Shabwa

Conflict background

Early in the conflict, Shabwa was on the frontlines of the conflict between Houthi-Saleh forces and the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). The governorate had been a stronghold for then-president Tariq Saleh’s party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and the support from co-opted local tribes and elites facilitated their rapid advance from the north of the governorate to the capital of Ataq by April 2015. However, their gains were short-lived, and pro-IRG troops retook Ataq just four months later, pushing the Houthi-Saleh forces back to the northern border with Marib. They managed to hold onto the Wadi Bayhan area, consisting of Bayhan, Usaylan, and al-Ain districts, for over two years, in part due to its strategic importance as a gateway to surrounding governorates, the proximity of the Balhaf pipeline, and lucrative smuggling routes.⁴Peter Salisbury, ‘National Chaos, Local Order,’ Chatham House, December 2017 Their resistance, though, crumbled shortly after the breakdown in the alliance, and the killing of Tariq Saleh in December 2017 led to local tribes ending their support.

In addition to the civil war, Shabwa has also been the site of long-running al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) activity. Exploiting the conflict, AQAP militants captured the southern towns of Habban and Azzan in February 2016. However, starting in late 2016, the UAE’s recruitment and training of the Shabwa Elite Forces (SEF) from local tribes in areas where AQAP was operating began to prove effective in weakening the militant group.⁵Hussam Radman, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Strategic Retreat in Yemen,’ Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, 17 April 2019, p. 11 Working in coordination with Emirati and United States counter-terrorism forces, including drone and airstrikes, the SEF advanced through the center of the governorate, eventually chasing AQAP into neighboring al-Bayda by mid-2018.

The SEF’s expansion from the south into the center of the governorate created friction with IRG-aligned forces and the Islamist Islah party-affiliated Governor, Muhammad bin Adyu, not only due to their perceived territorial overreach but also due to their increasingly evident support for the secessionist STC. The antagonism between the sides reached a tipping point in the summer of 2019. A dispute between the SEF and IRG troops in Ataq city escalated into a pitched battle, which the IRG won as reinforcements from Marib overwhelmed the SEF troops. They were relocated to Aden and gradually disbanded over the next few years.

However, in September 2021, Houthi forces re-entered the north of the governorate for the first time since 2017, retaking Bayhan, Usaylan, and al-Ain as part of a sustained offensive in southern Marib and eastern al-Bayda. The sudden Houthi advances and the heightening infighting within the IRG exacerbated local division in Shabwa, where worsening local conditions sparked tribal protests that led to the dismissal of Governor bin Adyu and his replacement by the UAE-backed tribal leader Awad al-Awlaki.

This helped facilitate the redeployment of the Giants Brigades from the West Coast to Shabwa. In January 2022, they launched Operation Southern Cyclone, swiftly retaking the northern districts in the span of 10 days and advancing into Marib, where they established new units to maintain a defensive line to avert any future Houthi attacks. Tensions, though, remained in Shabwa, and despite the formation of the power-sharing Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in April, the infighting continued, peaking in August after al-Awlaqi sacked senior Islah-affiliated commanders.⁶Al-Ayyam, ‘The Governor of Shabwa dismisses ‘Lakkab’ and his office manager, Baoum continues to be detained,’ 7 August 2022 This time, the STC forces were victorious in the second battle of Ataq, ousting their rivals from the north and center of the governorate.

Since the STC-backed forces regained control of the governorate, infighting between the parties has declined. But, this coincided with an uptick in AQAP attacks in southern Shabwa and the bordering areas in Abyan. In response, the Shabwa Defense Forces (SDF), which had replaced the now-disbanded SEF, launched a new counter-terrorism operation, Southern Arrow, in September 2022 to clear the militants from the southeastern district of al-Musaynia. AQAP activity subsequently declined throughout the year before increasing again in mid-2023 as the group carried out drone, mortar, and IED attacks on the SDF. A steady stream of incidents continued into 2024, but hostilities also began to pick up on the governorate’s northern borders with Marib and al-Baydha, where a buildup of Houthi forces has led to an increase in confrontations between the group and pro-STC forces.