The Sahel: A Deadly New Era in the Decades-Long Conflict

The central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — all of which are now ruled by military juntas — are engulfed in a decade-long regional jihadist insurgency driven by al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel). ACLED data illustrate the deteriorating security situation in central Sahel as the region hit another record year of violence. In 2023, the number of people killed by acts of political violence doubled in Burkina Faso, placing highest after Nigeria in West Africa. Across central Sahel, conflict fatalities from political violence increased by a staggering 38%, and civilian deaths by over 18%. Mali and Burkina Faso, most affected by the crisis, are categorized as experiencing high levels of violence in the latest update to the ACLED Conflict Index. High levels of violence in all three central Sahel states are likely to persist in 2024 as counter-insurgency efforts escalate to meet the insurgency’s increasingly aggressive tactics.

Burkina Faso faced a severe escalation of deadly violence in 2023, with more than 8,000 people reportedly killed as the country grappled with a nearly nationwide conflict of civil war-like proportions. Despite the army’s efforts, launching several ground offensives supported by the use of unmanned drones and helicopters, it has failed to rein in militants and suffered setbacks in many regions. Mass atrocities, variously attributed to security forces, militants, and self-defense militias such as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), persisted at a regular frequency. Djibo, the capital city of the northern Soum province, was the site of heavy fighting between JNIM and military forces supported by the VDP and home to massacres of civilians.¹‘Agence d’information du Burkina, ‘Burkina : Plus de 400 terroristes décimés à Djibo (bilan provisoire),’ 27 November 2023; Imangahdien, ‘Burkina Faso : plus de 250 civils ont été tués par l’armée régulière en une semaine,’ 14 December 2023 Subsequently, power often shifted between these competing forces. Over the course of the year, the momentum alternated between scaled-up military and VDP operations and renewed offensives by JNIM and IS Sahel.

In neighboring Mali, an offensive led by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Wagner Group caused violence to shift northward toward areas previously under the control of militants and rebels. The offensive reawakened a rebellion by predominantly Tuareg and Arab armed groups operating under the banner of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) coalition.²The CSP carried out several successful attacks on FAMa bases, shot down aircrafts, and fought weeks of battles with joint FAMa and Wagner forces before being forced to retreat. Starting in August, the offensive gradually extended across the northern regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal. Russian mercenaries played a key role in enabling FAMa to achieve strategic and symbolic victories,³In addition to Kidal, FAMa and Wagner captured the towns of Ber, Anefis, Aguelhok, and occupied a former base for the UN peacekeeping mission to Mali in Tessalit. including the pivotal moment in this campaign — the capture of the rebel stronghold Kidal.⁴Following the capture of Kidal, Wagner mercenaries hoisted their flag on the historic fortress of Kidal, which represented a strategic propaganda victory. In particular, elements of the Wagner Group were similarly involved in the indiscriminate killing of hundreds of civilians, destruction of infrastructure, and looting of property, as well as triggering mass displacement.⁵Studio Tamani, ‘Kidal : le nombre de déplacés dans la région en hausse de 116%, selon OCHA,’ 17 November 2023 In the ongoing offensive, Wagner mercenaries introduced drone-delivered explosives and explosive barrels — tactics new to the region.⁶X @Menastream, 1 January 2024 The mercenary outfit’s engagement in violence more than tripled in 2023 compared to 2022. 

Niger joined its central Sahel neighbors when a military junta overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023. Despite grappling with several attacks perpetrated by insurgents in the country’s western and southeastern regions, Niger’s security situation was slightly improving ahead of the coup. After IS Sahel defeated JNIM in March 2023 and consolidated its control over most of the Menaka region, the group was able to shift its operational focus to Niger.⁷Afrique XXL, ‘Dans le nord-est du Mali, l’État islamique en voie de « normalisation » ?,’ 13 November 2023 Niger has since become a more frequent target of IS Sahel attacks, leading to an uptick in casualties among both military forces and civilians. The response of Nigerien forces has been proactive and cross-border in nature, by actively engaging in ground operations and airstrikes within Mali to target IS Sahel strongholds.

The escalation and spread of deadly violence in Burkina Faso and Mali have contributed significantly to the vulnerability of civilians, who are increasingly caught in the crossfire. Ongoing military offensives are likely to continue, and FAMa and Wagner operations in Kidal led to the depopulation of several towns with tens of thousands of inhabitants having fled, many to neighboring Algeria.⁸Mali Actu, ‘Kidal en crise humanitaire : 70% de la population déplacée,’ 28 November 2023 Mauritania is also preparing for the predicted arrival of 100,000 additional Malian refugees fleeing from border areas in the coming months.⁹‘Centre Essahraa d’Etudes et de Consultations, ‘La FAO prévoit un afflux de 100 000 réfugiés maliens en Mauritanie,’ 6 January 2024 The Djibo area in Burkina Faso was already one of the areas most affected by the ongoing humanitarian crisis and internal displacement before the latest rounds of fighting, as it has been under militant blockade for almost two years.¹⁰‘Burkina Faso: une attaque terroriste d’ampleur vise la ville de Djibo, dans le Sahel,’ RFI, 28 November 2023

What to watch for in 2024

The military juntas that rule Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are likely to continue to shape the region’s security policies in 2024. Their rise across the Sahel ushered in a new era, leading to the withdrawal of French troops, the termination of the United Nations peacekeeping mission to Mali, and the entrenchment of Russian mercenaries. Given current trends, these regimes’ militarized approach to counter-insurgency is likely to continue to fuel escalatory dynamics. In Burkina Faso and Mali, they have already made clear that they will meet increasing violence of militants and rebels with increasing violence of military forces. 

The jihadist insurgency remains at the center of the Sahel crisis and is the main cause of insecurity and instability. But while all eyes are on northern Mali, several regions in central Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as the Tillaberi region in Niger, continue to be the most affected by violence. For instance, JNIM attacks against majority-ethnic Dogon militia Dan Na Ambassagou and other Dozo (or Donso) hunter militias doubled, and the number of reported fatalities tripled compared to 2022. However, Dozo militias in the Macina area of Segou have recently begun to reorganize themselves and perpetrate retaliatory mass killings and kidnappings against ethnic Fulani. While these ‘communal wars’ tend to be overshadowed by other forms of armed violence, over the years, they have turned into particularly deadly and protracted conflicts. 

Lulls or more sporadic fighting in the second half of 2023 between the most active armed groups, JNIM and IS Sahel, freed up their resources and manpower for attacks on other targets, especially pro-government forces. JNIM and IS Sahel each conducted a series of large-scale attacks on military bases at the end of 2023, which reportedly killed about 200 soldiers. These attacks and others led to the latter part of 2023 becoming one of the deadliest periods of violence since the crisis began in 2012. Subsequently, the continued relative appeasement between the two groups may have further implications on the trajectory of violence in 2024.

The growing influence of the Wagner Group (now rebranded as ‘Africa Corps’), its relative success in Mali, and Russia’s growing involvement in the region suggest that the mercenary group may set to expand from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger.¹¹Frédéric Bobin and Morgane Le Cam, ‘Africa Corps, le nouveau label de la présence russe au Sahel,’ Le Monde, 15 December 2023 There are indications that a military base for Russian troops is being built in Burkina Faso,¹²Benjamin Roger, ‘[Enquête] Comment Poutine reprend en main Wagner en Afrique,’ Jeune Afrique, 21 December 2023 while the Nigerien junta appears to be divided on the issue.¹³Morgane Le Cam, ‘Le Niger renforce sa coopération avec la Russie et tourne le dos à l’Europe,’ Le Monde, 6 December 2023; Abdou Pagoui, Facebook, 2 January 2023; Abdou Pagoui, Facebook, 3 January 2023 In northern Mali, where the FAMa and Wagner forces are continuing their offensive, its involvement has directly contributed to the brutalization of the conflict due to the widespread atrocities committed by Russian mercenaries, often alongside Malian troops.

The Sahelian state military forces make frequent use of more recently obtained aircraft, including Turkish drones, which have become something of a game-changer for their advantage against jihadist militants and rebels. However, their extensive use has contributed to an ever-growing air war and a broader trend of indiscriminate violence. The widespread use of air and drone strikes has been accompanied by more aggressive tactics by militant groups and more frequent use of remote violence (e.g., improvised explosive devices, landmines, mortar, and rocket fire). JNIM, in particular, has resorted to suicide tactics in one-off attacks or as part of larger armed assaults against military positions, reaching the highest number of such attacks recorded in 2023. Thus, aerial assets have acquired a central role on the battlefield. However, alongside mass atrocities committed by state forces, militias, and militants alike, and the region’s escalating violence, new technology and tactics pose an ever-growing danger to the safety of civilian populations in the region.