Yemen and the Red Sea: Rising Tensions Threaten Peace Process and International Security

The Houthis’ attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea and the subsequent responses overshadow the progress made in 2023 for peace in Yemen. After months of bilateral talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia to end the conflict that started eight years ago, a peace agreement seemed to be within reach. On 23 December 2023, the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, announced that representatives of the Houthi movement and the internationally recognized government committed to “a set of measures to implement a nationwide ceasefire.”¹Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-general for Yemen, ‘Update on efforts to secure a UN roadmap to end the war in Yemen,’ 23 December 2023. A first draft of the peace roadmap had been circulated in April 2023, following negotiations between Houthi and Saudi delegates in the Yemeni capital Sanaa. See: Al Sharq Al Awsat, ‘A Yemeni transitional peace phase awaits the final touches,’ 6 April 2023 Among other provisions, the UN roadmap included the payment of public sector salaries, a resumption of oil exports, the opening of roads in Taizz and other provinces, and an end to restrictions on air and sea ports in Houthi-controlled areas.

The war in Yemen is estimated to have directly killed over 160,000 people since March 2015, when a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia intervened to restore the internationally recognized government ousted by the Houthis. A nationwide UN-mediated truce came into effect in April 2022 as a result of several compounding factors: an unprecedented military balance amid warring parties, a regional détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Riyadh’s desire to exit the war.²Peter Salisbury, ‘Behind the Yemen Truce and Presidential Council Announcements,’ International Crisis Group, 8 April 2022; David Hearst, ‘Saudi-Hezbollah meeting secured Yemen ceasefire and Hadi resignation,’ Middle East Eye, 27 June 2022 Meanwhile, Houthi and Saudi representatives started engaging in direct talks to build mutual trust, sidelining the fragmented anti-Houthi camp re-organized under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).

Overall, the truce has contributed to a significant de-escalation, with the activity of the warring parties decreasing by 70% in 2023 compared to the year prior. However, a low-intensity conflict has since surfaced, continuing to threaten civilian lives and uphold consistently severe violence. For instance, the share of violent events that targeted civilians more than doubled in 2023, with over 1,120 events recorded by ACLED last year alone. Behind these patterns are several factors, including the increasing repression of the Houthi-led Sanaa-based government against the last shreds of local opposition; the increased mobility spurred by the truce, which led to frequent landmine and explosive remnants of war incidents; and an over 55% increase in the violence against migrants attempting to cross the Yemen-Saudi border.

Alongside these domestic developments, the Houthis have increasingly shifted their strategic focus toward the Red Sea. Since at least September 2022, Houthi leaders have made explicit threats to international sea routes, amid reports of a renewed militarization on Yemen’s western coast.³Sheba intelligence, ‘Houthis Establish Military Bases on Islands Near International Waters,’ 2 December 2023 Yet, the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza, on 7 October 2023, offered the group an opportunity to demonstrate its stated support for Palestine, which resulted in a sequence of attacks against Israeli targets. Since 19 October 2023, the Houthis launched 14 drone and missile attacks toward Israel’s southern port of Eilat, mostly intercepted by Israel and the United States. In a further escalation, they declared Israeli-linked vessels⁴X @army21ye, 19 November 2023 and ships heading to Israeli ports⁵X @army21ye, 9 December 2023 as military targets on the ‘Gaza front,’ leading to one successful hijacking and 19 drone and missile attacks on commercial vessels in November and December, 2023.

Historically, the Red Sea maritime axis — stretching from the Bab al-Mandab strait to the Channel of Suez, two strategic chokepoints for global trade — has been characterized by maritime safety, despite occasional piracy incidents originating from the Horn of Africa.⁶Alex de Waal, ‘Pax Africana or Middle East Security Alliance in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea?,’ World Peace Foundation, January 2019 The war in Yemen turned this region into an active conflict area. ACLED records over 250 political violence and interception events affecting the Red Sea and its ports since 2015. However, major disruptions to shipping lanes occurred only as a result of the recent Houthi escalation.

Approximately 30% of container trade⁷Financial Times, ‘Container ships abandon Red Sea as allies scramble to fend off attacks,’ 19 December 2023 and 12% of global oil⁸U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘Red Sea chokepoints are critical for international oil and natural gas flows,’ 4 December 2023 transit through the Red Sea. The risk of Houthi attacks prompted companies to redirect half of the vessels that regularly navigate this route through Southern Africa.⁹GCaptain, ‘299 Containerships Reroute to Avoid the Red Sea, Doubling in Number from Last Week,’ 28 December 2023 Longer journeys boosted freight rates and reduced global shipping capacity, also causing a severe impact on Israel’s economy.¹⁰Ari Rabinovitch, ‘Israel’s Eilat Port sees 85% drop in activity amid Red Sea Houthi attacks,’ Reuters, 21 December 2023 But they also affected Yemen, drastically reducing maritime traffic through the port of Aden and driving an increase in insurance war premiums.¹¹Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Houthi Red Sea Attacks Increase Shipping Costs,’ 27 December 2023

What to watch for in 2024

The domestic situation in Yemen remains tense despite the recent announcement of an imminent roadmap under UN auspices. A regional escalation in the Red Sea could nevertheless derail ongoing peace efforts and lead to a resurgence of the conflict. This intricate situation results in domestic, regional, and international actors finding themselves in diverse predicaments.

The Houthis are likely to capitalize on attacks in the Red Sea. As of September 2023, they faced unrest and protests by public-sector employees demanding salary disbursement. The Israel-Gaza conflict conveniently redirected popular sentiments, boosting the group’s regional and domestic standing. Additionally, it provided leverage against Riyadh. Arguably, the Houthis may persist with attacks in the Red Sea until a ceasefire allows humanitarian aid in Palestine,¹²The Business Standard, ‘Yemen’s Houthis in Oman-mediated talks over Red Sea “operations,’’’ 3 January 2024 all the while seeking to secure a peace deal with Saudi Arabia. Overall, they might try to establish a balance of ‘controlled deterrence’ to avoid further international retaliation, while responding to direct US attacks with targeted operations. 

Further, the Houthis can leverage their dominant position in domestic military affairs as an additional card at the negotiating table. Conflict escalation in Yemen is unlikely amid ongoing negotiations,¹³Since April 2022 ACLED recorded occasional flare-ups between the warring parties associated with spoiler activity and attempts at leveraging the negotiations. The most sensitive areas are currently Marib, Shabwa, and Taizz. See: Arab News, ‘Yemen’s government warns of massive Houthi strikes in Shabwa, Marib,’ 4 December 2023 but frontline activity may swiftly resume if talks collapse. In such a scenario, the Houthis could gain the upper hand in the oil-rich Marib governorate or in Shabwa.

Tensions in the PLC between government loyalists and supporters of the secessionist  Southern Transitional Council mirror a regional divide between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are both vying for influence in the Red Sea. Riyadh’s Vision 2030 roadmap plans tourism projects on the Red Sea coast and an expansion of exports through the Jeddah port, while the traditional oil-driven economy is increasingly reliant on exports from the western Yanbu facility.¹⁴Azure, ‘UAE and KSA: Growth and influence along Red Sea,’ 2 November 2022; Melissa Hancock, ‘Saudi giga-projects: “enough work for every sector of the industry,”‘ Arabian Gulf Business Insight, 6 December 2022 Abu Dhabi envisions a ‘string of ports’ strategy which entails the indirect control of the maritime infrastructure in southwestern Yemen through local proxies,¹⁵Abdullah Baabood, ‘Seas, Checks, and Guns: Emirati and Saudi Maritime Interests in the Yemen Conflict,’ 16 March 2023, Carnegie Middle East Center combined with direct military control of select islands of strategic importance — such as Perim¹⁶Associated Press, ‘UAE-backed Yemen leader says his troops at island air base,’ 15 June 2021 and Socotra. Two United Arab Emirates-based companies, DP World and AD Ports, are spearheading the establishment of port infrastructures in Africa and along the Red Sea coast.¹⁷Eleonora Ardemagni, ‘One Port, One Node: The Emirati Geostrategic Road to Africa,’ 13 June 2023

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi hold diverging visions on Red Sea security. In the recent past, Saudi Arabia embraced a multilateral approach through the creation of an alliance of eight Red Sea littoral states.¹⁸RFI, ‘New Red Sea alliance launched by Saudi Arabia, but excludes key players,’ 10 January 2020 To this end, Saudi officials reportedly oppose US military strikes against the Houthis, expressing concerns about potential retaliation on Saudi oil infrastructure and prioritizing the pursuit of a peace deal in Yemen. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi invested in bilateral agreements,¹⁹Mustafa Naji, ‘Countering Terrorism in Yemen: Perceptions of Regional Powers,’ Carnegie, 7 February 2023 and it advocates for a designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), while fostering US military intervention to solve the Red Sea crisis.²⁰Aden Time, ‘The American envoy emphasizes coordination with the Transitional Council to enhance maritime security and the international shipping line,’ 7 December 2023; Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Red Sea Attacks Provoke International Response,’ 27 December 2023 Saudi Arabia and the UAE also hold different strategies in Sudan, where Emirati support to the Rapid Support Forces has derailed Saudi-hosted peace talks.

Yet, Gulf countries share a common goal of countering Iranian influence in the Red Sea with Israel and the US. Until now, Tehran’s involvement in the Red Sea has been mostly indirect, providing political and material support to the Houthis.²¹Jay Bahadur, ‘Snapping back against Iran: The case of the Al Bari 2 and the UN arms embargo,’ Global Initiative, 30 November 2020 Nonetheless, the Biden Administration and Tel Aviv see Iran as being “deeply involved” in planning and enabling attacks on commercial shipping.²²Times of Israel, ‘Iran ‘deeply involved’ in planning Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping — White House,’ 23 December 2023 Already in 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned of military intervention if Iran blocked Bab al-Mandab strait.²³Reuters, ‘Israel warns Iran of military response if it closed key Red Sea strait,’ 2 August 2018 Israeli efforts intensified after the Abraham Accords in 2020, leading to the alleged attack of the Iranian military ship Saviz with limpet mines and increased cooperation with the US to patrol the region.²⁴Ahmed El-Deeb, ‘Israel’s Maritime Security in the Red Sea: Historical Competition and the New Houthi Challenge,’ Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, 10 March 2023

For its part, Washington presents itself as a guarantor of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.²⁵This role is contested by Houthi officials arguing that international navigation in the Red Sea is safe, except for Israeli-linked vessels, and that the US are militarizing the region to protect Israel. See: Saba, ‘Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi holds America responsible for the attack on international navigation in the Red Sea,’ 20 December 2023 The Biden administration faces the predicament of containing Houthi threats while safeguarding the peace deal in Yemen and avoiding a regional escalation. To maintain this precarious balance, it launched Operation Prosperity Guardian,²⁶US Department of Defense, ‘Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea,’ 18 December 2023 a multinational naval partnership consisting of over 50 warships deployed in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, while issuing targeted designations to counter Iranian financial assistance to Houthi forces. In a further escalatory step, Washington and allied countries launched direct strikes on Houthi strategic assets in Yemen on 12 January 2024, retaliating for the group’s previous attack on US warships.

In the short term, following the 17 January US re-designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, effective from 16 February, few options remain on the table.²⁷US Department of State, ‘Terrorist Designation of the Houthis,’ 17 January 2024Al Jazeera, ‘US considers redesignating Houthis as ‘terror’ group after ship seizure,’ 21 November 2023 Further steps might include direct strikes or listing the group as fully-fledged FTO. However, considering that international support for Operation Prosperity Guardian has not gained traction among allies — with concerns from European and Arab countries about their domestic and regional pro-Palestine constituencies — the US might opt for indirect measures to curb future Houthi escalation. For instance, covert operations calibrated on strategic Houthi assets²⁸MichaelKnights, ‘Containing the Houthis in Yemen: Issues and Options for the Policy Review,’ The Washington Institute, 5 December 2023 or retaliatory strikes targeting other members of the ‘axis of resistance’ outside of Yemen. If, in the short term, the US aims to avoid escalation, the Red Sea crisis exposes long-term issues: the radicalization of Houthi leadership, the effectiveness of their deterrence strategies, and the lack of US leverage. All these factors cast a shadow on future peace efforts.