Regional Overview
Middle East
March 2025
Posted: 7 March 2025
In this Regional Overview covering February 2025
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- Gaza: Ceasefire holds despite ongoing violence in Gaza
- Lebanon and Syria: Syrian armed forces clash with Lebanese clans to curb cross-border smuggling
- Syria: Israel intensifies military operations, signaling its long-term presence
- West Bank: Israel expands its military operations in the northern West Bank
- Yemen: Mass protests erupt across IRG-held territories over services and the economy
Gaza: Ceasefire holds despite ongoing violence in Gaza
The first stage of the Gaza ceasefire largely held in February, despite 130 violent actions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that led to at least 44 reported fatalities in Gaza. On various occasions, Israeli troops shelled and opened fire on areas near the buffer zone where they remain stationed. Nearly 40% of all violent incidents and half of all reported fatalities occurred in the Rafah governorate. Israeli troops stationed in the Philadelphi Corridor fired at Palestinians in the southern areas of the governorate, including both displaced Palestinians returning to their homes and Hamas police officers involved in distributing aid. Furthermore, Israeli forces targeted individuals and vehicles traveling north through the Netzarim Corridor in at least 16 incidents, resulting in the deaths of at least five Palestinians. Following Israel’s withdrawal from the eastern section of Netzarim on 9 February, the number of incidents in areas between Dayr al-Balah and Gaza City declined, with no recorded lethal attacks in this area after 10 February.
In the meantime, Israel and Hamas have completed the exchange of hostages and prisoners under the phase one agreement, which concluded on 1 March. The second stage of the agreement, however, remains in limbo. Israel is seeking an extension of phase one to continue the exchange of hostages for prisoners without any commitment to permanently end the war. As of the time of writing, Hamas has rejected the extension proposal.1Lazar Berman, “Israel endorses new US plan for half of hostages to be released now, ceasefire maintained,” Times of Israel, 2 March 2025
For more information, see ACLED Gaza Monitor.
Lebanon and Syria: Syrian armed forces clash with Lebanese clans to curb cross-border smuggling
In February, the Syrian army launched a security operation in the western countryside of Homs in an attempt to tackle the smuggling of drugs, arms, and people along the border with Lebanon.2BBC News, “What do we know about the clashes in a village near the Syrian-Lebanese border?” 7 February 2025 (Arabic) The campaign escalated into clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed Lebanese clans, which control the villages in the area between Hermel in Lebanon and Qusayr in Syria.3The New Arab “Why is the Lebanon-Syria border tense and is Hezbollah involved?” 10 February 2025 Over four days of intense clashes that also involved cross-border rocket and artillery shelling, the Syrian army took control of 11 villages in the border area. Two Syrian fighters and four gunmen were killed, and several individuals from both sides were kidnapped. This latest escalation comes after the failure of Lebanese and Syrian clan leadership to hold talks following a tribal initiative by the Syrian al-Ulaywi tribes to curb smuggling operations.4BBC News, “What do we know about the clashes in a village near the Syrian-Lebanese border?” 7 February 2025 (Arabic)
The ill-defined 375-kilometer border area between Syria and Lebanon consists of tens of Syrian villages inhabited by Lebanese Shia civilians from various clans, including the al-Majdal, Zaiter, and Jaafar clans, who have strong ties with clans inside Lebanese territory. Hezbollah cultivated strong support among these groups, which aided its activities along the border area, including arms and drug trafficking, smuggling of goods, counterfeit money, and the production of Captagon, a highly addictive amphetamine-type drug widely trafficked in the region.5Dia Awda, “Hawik clashes reveal the features of a ‘difficult mission’ between Syria and Lebanon,” Al-Hurra, 7 February 2025 (Arabic) These clans are themselves heavily armed and actively engage in cross-border smuggling operations.6Sawsan Mehanna, “The Bekaa Valley clans and ‘Hezbollah’ coalition… the end of the honeymoon years,” Independent Arabia, 16 February 2025 (Arabic) While Hezbollah’s direct control of the border area waned following its withdrawal from Syria and intense Israeli airstrikes on its smuggling routes, the militias have gained more power, further destabilizing the border area and posing serious threats to the Syrian armed forces.
Syria: Israel intensifies military operations, signaling its long-term presence
Israel intensified its operations in Syria in February, carrying out at least 18 operations — a 50% increase in violence compared to January. The majority of these actions included airstrikes directed at both Syrian military and civilian targets. Additionally, Israeli troops carried out 25 incursions into al-Qunaytira and Daraa. In several instances, the attacks destroyed the Syrian army’s military positions in the countryside of al-Qunaytira. These ongoing operations, alongside the establishment of nine military camps along the border, point to Israel’s intention to maintain a long-term presence in Syria7Reuters, “Israel says its troops in Syria will remain atop Mt Hermon indefinitely,” 28 January 2025 and create a new buffer zone.
At least five airstrikes were launched on Syrian army positions in Daraa and Rural Damascus. These occurred less than a day after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to prevent Syrian military deployments south of Damascus, citing security concerns after the 7 October attacks.8William Christou, “Israel strikes targets in southern Syria after demanding demilitarisation,” The Guardian, 25 February 2025 Israeli officials have also emphasized Israel’s commitment to protecting the Druze community in the region, reinforcing ties with Druze citizens who serve in the Israeli military and police.9Emanuel Fabian, “Netanyahu and Katz direct IDF to ‘prepare to defend’ Syrian Druze suburb of Damascus,” The Times of Israel, 1 March 2025 Netanyahu’s remarks have been met with widespread rejection by Druze communities in southern Syria: ACLED records 30 protest events against his remarks across the region.
The latest moves come amid Israel’s pursuit of further strategic objectives, aiming to maintain Syria’s weakened military state and curb Turkey’s expanding influence. To this end, Israel has been pressing the United States to block any Turkish attempts to establish military bases in Syria while supporting Russia’s continued military presence as a counterbalance to Turkish ambitions.10Maya Gebeily and Humeyra Pamuk, “Exclusive: Israel lobbies US to keep Russian bases in a ‘weak’ Syria, sources say,” Reuters, 28 February 2025 On 2 March, Netanyahu dispatched his military secretary to Moscow for high-level talks, underscoring Israel’s commitment to ensuring the maintenance of Russian military bases in Syria.11Kurdistan24, “Israel Seeks to Counter Turkey’s Growing Influence in Syria,” 2 March 2025
West Bank: Israel expands its military operations in the northern West Bank
Violence involving Israeli security forces in the West Bank escalated in February as ACLED records a nearly 20% rise in Israeli military actions compared to January — largely due to intensified violence against civilians. In Jenin, Tulkarm, and Tubas, attacks on civilians surged from 10 events in January to nearly 100 in February amid the IDF’s ongoing Iron Wall offensive. Israel’s stated objective with the offensive is to crack down on Palestinian armed groups in the north. During raids, Israeli troops fired on homes and assaulted residents to clear camps, while demolitions of buildings, roads, and infrastructure persisted. Since the operations began on 21 January, around 40,000 Palestinians have fled camps in Jenin and Tulkarm, marking the largest such displacement since the 1967 Six-Day War.12Paul Adams, “‘It’ll be a disaster’: Uncertainty for thousands forced from West Bank camps by Israeli raids,” BBC, 26 February 2025 Israel has also relaxed “open-fire orders,” allowing soldiers to shoot to kill perceived threats and fire at suspicious vehicles near checkpoints, according to a Haaretz newspaper investigation.13Yaniv Kubovich, “Israeli Army Expands Open-fire Orders in West Bank, Leading to Surge in Palestinian Civilian Deaths,” Haaretz, 10 February 2025
Beyond the city centers and refugee camps of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Tubas, the Iron Wall operation expanded into nearby towns and villages, where local armed groups — mainly affiliated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad — clashed with Israeli troops and detonated roadside bombs. Since mid-February, clashes in militant strongholds have declined, particularly in Jenin, where Israel deployed tanks for the first time since 2002. Since the operation began, ACLED records the reported deaths of at least 52 militants, three soldiers, and nine civilians in the north. Israeli forces have also arrested around 300 militants.14Times of Israel, “Shin Bet foiled terror plot by West Bank cell to use 100 kilogram mine against IDF,” 26 February 2025
The Israeli government plans to keep its forces in northern West Bank refugee camps for at least a year,15Al Jazeera, “Israel expands West Bank offensive, says troops to remain ‘for next year,’” 23 February 2025 aiming to prevent militant regrouping and weaken the camps as both a symbol and stronghold.16Gerry Shih, et al., “Israeli settlers boast of their influence as army pivots to West Bank,” Washington Post, 6 March 2025 However, violence against civilians and collective punishment — including forced displacement, property destruction, and movement restrictions — risks perpetuating the cycle of violence.
Yemen: Mass protests erupt across IRG-held territories over services and the economy
Last month, hundreds demonstrated in Aden, Abyan, Hadramawt, Shabwah, and other southern governorates against power outages, deteriorating public services, and worsening economic conditions. ACLED records 63 demonstrations in February, representing a monthly record-high for Yemeni areas under the authority of the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Security forces responded to the demonstrations with arrest campaigns targeting demonstrators and activists.17Yemen Shabab, “Aden: STC forces continues arrest campaign targeting demonstrators criticizing currency collapse, including union head,” 15 February 2025 (Arabic)
Mass demonstrations against power outages and deteriorating public services are not new to PLC-held territories, especially in Aden, where such demonstrations happen semi-annually. For several months, fuel shortages have limited Yemen’s power generation capacity, leading the General Electricity Corporation in Aden to shut down the power system. The shortage developed after the Hadrawmawt Tribal Alliance suspended crude oil exports to other governorates in protest of their perceived marginalization, with the latest blockade implemented in early February.18Al Masdar Online, “Hours after after Aden Electricity begs… the the Hadrawmawt Tribal Alliance declares a ban on the export of crude oil starting tomorrow Monday,” 2 February 2025 (Arabic) For its part, Yemen’s internationally recognized government remains paralyzed. The PLC — the political body nominally uniting the country’s anti-Houthi factions — grew increasingly dysfunctional over the past year due to infighting, with reports of tensions between the prime minister and the president, as we all as between the secessionist Southern Transitional Council and other factions in the internationally recognized government.19Al Masdar Online, “As protests increase… al-Zoubaidi distance the transitional council from the crisis and demands the government act,” 10 February 2025 (Arabic); Aden Today, “Disagreements between Ben Mubarak and President Rashad al-Alimi affect the political situation,” 22 February 2025 (Arabic)
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