Regional Overview
Latin America and the Caribbean
March 2025

Argentina: Discontent with the government sparks nationwide protests

Growing discontent against President Javier Milei prompted at least 155 demonstration events in February, more than double those recorded in the previous month. On 1 February, the Federal March of Anti-fascist and Anti-racist Pride took place in over 60 cities, uniting LGBTQ+ groups, unions, and social movements in condemnation of President Milei’s remarks at the World Economic Forum, where he criticized gender policies and linked same-sex marriage to pedophilia.¹El Día, “In La Plata, the gathering took place at 7 and 50 with hundreds of protesters,” 2 February 2025 (Spanish) Simultaneously, mass demonstrations erupted in Patagonia, Buenos Aires, and several southern cities, demanding stronger environmental policies amid devastating forest fires that scorched over 30,000 hectares and resulted in forced evacuations.²NASA, “Fires ravage Patagonia,” 14 February 2025 (Spanish) 

In addition to these protests, the Argentine government is now facing mounting public outcry due to the fallout from the “cryptogate” scandal linked to Milei’s public endorsement of a new cryptocurrency named $LIBRA. While the coin initially surged in value, it soon collapsed, causing at least 70,000 investors, including many from Argentina, to lose their investments.³Flora Genoux, “‘Cryptogate’ in Argentina: Javier Milei in turmoil for encouraging the purchase of an obscure cryptocurrency,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 18 February 2025 Although this did not spark protests, it did affect people’s opinions of Milei: 53% of 1,500 interviewees in a public opinion survey believed that Milei was an accomplice in a scam.⁴Letra P, “Survey: 53% believe that Javier Milei was a ‘complicit’ in the crypto scam,” 27 February 2025 (Spanish) This crisis is having political and economic repercussions, threatening Argentina’s international credibility and access to financial support, including from the IMF.⁵Tobias Käufer, “Argentina’s Milei faces credibility crisis over crypto scam,” Deutsche Welle, 21 February 2025

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Colombia: The ELN’s offensive against rivals expands to other departments

Following the January offensive in Norte de Santander’s Catatumbo region against the 33rd front, a dissident faction of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) stepped up its aggressive posture with rival groups in Arauca, Antioquia, Bolívar, and Chocó departments. Alliances between these groups are highly volatile, as the ELN and FARC dissidents are allied against the Gulf Clan in Antioquia but fight one another in Arauca.

In Antioquia and Bolívar, where the ELN and FARC dissidents are allied against the Gulf Clan,⁶El Colombiano, “War on the borders between Antioquia and Bolívar puts 150,000 people at risk: Fundación Sumapaz warns,” 25 February 2025 (Spanish) ACLED records 37 events of armed group violence in February, 19% more than in January. In Arauca, a clash between the ELN and the FARC dissident 10th front faction, which is affiliated with the General Central Staff (EMC) in La Esmeralda municipality, left four rebels dead at the beginning of February. 

However, the humanitarian impact of the turf wars involving the ELN was most evident in Chocó. Clashes between the ELN and Gulf Clan around the Istmina municipality and the ELN’s imposition of a 72-hour “armed curfew” in the entire Chocó department led to the forced displacement of over 3,500 people and the confinement of 2,000 families.⁷Carol Yesenia Rodríguez Gutiérrez, “More than 3,500 people have been displaced in Chocó, according to Indepaz,” RCN Radio, 18 February 2025 (Spanish) During the armed curfew, the ELN forbade any public activities, shut down public transportation, and ordered civilians to remain indoors for the entire period, threatening anyone who disobeyed with violence. The regional governor, Nubia Carolina Córdoba, urged the central government to declare a state of emergency, similar to measures taken in Catatumbo in January.⁸Daniel Esteban Reyes Espinosa, “ELN armed strike begins in Chocó: Governor asks to declare state of internal commotion,” Infobae, 18 February 2025 (Spanish) 

The situation is further complicated by the reported presence of FARC EMC dissidents, who are, in this case, reportedly siding with the Gulf Clan against the ELN, marking a new development in the ongoing conflict.⁹Diego Stacey, “The ELN causes another mass displacement with the announcement of an armed strike in Chocó,” El País, 18 February 2025 (Spanish) The ELN’s violent activity in different parts of the country and the shifting alliances that underlie these conflict settings display not only the group’s quest for expansion but also the increasingly fragmented and localized character of Colombia’s conflict. They furthermore represent a significant challenge for President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace plans.

For more on Colombia, see ACLED’s report Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence during Petro’s presidency.

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Ecuador: Attacks on political figures highlight escalating violence as Ecuador heads toward a runoff election

On 9 February, Ecuador’s presidential and legislative elections took place, and incumbent Daniel Noboa and Luisa González advanced to a presidential runoff election scheduled for 13 April.¹⁰Juan Diego Quesada and Carolina Mella, “Noboa and González will compete for the presidency of Ecuador after a tight first round,” El País, 10 February 2025 (Spanish) The winner of the runoff election will face the daunting challenge of tackling the escalating political and criminal violence that has destabilized the country in recent years. For example, homicides skyrocketed by 430% in the past five years.¹¹Juanita Goebertus Estrada, “Ecuador needs a different approach to fighting organized crime,” Human Rights Watch, 17 January 2025 

On 12 February, hitmen ambushed the political leader of the Olmedo district while leaving a property in Manabí in his vehicle. He was the son of former mayor Jacinto Zamora Rivera and had run for mayor in 2019. This incident, along with the attempted assassination of Gabriel Ugarte, a candidate for the National Assembly in El Oro province just days earlier, highlights the heightened threats political figures face in Ecuador, particularly around electoral cycles, as is exemplified by the killing of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio ahead of the 2023 elections. ACLED records at least 62 events of violence targeting political figures since the start of the electoral process on 9 February 2024, leading to 45 reported deaths, and further violence can be expected in the run-up to the second round of the presidential elections.

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Haiti: Clashes between self-defense groups and the Viv Ansanm gang alliance escalate in Port-au-Prince

Between 8 and 11 February, the Kraze Baryè gang — affiliated with the Viv Asanm coalition — attacked several neighborhoods in Pétion-Ville commune in Port-au-Prince, destroying and looting civilian houses and forcing residents to flee the area. Police, supported by self-defense groups, responded to the attacks, killing several gang members in the subsequent clashes. In retaliation, on 16 February, gunmen affiliated with Kraze Baryè gang killed at least 20 people in an attack against community members they believed to have joined anti-gang actions.¹²Gazette Haiti, “At least 20 dead in a massacre on Route de Frères, not far from the National Police Academy,” 17 February 2025 (French) The rise in gang violence in Pétion-Ville led to the highest number of violent incidents recorded in this commune since March 2024. 

Actions by self-defense groups to support police and push back gangs also led to deadly clashes in other communes of the capital. On 24 February, Kraze Baryè and other allies of Viv Ansanm clashed with self-defense groups in Delmas and Tabarre communes, leaving at least 12 and 15 people dead in two separate clashes. Meanwhile, gangs continued to attack rural communities of Kenscoff commune, notably targeting telecommunication antennas in the area. Gangs have coveted Kenscoff due to its elevated position offering a commanding view of Port-au-Prince. The control of this upscale commune would enable gangs to expand their extortion revenue and gain control of the capital’s last remaining exit route.¹³Peterson Luxama, “Haiti: Gang attack leaves several dead and injured among law enforcement officers,” RFI, 17 February 2025 (French) Gang actions in Port-au-Prince drove the 20% increase in overall violence in February relative to the month prior.

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Honduras: A string of multiple killings raises concern over organized crime violence around the electoral process

In February, Honduras recorded a string of at least five multiple-fatality attacks in four departments, most of which are probably linked to disputes between organized crime groups. This was the highest number of events since June 2023. Across the first two months of the year, such killings left a toll of 23 victims, more than double that in the same period of 2024, according to ACLED data. In particular, multiple attacks left a trail of 11 victims in the Olancho department, turning it into the second most lethal month for the department since ACLED started covering the country in 2018. 

The deadly attacks took place despite Xiomara Castro’s government’s efforts to rein in organized crime through a state of exception that has been regularly extended since its initial imposition in November 2022.¹⁴Daniel Girón, “Does a state of emergency guarantee electoral security or compromise its transparency and impartiality?” Criterio, 24 February 2024 (Spanish) The security measures were last extended until 5 April to provide security guarantees for the primary elections that the country’s main parties will hold on 9 March. Nonetheless, the pre-campaign period was tainted by the killing of at least four precandidates for public posts.¹⁵La Prensa, “Violence tarnishes the primary elections in Honduras”, 23 February 2025 (Spanish) Since the start of the electoral cycle in September 2024, ACLED records 10 events of violence targeting political figures. As the country enters a crucial electoral process that will culminate with the 30 November general elections, political and criminal disputes risk prompting further increases in violence.

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Mexico: Security operations against the Sinaloa Cartel intensify in Sinaloa state

In February, federal and state forces doubled down on security operations targeting cartel leaders and criminal groups’ assets in Sinaloa, which led to the arrest of at least three close collaborators of one of the main Los Chapitos leaders between 8 and 20 February.¹⁶Pablo Ferri, “Mexico tightens the noose around Los Chapitos”, El País, 20 February 2025 (Spanish) Security forces also removed more than 80 security cameras installed by the cartel in Culiacán and destroyed at least 47 drug laboratories in Culiacán, Cosala, and Morocorito municipalities between 17 and 22 February.¹⁷Baruc Mayen, “Siege of drug trafficking in Sinaloa: 27 clandestine laboratories seized in less than 48 hours”, Infobae, 23 February 2025 (Spanish); Javier Cabrera Martínez, “20 clandestine laboratories seized in Sinaloa; military disables them, the General Attorney’s office investigates”, 20 February 2025 (Spanish) While authorities continued to engage in direct confrontations with criminal groups, intelligence actions intensified, and the number of property destruction actions carried out by state forces against criminal assets in February more than doubled relative to the month prior. These operations may have contributed to a gradual decrease in violence levels in Sinaloa, which are now slightly lower than in September 2024, when the war between Los Chapitos and Los Mayos factions of the Sinaloa Cartel started. 

The escalation of operations against organized crime in Sinaloa follows pressure from the US government to fight drug trafficking, which Washington set as a condition to avoid the imposition of tariffs to export Mexican goods.¹⁸Victoria Dittmar and Parker Asmann, “Can Mexico’s president appease Trump with anti-crime crackdown?”, InSight Crime, 1 March 2025 In this context, on 27 February, Mexican authorities ordered the extradition of 29 prominent drug traffickers, including Rafael Caro Quintero, the former head of the Guadalajara cartel.¹⁹BBC, “Mexico sends 29 drug-related detainees to the US in one of the largest extraditions in its history”, 27 February 2025 (Spanish)

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