Yemen Conflict Observatory
Regional Profile

Western Yemen-Saudi Border

Updated: 31 January 2024

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  • Methodology
Territorial Control Maps

Territorial control maps are generated through the expert assessment of the Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO) team and they are updated on a quarterly basis. ‘Contested areas’ are defined on the district level (Admin2) and encompass active frontlines and territories disputed by the warring parties. Each map corresponds to a 'region' as defined by the YCO, potentially crossing governorate (Admin1) boundaries.

Links

Find links to relevant methodology docs below:

Coding decisions around the Yemen war

  • A brief overview of ACLED’s coding and sourcing methodology for Yemen

Quick Guide to ACLED Data

  • A brief overview of the most frequently asked questions by users of ACLED data

Knowledge Base

  • Guides for using and accessing ACLED data and documentation for ACLED’s core methodology
Map of territorial control in Western Yemen's Saudi Border Region as of January 2024

This regional profile provides information about the Western Yemen – Saudi Border region, as classified by the YCO, which includes Hajja, Saada, and northern al-Jawf governorate. For more on the YCO and the ACLED methodology on Yemen, see the ‘More information’ tab to the right.

Overview

From west to east, four Yemeni governorates share a border with Saudi Arabia: Hajja, Saada, and northern al-Jawf. The relatively flat western Tihama plains along the Red Sea coastline characterize the terrain in western and central Hajja. These then rise up into the steep mountains of the northwestern highlands, which span eastern Hajja and western Saada, marked by narrow roads and steep inclines, where most of the Saada population resides. Moving east, Saada flattens out into the more arid eastern district of Kitaf that borders northern al-Jawf. A spine of mountains runs from the north-western corner of al-Jawf in a south-easterly direction, separating the governorate’s more populated western districts and the desert in the east. 

The Houthis maintain control of the majority of the western end of the Yemen-Saudi border from central Hajja to western al-Jawf. However, pockets around the port town of Midi on the Red Sea and at the al-Buqi crossing are still held by Saudi-backed Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) forces. To the east, the border is controlled by IRG and Saudi troops on their respective sides of the boundaries and have not been involved in the conflict. The western border areas, though, are contested, seeing regular bouts of violence, primarily in the form of artillery and machine gun fire in western Saada. There is a high level of militarisation along the border, particularly in the mountainous west, where the landscape on both sides is interspersed with conflict-related infrastructure, including checkpoints, outposts, and other fortified positions. A network of patrol routes traverses the Saudi side of the border.

Four major land ports link Yemen with Saudi Arabia, only one of which remains open. In Hajja, al-Tuwal border crossing between Harad district and Jizan in southwestern Saudi Arabia is currently closed. Saada has two crossings – al-Alb in Baqim district and al-Buqi in Kitaf – both of which are closed, but are used intermittently by the armed forces. The fourth border crossing is at al-Wadia, in Hadramawt, which has been kept open for most of the conflict and serves as a vital gateway for the movement of goods and people between the two countries.

Interactive Map

This dashboard includes political violence events recorded within this YCO-defined region since the start of the regional conflict on 26 March 2015. By default, the map displays data for the period beginning with the UN-mediated truce, on 2 April 2022, up to the most recent week.

Filters on the left allow users to define a time range and analyze trends in more detail. The toggle at the bottom of the dashboard activates markers indicating relevant infrastructure such as oil fields, airports, and military camps.

Conflict background

Six rounds of armed conflict took place in Saada between 2004 and 2010, widely referred to as the Saada wars, driven by hostilities between the IRG and local insurgents linked with the Houthis, a Zaydi politico-religious movement.1Chrisopher Boucek, ‘War in Saada; From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,’ Middle East Program, Carnegie Papers, April 2010 After six years of fighting, a ceasefire was agreed in 2010, but grievances and sporadic hostilities persisted, forming the backdrop to the broader conflict landscape across Yemen since 2014.2Kali Robinson, ‘Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering,’ Council on Foreign Relations, 1 May 2023 Ongoing fighting in Saada has resulted in widespread civilian casualties and displacement, damage to civilian infrastructure, and exacerbated the growing economic crisis.3Ribale Sleiman-Haidar, ‘Saada: Ground Zero,’ London School of Economics, 19 June 2017 

During the initial years of the current conflict from the start of the Saudi-led Coalition’s intervention in 2015, daily airstrikes and shelling were reported in areas along both sides of the border region, particularly in the west, resulting in a heavy civilian impact. These grew increasingly sporadic from late 2019 in Saada after the opening of back-channel talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, and airstrikes and cross-border Houthi attacks eventually ceased when the countrywide United Nations-mediated truce entered into force in April 2022. Since then, no airstrikes by the Coalition or long-range cross-border attacks involving missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles from the Houthis have been reported. Nonetheless, border violence persists in western Saada, which sees weekly reports of artillery fire and border outpost shootings, most notably in Shada and Munabbih districts.

Even before the UN truce, frontlines in the north of the country had been largely static, although a failed IRG offensive in 2020 enabled the Houthis to push back with counter-offensives that saw the group make swift advances through al-Jawf, reportedly facilitated by a series of agreements with local tribes.4Fatima Abo Alasrar, ‘Internal Divisions in Yemen Pave the Way for Houthis’ Advance’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 6 March 2020 Houthi forces captured the governorate capital, al-Hazm, in March 2020, shifting the lines of control to either side of the main northern road leading to the Saudi border, with the Houthis controlling the western mountainous spine running from al-Hazm through al-Yatma to al-Buqi junction in Saada and the IRG in the more open, desert plains to the east. The frontlines have been largely quiet since 2021, although intermittent skirmishes are occasionally seen, and explosive remnants of warfare remain a challenge for civilians, particularly on the unpaved desert routes linking former frontline areas. 

In Hajja, meanwhile, until the countrywide truce entered into force, hostilities between Houthi and IRG forces reverberated around a fixed set of flashpoints in the north of the governorate for several years, gradually diminishing from October 2019 onwards. There was a brief surge in fighting in early 2022 when the IRG mounted a surprise offensive towards the governorate capital.5Yemen Press Agency, ‘Developments in the Battles in the Border Areas of Hajjah governorate,’ 12 March 2021 The main frontlines were centered around Harad, Abs, and Midi in the northwest of the governorate, concentrating on the primary roads running from the IRG-held port town of Midi to the Saada border parallel to the border and the intersecting inland road from al-Hudayda to the Saudi border.

Efforts by IRG forces to push out from the border and secure critical crossroads at Harad and Abs were thwarted, and the lines of control have since hardened, with the IRG controlling an enclave around Midi and the Houthis the rest of the governorate. The Houthis’ grip, though, has not been entirely stable, experiencing uprisings from local tribal groups that have chafed at the group’s violations of tribal customs and attempts to seize tribal territory,6Hilal Al-Qaedi, ‘Peace, Tribal Customs, and War… Hajour and the Houhits, Who Will Defeat Whom,’ Al-Ayyam, 19 February 2019 In the most intensive bout of tribal disorder in the governorate, the Hujur tribes, who had reluctantly sided with the Houthis in 2015,7Andrea Carboni, “The Myth of Stability: Infighting and Repression in Houthi-Controlled Territories”, ACLED, 9 February 2021 rebelled against the local authorities. The Houthis accused the tribal leaders of siding with the GPC and colluding with foreign forces,8Gibran Suhail, “Hajour and Image Inversion”, Ansarollah, 1 December 2019 besieging and violently crushing the uprising, looting, and shelling villages in the process.9Rights Radar, “Hajour, Brutality of Abuses”, June 2019 In retaliation, the group destroyed the homes of the remaining tribal leaders as a warning sign against any other unrest.10Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Tribal Sheikhs and the War in Yemen”, Al-Masdar, 17 February 2020

Saada is a Houthi stronghold used by the group as a defensive bastion from which to launch attacks along the border with Saudi Arabia, and as a launch site for drone and missile attacks into Saudi territory. A spate of cross-border attacks was reported in 2019 before a partial ceasefire brought the situation back into check. For their part, Saudi forces aim to maintain and bolster a buffer zone along the border, and until the country-wide ceasefire commenced in April 2022, would launch occasional offensives to push Houthi forces out of firing range of critical Saudi infrastructure. 

The main flashpoints in northern Saada were around al-Buqi junction in the east of the governorate. Al-Buqi junction sits at the intersection of the road to the al-Wadia border crossing and the main Houthi supply route through al-Jawf to al-Hazm. This junction is lined with border outposts and saw its fiercest fighting in 2019. To the west, the most active fronts include the vicinity of al-Alb border crossing and the western border districts. The al-Alb border crossing saw frequent reports of territory passing back and forth between the sides amid repeated clashes in 2019 while the rugged mountains in the western border districts were a particular focal point for shelling. All of these have slowed with the onset of the UN truce and the subsequent unofficial ceasefire, experiencing only occasional direct confrontations.

Away from the frontlines, the situation is generally calm. However, occasional bouts of violence still erupt, usually over tribal disagreements, such as land disputes, and checkpoint violence. This is especially true in southern al-Jawf, where incidents at both official and unofficial checkpoints have been on the rise over the past year, linked to issues around the passage of domestic fuel trucks and revenues from these posts. In early 2024, both Hajja and Saada were hit by US-led coalition strikes launched in response to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Abs airport and the Kahlan Military Camp were targeted, while several Houthi missile launchers were hit in Saada.

Timeline

  • 2004
    • Jun. | IRG forces clash with Houthi fighters in Saada, sparking the first of the Saada wars
    • Sep. | Houthi leader Husayn al-Houthi killed in an ambush by IRG forces
  • 2010
    • Feb. | Ceasefire reached between the IRG and Houthis
  • 2018
    • Aug. | A Saudi-led Coalition airstrike hits a school bus in Dahyan market, killing at least 40 children and injuring many more, drawing widespread international condemnation
  • 2022
    • Jan. | Coalition airstrikes hit a migrant detention centre in Sahar, killing at least 90 people and injuring many more
    • Apr. | Houthi forces intensify fighting in Saada, launching offensives across the border into Saudi Arabia
  • 2024
    • Jan. | US-UK joint strikes in response to attacks in the Red Sea target Houthi military sites and missile launchers in Hajja and Saada

Regional Context

Saada is the birthplace of the Houthi movement. Specifically, Marran in western Saada is the home of the Al-Houthi family.11Michael Knights, ‘The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,’ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 2018, p.15 The tomb of Sayyid Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the founder of the Houthi movement, is located in Jabal Marran. Coalition airstrikes destroyed the shrine in May 2015. Tribes in the area remain loyal to the Houthis.

Roughly 240 kilometers north of Sanaa city, Saada is isolated geographically, socio-economically, and politically and is one of Yemen’s poorest and least developed governorates, with little in the way of critical national infrastructure. On the Saudi side, the border forces have gradually expanded their presence throughout the conflict, building a network of military outposts and connecting roads. These form a defensive line stretching along the contested areas of the border, mainly clustered in the west, where cross-border incidents remain a regular occurrence.

The mountainous western border with Saudi Arabia is porous, and Munabbih and Shadaa districts both host several unofficial border crossing points into the country These are frequently used for informal trade but also by traveling groups of migrants, predominantly from East Africa. Saudi shelling and border outpost shootings in the area result in weekly reports of civilian casualties, among whom a high proportion are migrants predominantly from Somalia and Ethiopia. In August 2023, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing alleged abuses against Ethiopian migrants attempting to cross this border into Saudi Arabia. The report accuses Saudi border guards of using explosive weaponry in the border region, killing hundreds of migrants and asylum seekers between March 2022 and June 2023.12Nadia Hardman, ‘“They Fired on Us Like Rain”: Saudi Arabian Mass Killings of Ethiopian Migrants at the Yemen-Saudi Border’, Human Rights Watch, 21 August 2023