Aden

Conflict background

The conflict quickly reached Aden in March 2015 when the Houthis, together with forces loyal to the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, pushed south in pursuit of then-President Hadi, sweeping across Taizz and Lahij, reaching the city on 25 March. Instrumental to the Houthi advance into Aden was the breakdown of military and security structures, especially after President Hadi fled the city for Riyadh, leaving its defense to a patchwork of local resistance groups.⁴Michael Knights and Alex Almeida, ‘The Saudi-UAE War Effort in Yemen (Part 1): Operation Golden Arrow in Aden,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10 August 2015

Fierce fighting continued in the city throughout May and June, with Houthi forces taking control of key infrastructure, including the airport, the oil refinery in al-Burayqa, and the Presidential Palace. Although they captured much of the city, the Houthis were unable to gain a decisive advantage as they fought street-to-street with the Southern Resistance groups and carried out heavy shelling in some of the worst fighting in the entire war.⁵Human Rights Watch, ‘Houthi Artillery Kills Dozens in Aden,’ 29 July 2015 

The local resistance relied on Coalition bombing and limited weapons supplies arriving by sea to hold onto parts of the city. The situation, however, changed in mid-July with the launch of UAE-led Operation Golden Arrow, a major counter-offensive to retake Aden that managed to push the Houthis forces out of the city. The operation progressed all the way into northern Lahij by early August, where the current frontlines in al-Qabbayta district are still situated.⁶Khabar News, ‘In response to Houthi bombing… Houthi dead and wounded in intense bombing of the 5th Brigade on the Karsh-Balhaj front,’ 16 August 2023

With the retreat of the Houthis, an uneasy peace held in Aden, although the city still experienced widespread insecurity driven by the myriad militias and military units that controlled its districts, as well as the active local al-Qaeda franchise, resulting in frequent assassinations, bombings, and armed clashes. As the institutions of the city were rebuilt with UAE support, members of the secessionist Southern Movement began to dominate the newly established security structures, later known as the Security Belt Forces, in parallel to units loyal to President Hadi. 

The simmering tensions briefly erupted in January 2018 as fighting broke out between the STC-affiliated forces and Presidential Protection Forces as the pro-STC forces seized government positions, but Saudi mediation ended the several days of clashes before they reached the symbolic Presidential Palace.⁷Saeed Kamali Dehghan, ‘Aden crisis: alliances of convenience unravel across Yemen,’ The Guardian, 30 January 2018 However, the underlying issues remained, reaching a boiling point in August 2019 as the STC and IRG returned to open conflict following the death of popular Security Belt Force commander Abu al-Yamama in a Houthi missile attack⁸Al-Wadhah News, ‘The death of “Abu Al-Yamamah,” commander of the mercenary support brigades in Aden,’ 1 August 2019 and an alleged Islamic State suicide attack on a police station⁹Al Jazeera, ‘Dozens killed in Houthi attack on Aden military parade,’ 1 August 2019 that brought STC supporters to the streets to demand action.¹⁰Al-Mandeb News, ‘10 martyrs and 20 wounded in an attack by the Brotherhood militia on mourners in Crater,’ 1 August 2019

In less than 48 hours, STC forces took over the city, securing government buildings, ministries, and military camps. The take-over was confirmed when UAE airstrikes hit IRG forces outside the city to halt their attempt to return to Aden, eventually being formalized with the signing of the Riyadh Agreement in November that officially ended the fighting between the sides in Aden. However, insecurity has remained, including targeted attacks on political and security figures, most notably Houthi missile strikes on Aden airport moments after the arrival of the newly formed power-sharing cabinet in December 2020.¹¹United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, ‘Final Annual Report 2022,’ 26 January 2022, pp. 85-116 

The STC has continued to consolidate its authority within the city and surrounding districts in Lahij – which, unlike Aden governorate, were not as affected by the infighting between the IRG and STC – and largely remained under the remit of STC-affiliated forces.¹²Peter Salisbury, ‘Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council: A Delicate Balancing Act,’ International Crisis Group, 30 March 2021 However, the Riyadh Agreement was never fully implemented and the underlying divisions continued to erupt into internecine clashes in other southern governorates.¹³Elana DeLozier, ‘Saudi Leverage Not Enough to Achieve Peace in Yemen,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 April 2020 Although Aden was spared the fighting, members of the government avoided the interim capital due to internal tensions.¹⁴South24, ‘The Prime Minister Returns to Aden After an Official Visit to Egypt,’ 13 October 2021 Even after Saudi Arabia intervened once again to resolve the differences between the parties replacing Hadi with the power-sharing PLC, the changes did not result in any meaningful unity or reforms to reverse the economic decline.¹⁵Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, ‘The Presidential Council’s Year of Failure,’ Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, 11 July 2023

Assassination attempts, clashes between armed groups, kidnappings, and bombings are still reported on an intermittent basis in Aden city and its environs. Protests and civil unrest have also been a common occurrence in the southern city since it has become the seat of power for the IRG. Outside of the politically organized demonstrations arranged by the rival parties in the city, economic issues have been the primary cause of unrest in Aden. The failure of basic services, in particular, has been one of the main sources of frustration for residents. Electricity blackouts have routinely reached more than 12 hours per day, especially in the summer months when there is a surge in demand to cope with the sweltering seasonal temperatures.¹⁶Saeed Al-Batati, ‘Aden’s power outages worsen as private generators cut supplies,’ Arab News, 22 May 2023 The authorities have been increasingly unable to address the issue as a shortfall in revenues has left them short of funds to pay for fuel for power stations and fund the repairs and maintenance to maintain production on the Adeni grid.¹⁷Aden Hura, ‘The Governor of the Yemeni Central Bank Reveals Disastrous Secrets About the Yemeni Economy,’ 26 February 2023 For the most part, these protests have been peaceful, but the greater the anger and disruption caused, the harsher the response from the security forces.¹⁸Mansour Al-Maswari, ‘Yemen Security Forces Open Fire on Protesters in Aden,’ Al-Bawaba, 23 August 2023