Ukraine: A Deadly Stalemate with No End in Sight

After a turbulent first year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the frontlines of the conflict turned increasingly static in 2023.¹Josh Holder, ‘Who’s Gaining Ground in Ukraine? This Year, No One,’ New York Times, 28 September 2023 Russia’s winter-spring offensive was mostly unsuccessful, barring the capture of Bakhmut in May after a drawn-out battle.²Kateryna Stepanenko, ‘The Kremlin’s Pyrrhic Victory In Bakhmut: A Retrospective On The Battle For Bakhmut,’ Institute for the Study of War, 24 May 2023 Nonetheless, it bought Moscow enough time to fill trenches with newly mobilized personnel and build layers of fortifications in the south, allowing it to fend off Ukraine’s counter-offensive over the summer. Further west, the Russia-provoked³James Glanz et al, ‘Why the Evidence Suggests Russia Blew Up the Kakhovka Dam,’ New York Times, 16 June 2023 collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam across the Dnipro river in the Kherson region on 6 June flooded both Ukraine-held and Russia-occupied areas, precluding a cross-river attack by Ukraine and allowing Russia to redeploy troops.⁴X @DefenceHQ, 19 June 2023 In October, as Ukraine’s counter-offensive reached an impasse, Russia launched a new offensive aiming to ease out Ukrainian forces from the semi-encircled stronghold of Avdiivka north of Donetsk city.

With stalemate setting in on land, Ukraine has been chipping away at Russia’s dominance in and near the Crimean peninsula since mid-July, striking the Kerch bridge linking Crimea to mainland Russia as well as the Russian Black Sea Fleet and other military assets. Meanwhile, Russia walked out of the grain deal that allowed Ukrainian agricultural exports by sea and began systematically bombing Ukraine’s ports and warehouses. By September, Ukraine rerouted merchant vessels along its shore close to Romania to dissuade attacks, though grain trade revenues fell by half nonetheless.⁵Yurii Doshchatov, Kateryna Danishevska, ‘Russia attacks Ukrainian ports, EU blocks exports: How Ukraine seeks ways to export grain,’ RBC-Ukraine, 15 September 2023

The border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine, in effect, became a secondary line of contact in 2023. Despite being liberated between the spring and autumn of 2022, it continued to be subjected to routine shelling and air or drone strikes from across the border. Ukraine reciprocated with strikes on Russia’s border areas, as well as occasional armed incursions by formations composed of Russian nationals fighting on the Ukrainian side.⁶International Crisis Group, ‘The Russians Fighting for Ukraine,’ 12 October 2023 Since May, Ukraine has increasingly attempted to take the war back to Russia by directing attack drones to areas further away from the border, shifting from attacks on the Moscow city center to targeting military airfields, bases and production sites, and fuel infrastructure. Still, a mutiny staged by the Wagner Group as it returned from the battle of Bakhmut in late June proved a greater challenge for the Russian government. However, the rebellion was short-lived. Wagner formations were dismembered or brought under the Russian Ministry of Defence’s authority,⁷Ilya Barabanov and Anastasiya Lotareva, ‘The Bearded Circus Ongoing for a Year and a Half. Whereto are PMC Wagner fighters leaving,’ BBC, 2 November 2023 and its leadership killed when a plane carrying the founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and other key figures crashed northwest of Moscow.⁸Thomas Grove, Alan Cullison, and Bojan Pancevski, ‘How Putin’s Right-Hand Man Took Out Prigozhin,’ Wall Street Journal, 22 December 2023

Despite limited frontline shifts, the war in Ukraine remains one of the world’s deadliest conflicts according to the ACLED Conflict Index. The number of civilian fatalities due to war has declined as the frontlines in Ukraine became deadlocked — over 80% of reported deaths occurred in areas subjected to active hostilities, with nearly 90% caused by imprecise weapons. The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam led to a spike in the number of civilian fatalities, despite many victims likely still unaccounted for as Russia did not allow relief missions to access areas it occupies.⁹United Nations, ‘Statement by the Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine, Denise Brown, on humanitarian access to areas under Russian control,’ 18 June 2023 Russia’s blanket targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the cold season inflicted extreme hardship on civilians across the country but failed to disrupt utilities completely. The strikes escalated in May 2023 ahead of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, with Kyiv targeted almost daily. Although interception rates have improved, the debris from missiles and drones puts civilians at constant risk of death or injury regardless of the distance from the frontlines. The provision of cluster munitions to Ukraine amid a faltering counter-offensive did not bring about a decisive advantage, though it will likely contaminate Ukrainian lands with explosive devices.

What to watch for in 2024

Although embroiled in an attrition war, both sides are rapidly evolving their weapon use and tactics. Subsequently, the fog of war is thickening despite the battlefield being nearly transparent thanks to the omnipresence of reconnaissance drones.¹⁰The Economist, ‘Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia,’ 1 November 2023 Russia still boasts an edge in the air, albeit severely curtailed, due to equipping its hitherto unguided air bombs with glide kits. Both sides increasingly rely on strike drones acting as slow-motion cruise missiles that are difficult to intercept. Russia scaled up its use of Iranian-made Shahed-series drones for less-defended targets in Ukraine,¹¹Airwars, ‘Reported Shahed drone launches in Ukraine: August 2022-September 2023,’ 8 September 2023 domesticated their production,¹²David Albright, Sarah Brukhard, and the Good ISIS Team, ‘Visible Progress at Russia’s Shahed Drone Production Site Satellite Imagery Update and Call for Action,’ Institute for Science and International Security,’ 13 November 2023 and has caught up with Ukrainian pioneers flying fast-paced armed “first-person view” drones on the frontline.¹³Max Hunder, ‘Some Ukraine drone pilots fear early advantage over Russia now lost,’ Reuters, 9 November 2023 

An emboldened Russia is seemingly doubling down on its assault on Ukraine to force it to exchange land for a ceasefire. It is likely betting on sustaining the war for at least another year until the United States presidential election, when a possible Republican victory may upend the G7 consensus on continuing assistance to Ukraine.¹⁴G7, ‘Joint declaration of support for Ukraine,’ 12 July 2023 Russia also ramped up the production of weapons despite sanctions and secured the deliveries of North Korean artillery shells.¹⁵James Byrne, Joseph Byrne, and Gary Somerville, ‘The Orient Express: North Korea’s Clandestine Supply Route to Russia,’ Royal United Services Institute, 16 October 2023 Meanwhile, US military aid has been delayed due to Congressional gridlock, and less than half of one million artillery shells the European Union pledged to Ukraine by March 2024 have been delivered.¹⁶Andrew Gray, ‘EU countries order only 60,000 shells for Ukraine via new scheme – sources,’ Reuters, 6 December 2023 Short attention spans and return-on-investment mindset in the West in light of setbacks, the proliferation of crises increasing demand for already hard-to-get ammunition,¹⁷The Economist, ‘From Gaza to Ukraine, wars and crises are piling up,’ 13 November 2023 fraying unity in the EU,¹⁸Reuters, ‘New Slovak government rejects final military aid package for Ukraine,’ 8 November 2023; Nicholas Vinocur, ‘Hungary’s Viktor Orbán threatens to blow up EU’s Ukraine policy,’ Politico, 22 November 2023 and differences among leadership in Kyiv¹⁹Simon Shuster, ‘Nobody Believes in Our Victory Like I Do.’ Inside Volodymyr Zelensky’s Struggle to Keep Ukraine in the Fight,’ Time, 30 October 2023 could be contributing to Russian confidence. 

The presidential election scheduled for March 2024 will see Russia attempt to cement control over the occupied parts of the four Ukrainian regions it had annexed in September 2022 and where it already staged all-Russian local polls in September 2023.²⁰Leonid Martynyuk, ‘Russia Fakes Elections and Turnout Numbers in Ukrainian War Zones,’ Polygraph, 15 September 2023 Russia views parts of the four regions still under Ukraine’s control as in need of ‘liberation.’ This, coupled with a high tolerance for losses,²¹The Economist, ‘Putin seems to be winning the war in Ukraine—for now,’ 30 November 2023 may lead to further attacks. They may also escalate violence to dissuade counter-offensives, which Ukraine could undertake as it is seemingly going on the defensive along the frontline but not in the Zaporizhia region.²²President of Ukraine, ‘We discussed mobilizing resources for fortification works: the priority is clear – address by the President of Ukraine,’ 30 November 2023 Remaining Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories will face increased pressure to accept Russian passports or face denial of basic services and even expulsion.²³Yale School of Public Health, ‘Forced Passportization In Russia-Occupied Areas Of Ukraine,’ 2 August 2023; European Broadcasting Union, ‘Russification in Occupied Ukraine,’ 16 November 2023 New Russian citizens could be dragged into the Russian army, which remains hungry for recruits. Systematic Russian torture and ill-treatment of anyone suspected of involvement in partisan activity is likely to continue,²⁴UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine,’ 19 October 2023 as is the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and Belarus under the pretext of duty of care.²⁵Anthony Deutsch, ‘Thousands of Ukrainian children taken to Belarus – Yale research,’ Reuters, 17 November 2023

As both belligerents are incurring heavy military casualties, a missing variable is the availability of reserves.²⁶Helene Cooper et al, ‘Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say,’ New York Times, 18 August 2023 Russia’s claims of having recruited over 400,000 contract soldiers in 2023 are at odds with the denial of reprieve to those drafted during the ‘partial’ mobilization in September 2022.²⁷TASS, ‘Medvedev notes high contract soldier enlistment rates in Sevastopol, Moscow, Chechnya,’ 1 December 2023 Ukraine is also facing shortages of trained troops, with mandatory conscription riddled with corruption.²⁸Fredrick Kunkle and Serhii Korolchuk, ‘Ukraine cracks down on draft-dodging as it struggles to find troops,’ Washington Post, 8 December 2023 Should the looming winter turn less mild, an important factor could be the supply of gear to survive the cold in trenches.²⁹Paul Schwennesen, ‘Eyewitness to war: Assessing Ukraine’s counteroffensive,’ GIS, 25 October 2023 A cold winter would strain Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which may again become the preferred target for Russia seeking to lure air defense systems away from the frontline and provoke another civilian exodus. 

Worryingly, the continued bombing of Ukraine’s ports will keep the risk of accidental hits on NATO territory high. Yet perhaps one of the most dangerous places will remain the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Captured by Russia early on during its invasion, it has been operating in permanent crisis mode ever since Russian forces turned it into a military base, with frequent power cuts and limited international oversight.³⁰Darya Dolzikova​, ‘Degradation Everywhere: The Long-Term Risks at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Plant,’ Royal United Services Institute, 18 September 2023 The normalization of nuclear rhetoric in Russia – coupled with allegations by both sides of looming attacks on the ZNPP, as well as Russia’s own nuclear facilities – somewhat subsided once it became clear that Ukraine’s counter-offensive failed to dislodge dug-in Russian forces. This narrative could be resuscitated and become a self-fulfilling prophecy should Ukraine inflict severe material or symbolic losses to Russia.

For weekly updates on the security situation in Ukraine and its impact on civilians, see the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor.