Western Yemen-Saudi Border

Conflict background

Six rounds of armed conflict took place in Saada between 2004 and 2010, widely referred to as the Saada wars, driven by hostilities between the IRG and local insurgents linked with the Houthis, a Zaydi politico-religious movement.¹Chrisopher Boucek, ‘War in Saada; From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,’ Middle East Program, Carnegie Papers, April 2010 After six years of fighting, a ceasefire was agreed in 2010, but grievances and sporadic hostilities persisted, forming the backdrop to the broader conflict landscape across Yemen since 2014.²Kali Robinson, ‘Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering,’ Council on Foreign Relations, 1 May 2023 Ongoing fighting in Saada has resulted in widespread civilian casualties and displacement, damage to civilian infrastructure, and exacerbated the growing economic crisis.³Ribale Sleiman-Haidar, ‘Saada: Ground Zero,’ London School of Economics, 19 June 2017 

During the initial years of the current conflict from the start of the Saudi-led Coalition’s intervention in 2015, daily airstrikes and shelling were reported in areas along both sides of the border region, particularly in the west, resulting in a heavy civilian impact. These grew increasingly sporadic from late 2019 in Saada after the opening of back-channel talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, and airstrikes and cross-border Houthi attacks eventually ceased when the countrywide United Nations-mediated truce entered into force in April 2022. Since then, no airstrikes by the Coalition or long-range cross-border attacks involving missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles from the Houthis have been reported. Nonetheless, border violence persists in western Saada, which sees weekly reports of artillery fire and border outpost shootings, most notably in Shada and Munabbih districts.

Even before the UN truce, frontlines in the north of the country had been largely static, although a failed IRG offensive in 2020 enabled the Houthis to push back with counter-offensives that saw the group make swift advances through al-Jawf, reportedly facilitated by a series of agreements with local tribes.⁴Fatima Abo Alasrar, ‘Internal Divisions in Yemen Pave the Way for Houthis’ Advance’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 6 March 2020 Houthi forces captured the governorate capital, al-Hazm, in March 2020, shifting the lines of control to either side of the main northern road leading to the Saudi border, with the Houthis controlling the western mountainous spine running from al-Hazm through al-Yatma to al-Buqi junction in Saada and the IRG in the more open, desert plains to the east. The frontlines have been largely quiet since 2021, although intermittent skirmishes are occasionally seen, and explosive remnants of warfare remain a challenge for civilians, particularly on the unpaved desert routes linking former frontline areas. 

In Hajja, meanwhile, until the countrywide truce entered into force, hostilities between Houthi and IRG forces reverberated around a fixed set of flashpoints in the north of the governorate for several years, gradually diminishing from October 2019 onwards. There was a brief surge in fighting in early 2022 when the IRG mounted a surprise offensive towards the governorate capital.⁵Yemen Press Agency, ‘Developments in the Battles in the Border Areas of Hajjah governorate,’ 12 March 2021 The main frontlines were centered around Harad, Abs, and Midi in the northwest of the governorate, concentrating on the primary roads running from the IRG-held port town of Midi to the Saada border parallel to the border and the intersecting inland road from al-Hudayda to the Saudi border.

Efforts by IRG forces to push out from the border and secure critical crossroads at Harad and Abs were thwarted, and the lines of control have since hardened, with the IRG controlling an enclave around Midi and the Houthis the rest of the governorate. The Houthis’ grip, though, has not been entirely stable, experiencing uprisings from local tribal groups that have chafed at the group’s violations of tribal customs and attempts to seize tribal territory,⁶Hilal Al-Qaedi, ‘Peace, Tribal Customs, and War… Hajour and the Houhits, Who Will Defeat Whom,’ Al-Ayyam, 19 February 2019 In the most intensive bout of tribal disorder in the governorate, the Hujur tribes, who had reluctantly sided with the Houthis in 2015,⁷Andrea Carboni, “The Myth of Stability: Infighting and Repression in Houthi-Controlled Territories”, ACLED, 9 February 2021 rebelled against the local authorities. The Houthis accused the tribal leaders of siding with the GPC and colluding with foreign forces,⁸Gibran Suhail, “Hajour and Image Inversion”, Ansarollah, 1 December 2019 besieging and violently crushing the uprising, looting, and shelling villages in the process.⁹Rights Radar, “Hajour, Brutality of Abuses”, June 2019 In retaliation, the group destroyed the homes of the remaining tribal leaders as a warning sign against any other unrest.¹⁰Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Tribal Sheikhs and the War in Yemen”, Al-Masdar, 17 February 2020

Saada is a Houthi stronghold used by the group as a defensive bastion from which to launch attacks along the border with Saudi Arabia, and as a launch site for drone and missile attacks into Saudi territory. A spate of cross-border attacks was reported in 2019 before a partial ceasefire brought the situation back into check. For their part, Saudi forces aim to maintain and bolster a buffer zone along the border, and until the country-wide ceasefire commenced in April 2022, would launch occasional offensives to push Houthi forces out of firing range of critical Saudi infrastructure. 

The main flashpoints in northern Saada were around al-Buqi junction in the east of the governorate. Al-Buqi junction sits at the intersection of the road to the al-Wadia border crossing and the main Houthi supply route through al-Jawf to al-Hazm. This junction is lined with border outposts and saw its fiercest fighting in 2019. To the west, the most active fronts include the vicinity of al-Alb border crossing and the western border districts. The al-Alb border crossing saw frequent reports of territory passing back and forth between the sides amid repeated clashes in 2019 while the rugged mountains in the western border districts were a particular focal point for shelling. All of these have slowed with the onset of the UN truce and the subsequent unofficial ceasefire, experiencing only occasional direct confrontations.

Away from the frontlines, the situation is generally calm. However, occasional bouts of violence still erupt, usually over tribal disagreements, such as land disputes, and checkpoint violence. This is especially true in southern al-Jawf, where incidents at both official and unofficial checkpoints have been on the rise over the past year, linked to issues around the passage of domestic fuel trucks and revenues from these posts. In early 2024, both Hajja and Saada were hit by US-led coalition strikes launched in response to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Abs airport and the Kahlan Military Camp were targeted, while several Houthi missile launchers were hit in Saada.