Yemen Conflict Observatory
// Regional Profile
Taizz Frontlines
Updated: 31 January 2024
More information
- Methodology
Territorial Control Maps
Territorial control maps are generated through the expert assessment of the Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO) team and they are updated on a quarterly basis. ‘Contested areas’ are defined on the district level (Admin2) and encompass active frontlines and territories disputed by the warring parties. Each map corresponds to a 'region' as defined by the YCO, potentially crossing governorate (Admin1) boundaries.
Links
Find links to relevant methodology docs below:
Coding decisions around the Yemen war
- A brief overview of ACLED’s coding and sourcing methodology for Yemen
- A brief overview of the most frequently asked questions by users of ACLED data
- Guides for using and accessing ACLED data and documentation for ACLED’s core methodology
This regional profile provides information about the Taizz Frontlines region, as classified by the YCO, which includes Taizz city, Maqbanah, and southern Taizz (al-Shamayatayn, Hayfan, al-Silw, Dimnat Khadir, and Mawiya districts). For more on the YCO and the ACLED methodology on Yemen, see the ‘More information’ tab to the right.
Overview
Taizz city is the third largest city in the country, estimated at some 600,000 people before the war, that has now declined to 200,000 due to displacement caused by years of fighting. As with other governorates along the western coast, the terrain in Taizz goes from flat coastal plains in western Dhubab and Mukha to more mountainous terrain in central, southern, and eastern parts of the governorate. Although located geographically in the southwest of the country, Taizz was part of the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) before Yemen’s unity. However, it has historically strong links to southern governorates given the strategic north-south route that runs to Aden.
Prior to the current conflict, Taizz was considered the economic hub of Yemen, home to many of the country’s most influential companies and business families. The governorate’s majority Sunni Shafii population was generally politically and economically marginalized under the presidencies of Ali Abdullah Saleh when northern tribes dominated the regime. As a result, Taizz was the center of some of the first large-scale protests of the 2011 youth uprising against Saleh, after which various armed groups that had risen to prominence competed for influence, presaging the divergent set of rival parties that controlled the governorate.1Adam Baron and Raiman Al-Hamdani, ‘The “Proxy War” Prism on Yemen: View from the city of Taizz,’ New America, 9 December 2019, pp. 20-25
The current military situation in Taizz is a stalemate between the Houthis and a diverse, tenuously aligned, though increasingly divided, Coalition of groups affiliated with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). Western and central areas leading to Taizz city are mainly under the control of IRG forces, as is most of the governorate capital. However, recent years have seen fluctuating tensions between pro-Islah factions and forces affiliated with Tariq Saleh, particularly to the south of the city. Houthi forces, meanwhile, are still positioned in the city’s western, northern, and eastern outskirts, leaving it in a state of semi-besiegement as the main access roads remain sites of frequent skirmishes and exchanges of shelling.2Fatima Abo Alasrar, ‘Yemen’s Truce Has Failed in Taizz,’ Middle East Institute, 16 August 2022 Houthi forces also maintain control of the north and east of the governorate.
Interactive Map
This dashboard includes political violence events recorded within this YCO-defined region since the start of the regional conflict on 26 March 2015. By default, the map displays data for the period beginning with the UN-mediated truce, on 2 April 2022, up to the most recent week.
Filters on the left allow users to define a time range and analyze trends in more detail. The toggle at the bottom of the dashboard activates markers indicating relevant infrastructure such as oil fields, airports, and military camps.
Conflict background
Houthi forces were repelled from a complete take-over of Taizz city in 2015 by a range of armed groups that mobilized alongside troops affiliated with the IRG. This created a semi-besieged enclave,3Worldview for Stratfor, ‘Yemen: Government Forces Break Stalemate In Taizz,’ Stratfor, 30 May 2017 with Houthi forces controlling the city’s eastern and western entrances. IRG forces then pushed out from Aden and the south, steadily retaking control in southern and central districts of Taizz, and in 2017, forces backed by the Saudi-led Coalition launched Operation Golden Spear to retake al-Hudayda city, advancing up the western coast, capturing al-Mukha port and pushing the frontlines away from the coastline and towards Taizz city.
The Taizz frontlines are among the most active in the country. The governorate’s multiple frontlines have since been largely static but interspersed with periodic outbursts of intensive clashes as one or another of the sides tries to make gains on a specific front. This has remained the case despite various high-level negotiations and the 2022 truce period. Hostilities are primarily centered in the city and along the primary routes from the governorate capital running to the west, south, and east – inflicting a heavy toll on the civilian population. Over the past three years, Taizz has seen among the highest civilian fatalities in the country.
Taizz city has been divided since the start of the current conflict, with Houthi forces controlling the three main arterial roads leading to the city. The frontlines run through the city’s outskirts from the western entrance near the Air Defense camp to Wadi Sala in the southeast, where there are intermittent outbreaks of hostilities, though mainly in the form of sniper and shelling. Flashpoints include the Bir Basha area in the west, Jabal Hadhran in the north, the Usayfira area in the northeast, and Wadi Salh to the east.
In the west of the governorate, Maqbanah sees weekly reports of incidents, typically in the form of stand-off shelling and drone activity, including around the district capital of al-Barh and on the Kadaha frontline. The epicenter of the front has been the drive to control the western Hudayda-Taizz route, which has been held for the most part by Houthi forces. Hostilities occasionally spill across into neighboring al-Maafir and Jabal Habashy districts, but there have been no recent significant changes in territorial control. To the east, Mawiya district, through which the main road to al-Dali runs, also sees occasional clashes between the two sides, while to the south, the border area between southern Taizz and northern Lahij retains active frontlines, primarily between Silw and Hayfan districts on the Taizz side and in al-Qabbayta in Lahij, with Kirsh the main flashpoint.
Away from the frontlines, the most significant flare-ups in recent years have been between armed actors affiliated with the Islamist Islah party.4Maged Al-Madhaji, ‘Taizz at the Intersection of the Yemen War,’ Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 26 March 2020 Islah has become the predominant faction in Taizz through the overarching Taizz Military Axis, and those opposing its increasing influence in the governorate. This opposition was particularly marked by Emirati-backed Salafi groups, with whom tensions peaked in the summer of 2019.5Middle East Eye Sana’a Correspondent, ‘Yemen’s southern tensions crack open deadly faultlines in Taizz,’ Middle East Eye, 24 August 2019 More recently, Islahi dominance has been weakened in the governorate’s periphery by Tariq Salih and his Guardians of the Republic (GoR) forces, undermining Islah’s influence in Taizz’s only port in al-Mukha and along the southern border with Lahij, which has shifted toward southern forces and the ascendant Southern Transitional Council (STC).
In early January 2024, the governorate was also hit by the joint US-UK retaliatory strikes launched in response to the Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Houthi-held sites on the outskirts of Taizz city were targeted, while several Houthi anti-ship missiles prepared to launch into the Red Sea were also struck by US-led airstrikes, the first on Taizz since 28 March 2022.
Timeline
- 2015
- Mar. | Houthi forces seize control of Taizz city
- May | IRG forces launch offensive, backed by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes to retake control of Taizz city, prompting fierce clashes on frontlines in the vicinity of the city
- 2016
- Nov. | After months of intense hostilities, IRG forces regain control of parts of Taizz city
- 2018
- Apr.-May | Operation Golden Spear and Red Thunder advance up the West Coast
- 2021
- Mar. | Joint Forces and Taizz Axis Forces mount a joint offensive in western Taizz, opening new routes
- 2024
- Jan. | US-led strikes and anti-ship missiles target Houthi military sites in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea
Regional Context
While the north and east of the governorate are under Houthi authority, the rest is broadly under IRG control. However, the different actors on the anti-Houthi side are supported by a range of internal and external patrons and largely exist as part of a decentralized system of governance and security. This creates an environment ripe for violence, driven by rivalries and competition for economic gain, along with ideological and political differences. These groups have also sought to gain control over state institutions, further undermining state power. Many of these actors are also part of formal IRG military forces fighting in Taizz, but as a result of the rivalries, infighting, and assassination attempts are not uncommon, particularly in the south and west of the governorate, where areas of operation overlap. Tariq Salih, who is closely aligned with regional UAE interests, has carved out the governorate’s west as his area of influence, with al-Mukha as the base of his political party, the Political Bureau of the National Resistance (PBNR).6Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, ‘‘The Battle of All Yemenis Against the Houthi Coup’ – A Q&A with Tareq Saleh’, 19 May 2021
As a result of the lines of control that divide the governorate, the humanitarian situation has been dire.7Mohammed, Abdulwasea, ‘A Crisis With No End in Sight: How the ongoing crisis in Taizz Governorate continues to put civilians at risk’, Oxfam Policy and Practice, 21 December 2020, pp. 6-7 This is especially true in the governorate capital, where access to basic supplies has been hindered, making the response of civil society and aid organizations challenging. Access into Taizz city is heavily restricted, including along the western road connecting to Hudayda and the eastern road running to Lahij and then Aden. The only accessible route into the city from Aden at the moment is a minor, poorly maintained road that runs through mountainous terrain to the south of the city.
The road is only a single lane at points and has previously been blocked during tribal disputes, internal divisions between IRG groups, and periods of heavy rainfall. Road openings around Taizz city are one of the main blockers to high-level negotiations between the parties. Each side recurrently blames the other for failures to reach an agreement on which roads to open and the mechanisms by which to do so. Roads are also, therefore, often the center of gravity of hostilities.