Regional Overview
Middle East
January 2025

Gaza: Violence declines amid breakthrough in hostage-ceasefire negotiations

December marked a decrease in the level of violence in the Gaza Strip compared to the month prior, driven by a reduction in activity by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in North Gaza, where it had launched an offensive in October 2024. Only 10,000 to 15,000 people are believed to remain in the besieged northern Gaza Strip, with much of the area razed to the ground.¹Tania Krämer and Hazem Balousha, ‘With Israel-Hamas ceasefire elusive, Gaza “feels like hell,”’ Deutsche Welle, 1 January 2024 With the establishment of its third ground corridor, which separates Jabaliya’s North Gaza from the Gaza City governorate, Israel has divided the Gaza Strip into four isolated zones and turned Hamas into an unorganized fighting force. While Hamas and allies continued to engage in armed clashes and remote violence against IDF troops, the number of these events steadily declined in 2024. 

Indirect ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel resumed in the meantime, with reports suggesting that after over a year of firmly opposing the presence of Israeli troops in the Nezarim and Philadelphia corridors, Hamas now appears more flexible.²The Times of Israel, ‘Report: Hamas has agreed to temporary IDF presence in Gaza in potential hostage deal,’ 12 December 2024 Hamas has been militarily weakened after the killing of thousands of its fighters and dozens of key leaders and commanders, including Yehya Sinwar and Mohammad Deif, masterminds of the 7 October 2023 attack. Furthermore, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has deepened, increasing the risk for Hamas that rising public dissent would erode its support in Gaza. Despite the increasing odds of a deal that would pause the war and bring the Israeli hostages home, the prospects for an open-ended war of attrition remain high, with Hamas retaining some operational capabilities to conduct guerilla warfare and Israel planning to maintain a presence in the Gaza Strip.

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Lebanon and Israel: Tensions linger in December despite the ceasefire

The ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Hezbollah on 27 November produced a significant decrease in cross-border violence. Although Israel conducted approximately 180 attacks in southern Lebanon during December — bringing up the total of IDF attacks since the ceasefire to over 235 incidents —  the violence  represented an over 90% decrease compared to the previous month. Fatalities in Lebanon for the month totaled at least 30, the majority of which were civilians. Hezbollah carried out only one attack in December, striking an IDF base in the occupied Golan Heights on 2 December.

Lebanon continues to grapple with the devastating impact of Israel’s heavy air campaign in 2024. Between mid-September and November, the IDF intensified its attacks, primarily targeting Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley in the east, and the capital, Beirut. By the time the ceasefire took effect, the total number of IDF attacks in Lebanon had surpassed 12,650. The frequency of Israeli airstrikes in September, October, and November was the highest recorded by ACLED in the region since 2017. The campaign culminated in a ground invasion near the southern border, leading to the destruction of numerous villages. Nearly 100,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed, and almost 4,000 people were killed in Lebanon during the 14 months of hostilities.³Michelle Inez Simon and Daniel Dunford, ‘New data reveals impact of war on civilians in Lebanon,’ Sky News, 28 November 2024

By early January 2025, IDF forces had withdrawn from only three of the dozens of areas they captured in southern Lebanon,⁴Euan Ward, ‘U.S. Envoy Says Israel Will Withdraw From Southern Lebanon,’ New York Times, 6 Jnuary 2025 leaving uncertainty about whether they would meet the 60-day deadline outlined in the ceasefire agreement. Israeli officials have warned that the ceasefire may collapse if Hezbollah does not fully withdraw north of the Litani River and if the Lebanese Armed Forces fail to gain control of southern Lebanon.⁵Catherine Nicholls, Dana Karni and Charbel Mallo, ‘ Israel warns Lebanon truce could collapse if Hezbollah doesn’t withdraw in south,’ CNN, 6 January 2024 

In northern Israel, more than 60,000 people were evacuated from their homes due to Hezbollah’s attacks, which reportedly resulted in the deaths of nearly 60 soldiers and civilians. Reports indicate that only about 20% of Israeli families have returned to their homes as uncertainties persist over whether the ceasefire will hold.⁶Shira Rubin, ‘Northern Israel is quiet again, but most families have not gone home,’ The Washington Post, 3 January 2025

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The Red Sea and Yemen: Houthis continue confrontations with the US and Israel in response to the Gaza crisis

Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea continued to decrease in December, while continuing their strikes on US warships and Israeli targets. These developments align with the broader trends observed in the Red Sea crisis since September 2024. The Houthis attacked two convoys of US-registered commercial and military ships in early December, prompting Washington to retaliate with a precision strike on the Ministry of Defense complex in Sanaa city.⁷The US announced it targeted a Houthi hub for coordinating attacks on maritime routes. See @CENTCOM, 16 December 2024. This is the first US attack targeting a Houthi-run ministry recorded by ACLED. At the same time, the Sanaa-based forces carried out the highest number of drone and missile attacks against Israel ever recorded by ACLED, prompting two rounds of confirmed Israeli airstrikes targeting port facilities, airports, and power plants on the West Coast and around Sanaa, resulting in the death of at least 15 people and more than 30 injuries.

Overall, in 2024, the Houthis carried out around 330 attacks with the stated goal of securing a ceasefire in Gaza. These attacks targeted over 120 commercial ships and 25 naval vessels, surpassing their declared military objectives and disrupting global maritime trade.⁸Freightos, ‘The Impact of the Red Sea Crisis on Global Shipping and Trade,’ 30 October 2024 The group employed a strategy of controlled escalation, introducing new weapons and expanding targets to maintain a heightened sense of risk in the Red Sea. ACLED data indicate that shifts in attack trends were driven more by domestic and regional factors than by the Gaza crisis,⁹Examples include the escalation of Houthi attacks in February, following the terrorist designation by the US, and in June, in response to economic pressure from Yemen’s internationally recognized government, with a subsequent drop after the July economic de-escalation accord. See @abdusalamsalah, 23 July 2024 with confrontations against the US and Israel playing a pivotal role in the escalation.

Tensions with Washington developed rapidly throughout 2024. Overall, ACLED records around 40 direct Houthi attacks against US warships, peaking in March, gradually declining in the second half of the year, and continuing again in December with at least three corroborated attacks recorded. Meanwhile, the US sought to curb Houthi attacks by degrading the group’s capacity through pre-planned barrages on stationary military assets and dynamic targeting of pop-up mobile weapons systems. In the first half of 2024, Washington officials acknowledged limited success,¹⁰Elise Vincent and Irène Sulmont, ‘Yemen: Western armies powerless to halt Houthi attacks,’ Le Monde, 26 July 2024 prompting a shift in focus to critical infrastructure in the second half, in an effort to re-establish deterrence. Concurrently, Houthi confrontations with Israel escalated after July 2024, following the launch of the so-called fifth phase of Houthi attacks,¹¹Ansarollah, ‘The Israeli aggression on Yemen will not restore its deterrence, and the “Israelis” should be more afraid and worried than ever before,’ 21 July 2024 which peaked in December 2024, with five times the number of attacks recorded in the previous month.

For more, see the Red Sea attacks interactive map created as part of the Yemen Conflict Observatory.

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Syria: Rebel factions take control 13 years after the start of the Syrian civil war

Syrian Islamist rebel factions led by HTS took control of the Syrian capital, Damascus, on 8 December, forcing Bashar al-Assad to flee the country and bringing his regime’s decades-long rule to an end after 13 years of civil war. This occurred less than two weeks after HTS-led opposition forces launched an offensive, followed by separate operations by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Southern Operations Room. While HTS-led rebels seized control of the Hama, Aleppo, Idlib, and Homs provinces, SNA took control of the northern countryside of Aleppo, and the Southern Operations Room captured the southern provinces, including Daraa, Qunaytra, and al-Suwayda. Opposition rebels faced less resistance from the Syrian army and its allies than expected, with ACLED recording no violence in nearly half of recorded events of rebels seizing territory.

The rebel factions’ rapid military victories throughout Syria came with little warning after the country had experienced a long period of status quo since the 2020 ceasefire brokered by Turkey and Russia. Levels of violence involving regime forces and their allies, as well as opposition forces, had remained largely stagnant in recent years.

In northern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), at the urging of the US, agreed to a truce with Turkey and SNA on 9 December. This followed SNA’s significant advances into Kurdish-controlled areas, where they captured the strategic town of Tall Rifaat and headed towards the strategic towns of Menbij and Ain al-Arab (Kobani) on the Syrian-Turkish border. Under the truce, the SDF conceded control of Menbij and other areas west of the Euphrates River in exchange for a pause in fighting in the city of Ain al-Arab and a halt to the SNA’s eastward expansion.¹²Lara Jakes and Eric Schmitt; ‘New Battles Threaten Kurdish-Turkish Truce in Northern Syria,’ New York Times, 18 December 2024 Yet, despite efforts to extend the precarious truce, violence resumed on 17 December in the areas of Menbij and Ain al-Arab. Turkey maintains its unwavering opposition to the presence of the SDF along its border with Syria, perceiving it as an extension of the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US, and the European Union.¹³Amberin Zaman; ‘Turkey-backed Syrian factions end US-mediated ceasefire with Kurdish-led SDF,’ Al-Monitor, 16 December 2024

At the same time, the fall of Assad has seen Israel increase its territorial stake in Syria. Hours after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli forces launched a military incursion into the demilitarized buffer zone in the Golan Heights and the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, claiming the need to establish a “sterile defense zone” as a temporary state of emergency.¹⁴Al Jazeera, ‘Israel says to impose “sterile” zone in south Syria, launches 480 air raids,’ 10 December 2024 Several air attacks also targeted military assets across Syria to prevent hardware belonging to Assad’s army from falling in the hands of Syria’s new rulers. 

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Syria and Iraq: ISIL activities increase in Syria and decline in Iraq in 2024 

Amid fears that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) could exploit the vacuum left not only by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and fighting between US-backed Kurdish forces and Turkish-backed rebels, US and allied forces carried out airstrikes targeting five ISIL positions in the Syrian desert on 8 December.¹⁵Saad al-Yaziji, “CENTCOM targets 75 ISIS camps in central Syria,” North Press Agency, 9 December 2024 Despite efforts by the former Syrian regime and allied Russian forces, as well as the US-led Global Coalition and allied SDF forces, ISIL increased their activity in 2024, perpetrating over 700 attacks against the SDF, former Syrian regime forces and their militias, and civilians, compared to less than 500 attacks in 2023. ISIL targeted oil tankers in over 45 instances and resumed suicide attacks for the first time since 2019. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad, ISIL continued its attacks, killing 54 former soldiers on 10 December. While the shift in power could present an opportunity for ISIL to expand beyond the Syrian desert, the group has an adversarial relationship with HTS-led groups, which have consistently countered ISIL cells within their territories.

The surge in ISIL activities in Syria was not mirrored in Iraq, which experienced a significant decline in ISIL-related violence in 2024. ACLED records nearly 80 armed clashes involving ISIL militants in Iraq in 2024, compared to 174 the previous year. Similarly, the number of remote explosions conducted by ISIL dropped to 54 in 2024, down from 70 in 2023. This decline can be partly attributed to Iraqi security forces’ concerted crackdown on ISIL military assets and infrastructure, including tunnels and hideouts. These efforts significantly reduced the group’s capacity to launch attacks against security forces and civilians.

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West Bank: PA forces launch a campaign against armed groups in Jenin camp

The Palestinian Authority (PA) stepped up its crackdown on armed groups in the northern West Bank’s Jenin refugee camp in December,  marking its largest campaign since 2007 when the PA targeted Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza.¹⁶Isabel Kershner, ‘On West Bank, a Show of Force by Fatah,’ The New York Times, 16 June 2007 The PA’s security forces have placed the Jenin camp under siege, where daily armed clashes have occurred with Katibat Jenin and other militants. These clashes resulted in the killing of at least 11 people in December, including six PA security officers and a senior commander affiliated with the Katibat Jenin. While the PA campaign focuses on Jenin camp, limited and sporadic armed clashes also occurred in the governorates of Tulkarm, Tubas, and Nablus during December. 

The campaign highlights the PA’s move in 2024 toward a more assertive approach against armed groups in the northern West Bank. ACLED records a gradual increase in armed clash events between PA security forces and Palestinian militants in the northern West Bank, reaching a total of 80 incidents in 2024, with December marking the peak of violence. PA security forces have also intensified their efforts against armed groups through increased arrests, weapons seizures, and defusing roadside explosives. The PA leadership may see an opportunity to regain its influence in the northern West Bank, aiming to prove it can play a role in Gaza’s postwar governance and reconstruction.¹⁷The Times of Israel, ‘Egypt pushing for Palestinian Authority to take over Gaza’s Rafah Crossing – report,’ 11 August 2024 Throughout 2024, Palestinian armed groups increased their activity in the West Bank, which made up nearly 18% of total violent incidents and contributed to 65% of total recorded fatalities. Israeli forces have intensified their operations against armed groups in the West Bank, deploying drones and helicopters in operations targeting militants.

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