bank carried out some of the highest-impact attacks leading to Israeli casualties. They are also increasingly executing complex explosive operations.

While groups affiliated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade remain at the forefront of armed violence in the West Bank, Hamas’ attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers have been among the most significant in terms of reported fatalities or injuries. Since 7 October, ACLED records at least 12 Hamas attacks in the West Bank that resulted in casualties, including two that also led to one reported fatality each. Hamas operatives have also conducted three fatal attacks inside Israel after 7 October. An attack in Jerusalem in November killed three Israeli civilians and injured six others, and another in Raanana in January killed one civilian and injured 18. Most recently, Hamas claimed responsibility for an attack in the Jaffa neighborhood of Tel Aviv on 1 October when gunmen from Hebron killed at least seven people and injured others. Additionally, Hamas gunmen, working alongside other Palestinian groups, killed at least four Israeli soldiers during IDF raids.

Furthermore, Hamas appears to have refined its tactics in recent months, attempting more sophisticated and complex attacks using explosives that are reminiscent of the Second Intifada. In a significant development, Hamas and PIJ attempted their first suicide bombing inside Israel in nearly eight years in August, with the attacker hailing from the city of Nablus.¹⁴The Palestinian Information Center, ‘Identity of Tel Aviv suicide bomber revealed.’ 22 August 2024 Additionally, on 30 August, Hamas operatives carried out two car bombings in the southern West Bank within 20 minutes of each other. The first explosion occurred at a gas station near the Gush Etzion settlement, and the second detonated inside the Karmei Tzur settlement. Hamas also documented an operation on 23 July near the Jenin separation wall, where its operatives planted three IEDs.¹⁵The Palestinian Information Center, ‘Lure and bombing.. Qassam publishes footage of a complex triple ambush near Jenin,’ 25 July 2024 The militants triggered the first explosion to lure soldiers and detonated the remaining two remotely, injuring three soldiers. 

Palestine’s future will likely include Hamas

A militarily weakened Hamas is expected to continue its armed struggle against Israel while maintaining a strong ideological and political foothold in Palestine.

With Netanyahu apparently postponing any plans for a ceasefire with Hamas until after the US presidential elections,¹⁶Aluf Benn, ‘Analysis | Netanyahu Just Mapped Out How Israel Would Rule Gaza Forever,’ Haaretz, 3 September 2024 the IDF has shifted its focus to the north. Israeli airstrikes have decimated Hezbollah’s leadership, while the IDF launched a “limited” ground invasion of southern Lebanon on 1 October.¹⁷Peter Beaumont, Andrew Roth, and William Christou, ‘Israeli military says it is carrying out ‘limited’ ground operation targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon,’ The Guardian, 1 October 2024 Iran launched missiles into Israel shortly thereafter. The Middle East now seems more than ever on the edge of a full-blown regional war, which has been Hamas’ objective since last October.¹⁸The Palestine Chronicle, ‘“Today, the People Claim their Revolution”: This is What Al-Qassam Commander Said in His Speach,’ 7 October 2023   

Meanwhile, the war in Gaza continues as a war of attrition one year after it began, as the IDF concentrates on strengthening its presence along the Philadelphia and Netzarim corridors.¹⁹Lazar Berman, ‘Israel keeps moving up the escalation ladder, hoping Nasrallah will jump off,’ Times of Israel, 23 September 2024 Even if a formal agreement is reached in the near future to secure the return of the remaining hostages, Israel will likely aim to retain security control over certain zones in Gaza to conduct future operations, similar to how it operates in the West Bank. Although Hamas no longer has the capacity or desire to govern war-torn Gaza,²⁰Aya Batrawy, ‘A Hamas leader says they will give up governing Gaza, but won’t lay down arms,’ NPR, 16 August 2024 it retains the ability to continue fighting a low-intensity conflict. With Israeli military presence expected to persist in Gaza in some form and Hamas far from fully eradicated, armed violence is expected to continue in Gaza for the foreseeable future. 

At the same time, Hamas’ presence and operations persist in the West Bank, despite the IDF’s intensified crackdown on armed groups, which began in spring 2022 and escalated after 7 October with the use of war-like methods²¹Al Jazeera, ‘Israeli forces using ‘war-like’ tactics in occupied West Bank: UN,’ 4 September 2024 such as missile strikes and drone attacks. Amid record-high settler violence (for more, see this ACLED report), Hamas’ bolstered credentials, and increased support for armed struggle among West Bankers²²Gianluca Pacchiani, ‘Poll: Support for Hamas on the rise among Palestinians, now double Fatah’s,’ Times of Israel, 13 June 2024 the group may find greater opportunities to expand its influence and operational reach. While a unity of fronts and a more coordinated, organized, and simultaneous fight against Israel across the West Bank and Gaza has not yet materialized, such alignment remains a possibility depending on future developments on the ground.