Hadramawt

Conflict background

Unlike much of the rest of the country, Hadramawt has been spared from Houthi incursions. However, although it has been one of the most stable governorates, it has still experienced elevated insecurity as the conflict has resulted in a decline in the central government’s authority, and internal tensions have risen as competing political factions have sought to fill the vacuum. 

Exploiting the security breakdown at the start of the war, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took over the governorate capital of al-Mukalla in April 2015, holding the city for a year before being ousted by an Emirati-backed offensive. Taking advantage of the IRG and Saudi-led Coalition pre-occupation with Houthi advances in the center and west of the country, AQAP captured al-Mukalla without a fight. It released 150 fighters from the central prison, including current AQAP Emir Khalid Batarfi, and looted millions from the Central Bank branch. AQAP managed to run the city as a quasi-state for an entire year, delivering basic services and infrastructure projects while collecting customs fees.³Elizabeth Kendall, ‘Contemporary Jihadi Militancy In Yemen How Is The Threat Evolving?,’ Middle East Institute, July 2018, p.8 After reversing the Houthis’ gains in Aden, the United Arab Emirates turned its attention to al-Mukalla, building an alliance of tribal fighters and local troops under Faraj al-Bahsani, a long-exiled military leader convinced by the UAE to return after 20 years, to retake the city.⁴Adam Baron, ‘The Gulf Country That Will Shape the Future of Yemen,’ The Atlantic, 22 September 2018 Supported by Emirati ground and air forces, it swiftly removed AQAP in just a few days in April 2016. The minimal fighting and lack of casualties, though, sparked rumors of an arrangement between the UAE and militants for their withdrawal and relocation to other parts of the country,⁵Michael Horton, ‘AQAP in Southern Yemen: Learning, Adapting and Growing,’ The Jamestown Foundation, 14 October 2016 which Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied.⁶Maggie Michael, Trish Wilson, and Lee Keath, ‘US allies, al-Qaida battle rebels in Yemen,’ Associated Press, 7 August 2018 

The Hadrami Elite Forces, trained and equipped by the UAE, have since largely replaced regular forces in the coastal areas of Hadramawt. They have also gradually extended their areas of operation to the inner regions of Hadramawt, fueling tensions within the governorate. Initially, they clashed with AQAP militants in the districts surrounding al-Mukalla, mounting a series of campaigns to clear the south of the governorate, ending when they reached the borders of Wadi Hadramawt in May 2018.

Since then, targeted attacks and assassinations have been the primary types of security incidents, mainly in central Wadi Hadramawt in Sayun and Shibam districts. STC-affiliated figures and groups have blamed these on the failures of the Islah-leaning First Military Region, calling for their replacement with locally recruited units along the lines of the Hadrami Elite.⁷Ali Mahmood, ‘Yemenis in Hadramawt demand UAE-backed forces take over security,’ The National, 26 July 2018 This refrain has been a consistent demand for local groups; most prominently, the Hadramawt Tribal Confederation – the largest tribal grouping in the governorate who have held frequent protests calling for greater autonomy and control over resources. 

The protests have grown in size and frequency, driven not only by the political tensions, but also the worsening economic conditions as public services have broken down. The local authorities deflected blame onto the IRG for failing to deliver revenues, though the protests expanded into organized unrest targeting the governorate’s economic infrastructure through strike actions, roadblocks, and sit-ins disrupting oil production and commercial activity. Although mainly peaceful, the increasingly politicized nature of the demonstrations, which gained backing from the STC and former Governor Bahsani, often resulted in a hard-handed response from the First Military Region.

The economic pressures increased in late 2022 when the Houthis forced the shutdown of oil production in the country, cutting off the governorates and IRG’s main source of revenue. Houthi drones struck the al-Dahbba oil terminal on 21 October and 21 November as oil tankers were preparing to load crude oil, damaging the facility, but not any of the docked vessels. The group has threatened more attacks if oil exports resume, demanding a share of hydrocarbon revenues to pay for public-sector salaries. The shortfall in government income has exacerbated the political divisions and civil unrest.

The political tensions continue to mount in 2023 between the IRG and STC in Hadramawt. As the STC continues to try to expand its influence in the governorate as part of its aim to control the territory of the former South Yemen, Saudi Arabia – which has its strategic interests in the governorate⁸Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, ‘Saudi-UAE Spat Comes to a Head in Hadramawt,’ 15 August 2023 – invited influential Hadrami political and tribal figures to Riyadh for consultations with Hadramawt Governor bin Mabkhut bin Madhi. The meetings resulted in the formation of a new, Saudi-backed Hadramawt National Council with a platform of greater autonomy for the governorate, but in a national framework as opposed to the STC’s goal of southern secession.⁹Mansour Al-Maswari, ‘New Yemeni entity established in Saudi Arabia’, Al-Bawaba, 21 June 2023 

The establishment of the new party was followed by the announcement of a host of Saudi-funded development projects in Hadramawt and the first visit by Saudi-aligned Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi, who also pledged greater decentralization as part of a federal approach.¹⁰Middle East Monitor, ‘Saudi launches $320m developmental projects in Yemen’s Hadramout,’ 26 June 2023 The moves drew strong criticism from the STC, and the governorate remains a point of political contestation between national and regional rivals.¹¹Yasser Ezzi, ‘Hadramawt National Council: A new player in Yemen’s political landscape,’ The New Arab, 26 June 2023 The newly formed, Saudi-backed Nation’s Shield Forces (NSF) were subsequently deployed to Wadi Hadramawt in October 2023 to serve as a buffer between the First Military Region, which is aligned with Islah, and Second Military Region, which is aligned with the STC. The NSF are under the direct command of PLC chairman Rashad al-Alimi.